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ABSTR&CT 
Some possible conceptualizations of divine action within the world are 
considered in the light of modern scientific insights. A selection of 
types of approach is investigated, including: (i) that which makes use 
of a strong theological determinism; (ii) that which formulates non-
deterministic models of God's action to be in principle careless of the 
particular findings of modern science; (iii) that which sees science 
itself as the key to understanding how God might act; (iv) that of 
process theology which views God as immanently present within the 
physical processes themselves. In the evaluation of these models, a 
critical realism is adopted with regard to scientific findings. 
It is concluded that the type of approach (ii) independent of science 
is not likely to succeed. Also, models of type (iii) are unsatisfactory. 
Types (i) and (iv), theological determinism and process theology, in 
their different ways offer more promise, although each has its own 
characteristic problems and limitations. However, it is admitted that 
any finite theological system is likely to encounter problematic areas; 
it therefore remains possible that the most adequate such system ove-
rall might choose its difficulties to be in relation to science. 
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Chapter Is XmtTOdkagfciaa 
Christianity proclaims a God who has acted and continues to 
act in the world. In the biblical story of the Israelites, through 
Exodus and Exile, God's word is shown to be powerful and effective in 
shaping human history; and at the climax of that history the Word 
becomes incarnate, enacting God's redemption through crucifixion and 
resurrection. That God can act is thus never seriously queried by 
the biblical witnesses; for them, the only question is the correct 
interpretation of his action. Even in that most tortured of the books 
of the Bible, Job does not question that it is God who has brought 
misfortune upon him. Rather, his complaint is against God's justice, 
which yet finds its answer in terms of God's mighty creative activity. 
It is God's action which evokes our religious response. 
Equally in the centuries after Christ was no particular con-
cern shown about questions of God's ability to act in creation. 
Augustine did propose an account of the relationship between divine 
and creaturely causation, which Aquinas was later to develop more 
fully into the classical concept of secondary causation1. But the 
underlying issues here originated in the doctrine of God, rather than 
of creation. If God's transcendence should be understood in Platonic 
terms of eternal changelessness, how could he then be involved in the 
particularities of human history? How exactly God could bring about 
change in the world was not the point at issue; indeed, to the extent 
that it is a question understood against the background of modern 
scientific; empiricism, it was hardly a point at all. 
In the modern age, questions about God's action in the world 
have been transformed. That is not to say that those questions of 
God's agency asked by the theologians of medieval and earlier times 
have lost their relevance. They still raise profound issues of impor-
tance. But, with the rise of modern science and its increasing suc-
cess in explaining previously mysterious phenomena, the emphasis of 
such questions has now changed. Maurice Wiles makes the point suc-
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cinctly: 
"The various forms of scientific study which dominate our 
culture have done much to disclose patterns of regularity 
in the way the world functions. The world as we experi-
ence it appears to us a much more regularly ordered 
world than it did to our predecessors in the faith. Our 
difficulty in conceiving of God's action is more likely to 
be focussed on how and where that action is to be located 
or identified within the world of human experience."2 
Such a difficulty has had a great effect on the history of theology 
from the eighteenth century onwards3. The world-view which has 
been ascribed to Newton (although incorrectly4) conceived creation as 
a deterministic mechanism such as a clock. Here there was no role for 
God except to create the universe and to set it spinning upon its way. 
Thus did the deists expunge divine activity altogether from the world; 
only the wonder of creation could lead the creature to the worship of 
its author. 
In reaction to the austere religion of deism, liberalism in the 
nineteenth century tried to reclaim God's immanent activity in the 
world. But it did so by identifying God's activity more or less com-
pletely with the causal laws which science revealed. Notions of evolu-
tionary progress would enable God's will to be understood in terms of 
the advance of society. Human freedom was affirmed, whilst miracle 
disappeared. Friedrich Schleiermacher, for instance, allowed that 
causal law and divine providence were the same. Yet how God could 
act through causal law, without theism slipping into pantheism, was 
never made clear. 
In the twentieth century, Karl Barth in turn led a reaction 
against liberal theology. Insofar as God's action is concerned, neo-
orthodoxy represented a restatement of the classical Protestant affir-
mation of God's supreme sovereignty and freedom in creation. In the 
1940's, this led to the emergence of the biblical theology movement, 
which stressed the pivotal importance of God's mighty acts as 
described in the Bible, against the downgrading effected by liberal 
theology. Ernest Wright was a leading exponent of biblical theology 
and wrote of it: 
"There is, first, the peculiar attention [of the Bible] to 
history and to historical traditions as the primary sphere 
in which God reveals himself... Inner revelation is thus 
concrete and definite, since it is always correlated with a 
historical act of God which is the primary locus of con-
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centration..." 
"In dealing with biblical theology, therefore> primary atten-
tion must be given, not to abstractions concerning the 
nature of God, but to history. This involves the use of 
all our tools for historical criticism, for i f we fai l to take 
history every bit as seriously as the biblical writers, we 
shall not be expositors of biblical fai th." 5 
Biblical theology attempted to balance an understanding of the world 
as causally ordered with an acceptance of the witness of faith 
recorded in the Bible. But it came under criticism for failing to make 
clear what God was actually understood to do in these mighty acts. 
Frank Dilley, for instance, attacked the whole programme of biblical 
theology: 
"[The Biblical theologian's] plight is not a happy one. If 
he says that God does interfere in the workings of nature 
and history, then he violates his understanding of modern 
science and the validity of scientific explanation. He does 
not believe that people walk on water or that corpses rise 
into the air. If, on the other hand, he maintains that God 
does not interfere, then he has to give up the biblical 
notion of a God who acts specially in history. He speaks 
then of "acts of God" in terms of east winds and visions, 
using biblical language to assert liberal content. He 
refuses, to be explicit as to what he means, perhaps 
because any explication would make clear that there is no 
alternative to conservatism and liberalism except a merely 
verbal one. In short, unless he equivocates he is lost."6 
Langdon Gilkey had made a similar critique of biblical theology, argu-
ing that its attempt to repudiate liberalism fails: 
"The causal nexus in space and time which Enlightenment 
science and philosophy introduced into the Western mind 
and which was assumed by liberalism. is also assumed by 
modern theologians and scholars; since they participate in 
the modern world of science both intellectually and 
existentially, they can scarcely do anything else."7 
This statement is probably too sweeping to be accepted tout court. In 
particular, as a matter of fact some theologians do feel themselves free 
to assert God's miraculous or direct activity in the world. Neverthe-
less, the point which Gilkey makes needs to be taken seriously. In 
the modern age we assess claims for divine action in a different light 
to our forebears and that assessment includes an expectation that 
events will usually conform to scientific cause and effect. As Rudolf 
Bultmann wrote: 
"We cannot use electric lights and radios and, in the event 
of illness, avail ourselves of modern medical and clinical 
means and at the same time believe in the spirit and won-
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der world of the Mew Testament. And if we suppose that 
we can do so ourselves, we must be clear that we can 
represent this as the attitude of Christian faith only by 
making the Christian proclamation unintelligible and impos-
sible for our contemporaries."8 
His problem was how to take seriously the message of the New Testa-
ment writers whilst at the same time acknowledging that their world-
view is virtually incredible to us in the contemporary world. Disease, 
for instance, is no longer deemed to be the manifestation of demon 
possession. The problem has arisen for us to whom the forces of 
nature present themselves as regimented. Me have difficulties con-
ceiving how God can be active except through those same powers of 
nature; spirits and other supernatural agents have largely disap-
peared from our everyday framework of beliefs. It is perhaps not too 
much of an exaggeration to say that, in our culture, we have assimi-
lated the outlook that the forces of nature are supreme and bow to no 
one. The world is truly autonomous, we often assume, and the laws of 
nature have supreme jurisdiction. 
It therefore becomes problematical, if not merely eccentric, 
for us to deny the validity of much scientific insight. But how should 
divine action in our world then be conceived? That is the question 
with which this thesis is concerned. We wish to investigate the mod-
els of divine action presented by a range of writers and to assess 
their coherence or otherwise with the claims of modern science. 
Thereby we hope to delineate those approaches to theology which 
might create the fewest difficulties in the light of science's discover-
ies. Now it may be acknowledged that any theological system will 
have its weak points where tensions exist either within the system 
itself or between the system and aspects of our experience. We are 
subject to a creaturely limitation in attempts to comprehend God and 
his ways. It follows that the problems which inevitably arise with any 
theological account may in fact best be placed in the area of its coh-
erence with science. Nevertheless, our aim is to make clearer which 
types of account are likely to encounter such difficulties. 
Before we proceed to sketch the course of the thesis, how-
ever, it will be of help in maintaining clarity to mention three areas 
related to our theme which, although of great importance, are not 
themselves the focus of our interest. 
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First, we will not be concerned to produce an exhaustive 
account of God's action in the world. Such a brief would be too 
broad for us to cover adequately, being capable of incorporating 
almost every aspect of theology. Many wider concerns will be touched 
upon in the course of our investigation, but no direct consideration 
will be given to issues such as the problem of evil. It is admitted 
that much of the greatest importance will thereby be neglected. 
Secondly, the question of miracles will not be of particular 
concern to us. This is not because the occurrence of the miraculous 
is not a topic of importance, nor is it simply because there may well 
be good theological grounds, beyond those of a particular scientific 
outlook, for asserting that God does not countenance miracles9. 
Rather, considerations about miracles appear to be subsidiary to wider 
questions of divine action and science. Without entering a full dis-
cussion, it seems unlikely that we should posit miracles to be the 
foundational means of God's interaction with the world. Thus, for 
instance, the Bible itself most often takes miracles to be a sign and 
confirmation of God's power, authority and purposes, but not a pri-
mary means of self-communication. The sign is frequently subsequent 
to the prophetic word and we may question how that prophetic word 
itself has been communicated. Furthermore, many Christians who are 
convinced of their full relationship with God do not claim to have any 
direct experience of the miraculous. If this is so, then the focus of 
God's interaction with his creation must be broader than on miracles 
alone. 
To my mind, if one wishes to take a strong view about the 
regularity of nature and thus to deny the miraculous, then in fact 
any form of divine interaction, including what may be termed revela-
tion, would be difficult to conceive, as will be discussed later. 
Indeed, this is one of the considerations that has led the self-styled 
Christian Humanists to deny any objective existence to God at all 1 0. 
If we ]ive within a world of effects each of which, in principle, can 
only have as its cause the action of another entity itself within the 
ambit of physical law, then it seems we have no room left for action 
from a God who is presumably without the web of those laws. Such a 
conclusion would be of far more significance for theology than the 
mere absence of miracle. 
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The third area with which this thesis will not be especially 
concerned is natural theology. That is, there will be no attempt to 
discern what may be known of God merely by the use of human rea-
son and the data presented by the natural world around us. Once 
more, this is not to deny that such a study would be of importance. 
Many scholars who straddle the border between the disciplines of 
science and theology have in recent years attempted to raise the pro-
file of natural theology, convinced that it is a vital area of thought in 
the modern age. One of these writers, John Polkinghorne, has written 
with evident frustration: 
"Theology cannot just be left to the theologians, as is made 
clear by the recent spectacle of a distinguished theologian 
writing over three hundred pages on God in creation with 
only an occasional and cursory reference to scientific 
insight."" 
That may or may not be so, but it is not our concern. We wish to 
discover some of the implications for the whole of theology, including 
revealed religion, of the modern scientific world-view. Whether or 
how Christianity is dependent upon any particular form of natural 
theology is a subsidiary point. 
An exhaustive discussion of God's action, miracles and natural 
theology are thus not at the centre of our interest. Rather, we want 
to probe the question of what constraints are placed upon models of 
divine action in the world if one is inclined to accept the veracity of 
science. Would the universal functioning of physical law render 
divine interaction impossible? Does modern science place limits on 
where God may act? Would divine interaction be detectable in prin-
ciple by scientific methods? 
The outline of the thesis is as follows. In chapter two we 
first study some approaches to God's action which apparently by-pass 
problems of the regularity of nature by finding God's activity in a 
description of reality independent of science's claims. These attempts 
are found to be unsatisfactory, however, and so chapter three pro-
ceeds to explore the view of the world to which modern science may 
commit us. This chapter endorses a scientific critical realism. Chap-
ter four explores various issues which arise from theological determin-
ism, should such determinism be linked in some manner to the measure 
of mechanical determinism revealed by science in the universe. Ques-
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tions are raised about the possibility of revelation in such circum-
stances, and chapters five and sis go on to explore two possible solu-
tions: an anti-reductionist view whereby God may engage with the 
higher levels of reality which emerge from a simpler physical sub-
stratum; and a view which sees an opportunity for God's interaction 
with his creation in the openness of physical processes hinted at by 
the quantum and chaos theories. It .is argued that neither of these 
approaches overcome an inherent contradiction found between allowing 
science's description of the world to be complete and God's interaction 
which is by definition non-physical. Chapter seven explores the dif-
ferent ideas of process theology. Although questioning such 
theology's adequacy, merit is found in its approach of modifying the 
underlying metaphysics both of science and theology. Finally, chapter 
eight draws together our conclusions. 
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Chapter 2i Modern Scfenc® and Diuime bottom as iBdoTaeadeBt Realities 
It may be claimed that theology should take account of the 
whole range of human knowledge and experience if it is to reach 
towards a God who transcends every aspect of creation. Historically, 
this proposition certainly has some force, especially in the medieval 
tradition for which theology is the Queen of the Sciences. Thus, it 
can be argued, St Thomas Aquinas adopted an Aristotelian view of the 
world because it seemed to him to constitute the best science (in the 
modern sense)1. Later and for rather different purposes, apologists 
have gladly used science to bolster the argument from design for the 
existence of God, although with varying fortunes. Yet in none of 
these cases does one gain the impression that it is the reflection upon 
science which is critical in the formulation of theology. Aquinas, for 
instance, rejoices each time he succeeds in demonstrating that reason 
is consonant with prior revelation, but strictly maintains that order; it 
is revelation which is definitive. Wot only is science not necessarily 
uppermost in these traditions, but there are other traditions which 
view science as being more or less irrelevant to the religious endeav-
our. Many of the Christian mystics, such as St John of the Cross, 
stressed the life of faith as something to be held onto even in the 
face of a complete lack of understanding. 
There has therefore always been a tension in the relationship 
between revealed religion and natural theology. However, it is in 
later centuries that theologians have found themselves responding 
more directly to the tension arising from our scientific perception of 
the universe, as we have seen in the previous chapter. One response 
has been to insist that theology is concerned with an entirely inde-
pendent area of enquiry from science, so that science should not have 
any direct bearing upon theology. Thus one hears it said that 
science is concerned with questions of "how", whilst theology 
addresses questions of "why". If it is possible to maintain such a 
clear division, then indeed a theologian need have no great concern 
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about questions of science. 
In this chapter we shall investigate some understandings of 
divine activity which appear to be immune in principle from any 
scientific findings. If these theories are indeed found adequate, then 
modern science or its methodological justification will again hold little 
direct interest for the theologian. If not, we shall have to pay atten-
tion to science itself to conceive how God may interact with creation. 
We begin this survey of some such theories by considering the classi-
cal theory of secondary causation as propounded by Aquinas 
(although, of course, anachronistic ally so far as our interest in mod-
ern science is concerned) and its more recent development by Austin 
Farrer and others, before turning to the existentialist theology of 
Rudolf Bultmann and, finally, to the distinctive approach of Maurice 
Wiles. 
(a) Secondary causation 
At the heart of Christian theology there is an unresolved, 
although arguably creative, tension between God understood as both 
transcendent and also immanent in his creation. This tension makes 
itself felt in various ways. One of them is in the contrast between a 
remote God who allows his creation full autonomy, seen in human 
responsibility, and a God more immediately involved in our existence 
whose intimate presence may lead to a perceived loss of our own inde-
pendent freedom. In his treatment of causation, Aquinas is careful to 
keep such a tension in balance. He wishes to preserve both God's 
providence and also sufficient dignity for his creatures to retain 
moral creditworthiness or blame. This he does by distinguishing first 
and secondary causes, the former belonging entirely to God and the 
latter exercised by his creatures. 
If the notion of secondary causes is able to elucidate how 
God can maintain his providence in our world whilst at the same time 
allowing natural processes to operate unhindered, this might then pro-
vide a model of God's activity which would not conflict with modern 
science, whatever its findings. 
Let us first consider what Aquinas understood by the notion 
of an efficient cause, the cornerstone of modern science, by turning 
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initially to the second of his Five Ways for proving God's existence. 
In it, Aquinas points to the fact that, 
"in the observable world we discover an order of efficient 
causes, but no cause is found, or ever could be found, of 
something efficiently causing itself."2 
Excluding the possibility of an infinite series of efficient causes, there 
must be a first, uncaused cause, which is named "God". As Anthony 
Kenny emphasises3, care should be taken not to interpret such a 
series of causes as being temporal. Aquinas was happy that infinite, 
temporal series of causes might exist: for instance, 
"it is not impossible to go on for ever in the series of men 
begetting men; but such a thing would be impossible if 
the generation of one man depended on another and on an 
element, and on the sun, and so on to infinity."'4 
What Aquinas refers to by his "order of causes" is the Aristotelian 
view that the active qualities of the elements of which creation is 
composed, such as heat and cold, are not sufficient to explain the rise 
of substantial forms, such as a newly-begotten human being. Rather, 
some further active principle is required, which Aquinas identifies 
with the heavenly bodies5. Whilst today we find such medieval 
astronomy implausible, we recall that Aquinas was writing centuries 
before Hume suggested that causal power is an unwarranted fiction. 
To the medieval mind, causation involved some form of power in its 
operation. Thus, we may understand the First Cause to be the end 
point of the series which explains how anything comes to have causal 
power at all: for instance, a stone falls because its nature is itself 
granted by the First Cause. The First Cause, we might paraphrase in 
anachronistic terms, is that which energises the universe. 
With this understanding, God's creatures are able to act as 
secondary causes by channeling the powers granted to them. To illu-
minate the doctrine of secondary causation, the example may be used 
of an artisan wielding an axe in order to cut wood. Here, the cause 
of the wood's splitting is the blow by the axe. Equally, however, we 
are justified in claiming that it is the artisan who causes the effect 
by his own action. Thus the outcome is caused simultaneously by the 
axe (the secondary cause) and the artisan (the first cause). 
This example is, of course, no more than analogous to the 
actual situation envisaged by Aquinas: God's influence penetrates far 
more deeply into any secondary cause than does the influence of the 
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workman into the axe. Yet the example nicely illustrates the problem 
of reconciling secondary causation with any true independence from 
God. For it seems that, even though the axe may be the immediate 
cause of the log's splitting, it is acting only within the tight con-
straints imposed by the agent who is in actuality controlling the 
event. It would be stretching our language beyond credibility to 
claim that the axe itself acted, and even more that it acted freely. 
The first and second causes do not act independently, but in consort 
with the first apparently controlling the second. Thus one is led to 
question whether secondary causation actually allows any measure of 
real freedom to creation, and so to explore a little further Aquinas' 
motivation in his description of secondary causes. 
We first note that, unsurprisingly, Aquinas does not wish to 
divorce creation from God's oversight in any way: 
"We are bound to profess that divine Providence rules all 
things, not only in their general natures, but also as 
individuals.'116 
Rather, Aquinas emphasises secondary causation as a sign of God's 
goodness in allowing creatures a share in God's providential activity: 
"... divine Providence works through intermediaries. For 
God governs the lower through the higher, not from any 
impotence on his part, but from the abundance of his 
goodness imparting to creatures also the dignity of caus-
ing. "7 
Secondary causation is therefore not necessarily a means to freedom 
in any libertarian sense which we might understand, but a means of 
creation's reflecting God's generosity. However, if God's providence 
always comes to fruition even when through secondary causes (Aqui-
nas also allows God's direct action through miracles), it is not easy to 
understand how his creatures can be said to be sharing in his acti-
vity at all, rather than being manipulated by it. Aquinas affirmed 
that, 
"what the plan of Providence has arranged to result neces-
sarily and without fail wiH come about so, what too it has 
arranged to result contingently will come about so."8 
Here, the possibility that secondary causes might allow the world to 
be autonomous of God seems to be put into doubt: a truly contingent 
event cannot be prearranged, even by God. We would appear to have 
a situation in which the world is like a theatre where actors extem-
porize, except that in reality there is also a script. 
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Aquinas has gone some way towards distancing the action of 
creatures f rom the direct action of their creator, but his concept of 
divine providence does not allow fo r any greater freedom and by no 
means a separation. So, when Aquinas writes, 
"although one whom God reprobates cannot gain grace, 
nevertheless the fac t that he flounders i n this or that sin 
happens of his own free w i l l , " 9 
one cannot take that f ree will to indicate our autonomy from God. 
Aquinas, i n short, was a compatibilist believing that theological deter-
minism nevertheless allowed creaturely freedom. 
I t is against this background of thought that the concept of 
secondary causation is to be judged. Such causation was used by 
Aquinas to demonstrate how the universe might share i n God's cre-
ative goodness, but not how the universe may operate independently 
f rom God. Thus, although we have argued that i t is d i f f i c u l t to con-
ceive how secondary causation can be an analogy fo r God's act ivi ty 
embedded i n the physical processes of th is world, th is cannot i n fact 
be a direct crit icism of Aquinas. Nevertheless, secondary causes are 
inadequate as a means to understand how God's act ivi ty could exist 
alongside natural physical processes without their mutual interaction 
needing f u r t h e r explication. 
(b) Austin Farrer and double agency 
The struggle to see both human and divine action i n one and 
the same event is perhaps basic to the religious in tu i t ion , whether or 
not the divine then entirely subjugates the human. Aquinas, we have 
seen, allowed the divine a f ree rein i n th is partnership; more recently, 
Austin Farrer propounded a view of divine action indebted to that of 
Aquinas, but without requir ing total dominance by God. Instead of 
t r y i n g to see two agents i n one and the same act, Farrer suggested 
that we should see two acts, one human and one divine, i n the same 
event. The human act is then given a f u l l in tegr i ty of i t s own within 
the context of the web of physical causation which surrounds i t , 
whilst the divine act is also given scope to br ing about i t s own 
designs. 
Farrer takes a biblical story to be paradigmatic of th is so-
called double agency: the description of the Assyrians "as the rod of 
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God's anger" i n thei r treatment of Israel. Through their policy, the 
Assyrians were no doubt advancing their own economic and political 
interests, without any knowledge of the God of Israel. Yet, Farrer 
emphasises, they were nevertheless accomplishing God's will : 
"On the theistic hypothesis, everything that is done i n th is 
world by intel l igent creatures is done with two meanings: 
the meaning of the creature i n acting, the meaning of the 
Creator i n founding or supporting the action. Subjec-
t ively considered, there are two doings; physically there 
is but one event." 1 0 
This double agency, the notion that in f reely following one's own moti-
vations nevertheless one may be instrumental i n f u l f i l l i n g God's p r o v i -
dence, is clearly biblical. Yet i t is questionable whether i t is s t r ic t ly 
nonsense to speak of two agencies, rather than mere causes, being 
involved i n the same action. One may understand how a log is spli t 
both by an axe and also by the hand of an artisan, but these causes 
are descriptions at d i f fe ren t levels of freedom: only the artisan would 
be described as a f ree agent. On the other hand, Farrer maintains 
that both God and the human agent remain free. One may understand 
how the building of Solomon's temple, say, was the action both of the 
slaves who bui l t i t and of Solomon who ordered i t s construction. But 
here there is an acknowledged relationship between slave and master, 
in which the freedom of the slave is limited. 
Farrer acknowledged the d i f f i c u l t y , but believed that the 
means whereby God's and the creature's agency are l inked would f o r -
ever remain mysterious: 
"We are concerned with [God's] purpose and action solely 
as an operation to which we commit ourselves. I t is no 
part of our business to work any determinate system of 
communication. We do not f i n d where and by what means 
to touch God nor where and by what means to undergo 
his touch... the causal jo in t (so to speak) between in f in i t e 
and f in i t e action plays and i n the nature of the case can 
play no part i n our concern with God and his w i l l . " 1 1 
And so Farrer is content that, 
"we believe that God's way of acting is the inf in i te ly 
higher analogue of our way, but we cannot conceive i t 
otherwise than i n terms of our own." 1 2 
Accepting Farrer 's view, then indeed there is nothing more 
to be said i n the matter of God's agency: double agency would be the 
best analogous understanding that we could have. However, Maurice 
Wiles argues strongly that the analogy is simply not well enough 
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founded to be acceptable: 
"...the understanding of divine agency offered [by Farrer] 
is so distantly analogical and so unrelated to the causal 
story that we te l l of the happening of events, that we 
appear to be l e f t without even a direction i n which to 
look to give in te l l ig ib i l i ty to the concept of particular 
divine actions of the kind that he a f f i r m s / ' 1 3 
The judgment seems to be sound. The actions of an in f in i t e God will 
no doubt never be understood by us; perhaps even at best they will 
be made only plausible by analogy. However, i t is d i f f i c u l t to attach 
meaning to an analogy which gives to the same action two d i f fe rent 
but simultaneous motives; indeed, i t does not seem to be f u l l y analo-
gous to anything at all i n our experience. The only similar situations 
of which one can th ink involve one agent overrul ing another i n some 
respect, or one agent expressly professing obedience to another. Nei-
ther of these things can form a part of Farrer's picture of double 
agency. Double agency may be a good start ing point f o r f u r t h e r 
theological investigation, but i t does not seem to present an adequate 
end point. 
Farrer 's view continues to be attractive to many writers, 
amongst whom is Vernon White. He claims that the obscurity of the 
causal jo in t cannot be a problem to us i f we can, 
"accept i n human experience the hidden causal efficacy of 
human intention i n physical action without knowing i t s 
precise causal modality."! 4 
Whether we can accept th is is indeed a crucial question, to which we 
shall r e tu rn at some length when we consider the mind-brain prob-
lem 1 5 . The comment is of interest here, however, because of i t s tacit 
admission, which Farrer perhaps would not have allowed, that the 
answer to a properly scientific question (the causal modality of human 
intention) is of relevance to some aspects at least of th is concept of 
divine action. I f scientific insight may be gained into th is modality, 
then part of those foundations of double agency defended by White 
are undermined, since no longer would human intention be an example 
of a hidden causal efficacy. 
The conception of the causal jo in t between God and his cre-
ation is cr i t ical . Another theologian who is content to leave the causal 
jo in t out of view, but i n a rather d i f fe ren t fashion, is Rudolf Bul t -
mann, to whom we t u r n next. 
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(c) Rmdolf Bultmsmn asad eidsteatlalasjES 
I f i t is suspected that secondary causation and double 
agency have weaknesses either i n the denial to creatures of free 
agency or through incoherence i n a t t r ibut ing two parallel agencies to 
one event, these are not problems with Rudolf Bultmann's understand-
ing of divine act ivi ty . Such problems stem from the attempt to give 
some parity between the world experienced as a unity i n i tself with a 
real measure of autonomy, and the world experienced as the arena fo r 
the direct, saving act ivi ty of God. Bultmann's approach is somewhat 
d i f ferent : rather than holding these two aspects i n tension, Bultmann 
f i r s t allows that the scientific description of the world is i n all 
respects valid and complete. He then argues, however, that there is a 
circumscribed arena in which God acts, namely through the addressing 
and challenging of humankind i n i t s existential awareness. 
Bultmann believed that existentialism is required as the basis 
of a modern biblical hermeneutic, as will be reflected below. For 
some, this mixture of existentialism and Christianity is anathema, most 
especially when an allegedly secular philosophy becomes the in te rpre -
t ive key to the divine revelation of the Gospel. I n our review of 
Bultmann's thought, we cannot enter these larger questions about the 
adequacy or otherwise of existentialism, which would take us f a r f rom 
our immediate concerns. Instead, the question which interests us is 
whether, having assumed fo r argument's sake the acceptability of an 
existentialist interpretat ion, Bultmann's description of divine act ivi ty 
does indeed f ree us as claimed f rom problems associated with a scien-
t i f i c outlook. I f Bultmann's model is workable, i t would be the next 
step i n our enquiry to consider whether his programme is religiously 
adequate. I n fact , we will conclude that Bultmann's conception does 
not i n any case f u l l y overcome the problems in understanding God's 
act ivi ty . 
Existentialism is perhaps better described as a style of p h i -
losophy rather than one particular philosophy, since i t encompasses a 
group of people too diverse and individual to form one school of 
t hough t . However, the o r ig ina to r of existentialism is commonly 
regarded to be Soren Kierkegaard i n the nineteenth-century. His was 
the aphorism, " t r u t h is subject iv i ty ," which marks a reaction against 
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Cartesian rationalism and empiricism, but is not to be taken as an 
affirmation that anything goes. Rather, Kierkegaard's protest was that 
philosophy had lost i tself i n a cul-de-sac by analysing objective 
knowledge whilst ignoring the human subject who discerned such 
knowledge. We only come to t r u t h as individuals, Kierkegaard argued, 
s t ruggl ing to f i n d t r u t h and freedom in our unique existence. I t is 
the nature of this individual existence, he claimed, that had been 
overlooked by philosophy. 
Martin Heidegger was one who developed th is line of th ink ing 
and who was highly inf luent ia l on Bultmann. Heidegger analysed 
human experience i n terms of the limitations of "inauthentic" dehuma-
nizing existence and the fulness of "authentic" existence, which Bul t -
mann took over into Christian theology as l i f e with and without f a i th 
i n Christ: 
"And j u s t th i s is what is meant by ' f a i t h ' : to open our-
selves f reely to the fu tu re . Such f a i t h is simultaneously 
obedience, because i t is our t u rn ing away f rom ourselves, 
our surrendering al l security, our renouncing any attempt 
to be acceptable, to gain our l i f e , to t r u s t i n ourselves, 
and our resolving to t r u s t solely i n God who raises the 
dead (2 Cor. 1:19) and who calls into existence the things 
that do not exist (Rom. 4:17). I t is radical submission to 
God, which expects everything f rom God and nothing f rom 
ourselves; and i t is the release thereby given f rom every-
thing i n the world that can be disposed of, and hence the 
attitude of being f ree from the world, of freedom." 1 6 
Such an understanding of fa i th has many resonances beyond existen-
tialism, stretching back to Luther and beyond 1 7 , but Bultmann fe l t i t 
important to stress i t s existential nature as a means of understanding 
the mythology of the New Testament. Earlier classical liberalism had 
tended to ignore the supernatural aspects of the New Testament as 
being misguided, credulous accretions to i t s central message. Bul t -
mann understood that these supernatural episodes were integral to the 
texts and so could not be excised, whilst he was also clear that they 
could not be accepted as l i teral ly t rue i n our modern world. Hence he 
embarked upon the programme which he termed demythologization, 
involving the interpretat ion of New Testament myth i n terms of exis-
tentialism. 
I n doing so, Bultmann by no means took himself to be a r e v i -
sionist in the manner of a number of contemporary theologians. 
Rather, he believed that he was merely uncovering the actual meaning 
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of the New Testament texts i n a more precise and adequate language: 
"Mythological t h ink ing , however, naively objectifies what 
is. . . beyond the world as though i t were something within 
the world. Against i ts real intention i t represents the 
transcendent as distant i n space and as only quantita-
t ive ly superior to human power. By contrast, demytholo-
gizing seeks to b r ing out myth's real intention to talk 
about our own authentic reality as human beings*" 1 8 
Myth, which describes the world as open to the intervention of super-
natural forces, is taken to be the opposite of scientific th ink ing , in 
which the world can be explained as a closed system 1 9 . Since, in 
Bultmann's view, scientific th ink ing cannot now be doubted, mythologi-
cal th ink ing i n i t s outward form is rendered unusable; only the 
existentialist t r u t h i t seeks to express remains of value. 
I f this is the case, the question arises whether Christianity 
is no more than a redundant version of existentialist philosophy. 
Bultmann recognizes the force of this question, but his answer is 
clear: 
"This, then, is the decisive point that distinguishes the 
New Testament f rom philosophy, Christian f a i t h f rom 'natu-
ra l ' self-understanding: the New Testament talks and 
Christian f a i t h knows about an act of God that f i r s t makes 
possible our submission, our f a i th , our love, our authentic 
l i f e . " * 
As might be expected given Bultmann's antipathy to mythological 
th ink ing , th is act of God is not the intervention of a supernatural 
power. Rather, Bultmann describes i t as our coming to belief i n the 
saving efficacy of the cross of Christ: 
" I n fact , f a i t h i n the resurrection is nothing other than 
fa i th i n the cross as the salvation event, as the cross of 
Christ..." 
"How do we come to believe i n the cross as the salvation 
occurrence? 
"Here there seems to me to be only one answer: because i t 
is proclaimed as such, because i t is proclaimed with the 
resurrection. Christ the crucif ied and risen one encount-
ers us in the word of proclamation, and no where else. 
And f a i t h i n this word is the t rue f a i t h of Easter." 2 1 
And, as Bultmann wrote elsewhere, 
"to talk about God's act means to talk at the same time 
about my own existence... This event of being addressed, 
questioned, judged, and blessed by God here and now is 
what is meant by talk about the act of God." 2 2 
I t is i n such a way that Bultmann preserves the world 
described by science and history as a reality independent of any act 
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of God. Acts of God make an appearance in history only as mediated 
by those who have f a i t h , but not directly; acts of God are to be 
known personally i n a new existential awareness. 
We have already commented that i t is beyond our immediate 
concern whether such a view of the Christian f a i th is adequate. The 
point at issue is whether Bultmann's views are successful i n allowing 
us to conceive of God's action i n the world without confl ict with the 
f indings of scientific enquiry. Since the existentialist approach 
removes God's act ivi ty f rom the inanimate world, any criticisms will 
centre on the interaction of God and the individual . Re shall consider 
two. 
A f i r s t criticism concerns the subject ivi ty of f a i t h so con-
ceived. As Owen Thomas, i n his survey of problems concerning God's 
act ivi ty , puts i t : "Does God i n fac t act i n the world, or is i t only that 
f a i th sees the world as i f God were acting?" 2 3 The target of this 
criticism is not entirely clear, however, since Bultmann would i n any 
case deny that God acts directly i n the outward world. I f , however, 
the criticism is taken to refer to the subject ivi ty of f a i t h i tself , then 
indeed Bultmann f ree ly admits that f a i th cannot defend itself f rom the 
charge that i t is an il lusion: by i t s nature i t will always remain 
elusive. He writes: 
"To claim that f a i t h cannot be proved is precisely i t s 
s trength. To claim that f a i t h could be proved would imply 
that God could be known and established outside of f a i t h 
and thus put God on the same level as the available world 
that can be disposed of by an objec t i fy ing view." 2 4 
This appears to be an adequate response to the criticism. There can 
be no requirement that a theological system should be able to prove 
itself: surely the only requirement is that i t should make coherent 
sense of the experience of a religious f a i t h , one aspect of which is i t s 
lack of certainty. I n this respect, Bultmann's theology does not f a i l . 
A second objection is summarised by Thomas i n two ques-
tions: 
"Is there any ontological difference between an event i n 
which God is acting and one i n which God is not acting? 
How can we conceive of an act of God which is real and 
yet which does not have any objective effect on the f in i t e 
causal nexus?" 2 5 
Here we arr ive at a conceptual d i f f i c u l t y with Bultmann's proposals. 
For he is convinced that science provides a f u l l description of our 
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world: 
"The idea that divine action is unworldly or transcendent 
is preserved only i f such action is represented not as 
something taking place between occurrences i n the world 
but as something that takes place i n them, i n such a way 
that the closed continuum of worldly occurrences that 
presents i tself to an objec t i fy ing view is l e f t in tact ." 2 6 
But surely i n actuality that continuum cannot be l e f t entirely intact, 
fo r God's action shows itself i n the l i f e of those with f a i t h , influencing 
their actions i n a way they would not otherwise have been. So 
science, and i n particular the science of history as Bultmann describes 
i t , does not provide a f u l l description of worldly events, fo r i t is 
bl ind to the source of those actions motivated by fa i th . 
To i l lustrate the issues involved, let us consider Frederick, a 
highly paid actuary who has been recently converted to the Christian 
fa i th . After much thought, he concludes that his f a i t h is calling him 
to give up his work and luxurious l i festyle i n order to devote himself 
to work amongst the world's poor, i n which he becomes a well known 
and saintly f igu re . Some years later, Frederick's biography is wr i t -
ten, which naturally pays attention to his decision to leave the world 
of the actuary. What account could a secular biography give? There 
appears to be two possibilities, i f Bultmann's assumptions are correct. 
First , the biographer may prof fe r a psychological explanation. 
Thus, Frederick was always uneasy about his wealth; the Christian 
f a i th increased his feelings of gui l t ; the social pressure of fellow 
Christians affected his perceptions; his home l i fe was deeply unhappy. 
I f the biography were well researched, perhaps this explanation could 
be conclusively defended as being t rue i n the court of historical 
science. But, i f we assume that Frederick's f a i th was God-given, no 
amount of evidence could alter the fact that the biography is false: 
the explanation has to include the item that God acted i n Frederick's 
l i f e , even should the other factors mentioned also be t rue . Thus we 
arr ive at a position where there is conclusive evidence that the psy-
chological explanation is t rue , but where f a i t h nevertheless gives a 
d i f fe ren t explanation which is also t rue . There is surely something 
perplexing about having two t rue , but d i f ferent , explanations of the 
same event. We want to say that either God did act i n Frederick's 
l i f e , or he did not. Perhaps the one explanation is t rue fo r a scien-
t i s t , the other fo r the Christian believer; but what explanation should 
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a scientist who is also a believer hold? The only alternative is to say 
that we must in principle remain agnostic about someone's t rue moti-
vation, but that would itself undermine science's claim to provide a 
f u l l explanation of the world. 
A second approach the biographer may take is to t r y to 
avoid the above problems by allowing that Frederick had something 
named as " fa i th i n God" as well as the other psychological motives and 
pressures. But, f rom the point of view of objective science, no con-
tent could be given to such fa i th , as Bultmann himself stresses. Faith 
would be no more than a term of ignorance to cover what would 
otherwise inescapably appear to be i n some way arb i t ra ry or inexpl i -
cable i n Frederick's action; thus f a i th could not be judged as t rue or 
false within the biographical explanation. I t would follow that the 
explanation was not complete. 
I n either case, we end up with a paradox: that the f u l l 
scientific description of the causal continuum of the world is incapa-
ble, i n the one case, of deciding the t r u t h of i t s explanation, and, i n 
the other case, of giving a f u l l description. Perhaps the only way out 
of this dilemma is to allow that any f u l l y human action whatsoever 
fal ls outside the bounds of scientific description and explanation, not 
only acts of God. Indeed, i t seems from Bultmann's wri t ing that he 
himself believed this: 
" I t becomes clear f rom all th is that the world loses i t s 
character as a closed continuum fo r my existential l i f e , 
which is realized i n decisions i n face of encounters. Put 
d i f fe ren t ly , in f a i th the closed continuum presented (or 
produced) by objec t i fy ing th ink ing is sublated - not of 
course i n the manner of mythological th ink ing , so that i t 
is thought of as disrupted, but i n such a way that i t is 
sublated as a whole when I talk about God's act. Actu-
ally, i t is already sublated when I talk about myself; f o r I 
myself, i n my authentic being, am ju s t as l i t t l e to be seen 
and established within the world as is the act of God." 2 7 
I t seems that existential experience, not simply acts of God, is 
excluded f rom the world of science. We may recall here the comment 
by Vernon White quoted above concerning Farrer 's double agency, i n 
which appeal is also made to the inscrutabi l i ty of human intention to 
i l lustrate the conceivability of divine act ivi ty . I f this lies at the 
heart also of Bultmann's ideas, then likewise their success depends on 
science's being incapable of understanding the human mind. That is 
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an issue to which we shall r e tu rn ; but i t lessens considerably the 
attractiveness of Bultmann's thesis. His model of existential f a i t h loses 
i t s f u l l independence from science and the causal continuum which 
includes the human brain, which was i ts motivation; rather, i t needs to 
make the assertion that the human agent is independent of physical 
constraint. Existentialist f a i th becomes an analogy in which God is 
only f ree to act insofar as a human agent is f ree f rom scientific 
explanation. That a human agent is thus free is a case which needs 
to be argued, not assumed. 
(d) Maurice Miles 
The proposals of the theologians we have considered so f a r 
each attempts to make divine agency plausible by having God's act i -
v i t y running i n some sense parallel to events i n our world, whether 
or not acting beyond the confines of the human agent. Maurice Wiles 
rejects this understanding of God's act ivi ty and f inds himself con-
strained to place a greater distance between the divine and the 
human, at least i n terms of divine and human act ivi ty , i n that divine 
act ivi ty is f o r him a constant i n our world to which humans respond 
i n thei r various ways, rather than a temporal act ivi ty shadowing 
worldly events. He does so by speaking of the whole of creation as 
one act of God, rather than many. I n such a way, Wiles attempts to 
take f u l l account of our experience of the world as regularly ordered, 
as we noted at the beginning of this chapter. 
When we discussed Bultmann's wri t ing above, i t was stressed 
that we were not primarily concerned to judge his theology, but the 
coherence of his views concerning the causal influence of God in the 
world. I n the same way, our present interest i n Wiles springs f rom 
his conception of God's actual interaction with creation rather than 
the larger question of the adequacy of his theology. We start , how-
ever, by sketching the outline of his thought. 
For Wiles, God is decisively outside creation, which he 
created ex nihilo26. However, whilst a f f i rming that God is never 
affected by forces or events f rom outside the sphere of his own i n f l u -
ence, God is yet passible 2 9. Wiles' argument fo r this arises f rom 
moral considerations which play an important role i n his wri t ings. He 
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is i n favour of the f ree -wi l l defence against the problem of evi l , but 
believes tha t care must nevertheless be taken to acquit God of any 
evi l himself: 
" I f God is 'responsible' f o r evi l , i n however modified a 
sense, because he has taken the r i sk of creating a world 
in which i t was highly l ikely , or even logically bound, to 
emerge, then there are strong moral objections to any 
view of God which regards him as immune f rom the 
damaging consequences of that e v i l . " 3 0 
I t is this same concern fo r morality which leads Wiles along a path 
away from any publicly recognisable direct divine action at al l . He 
argues that since God did not intervene i n Auschwitz, f o r instance, 
this must imply that God has chosen never to intervene i n our world. 
I f he did so on some lesser occasion, he would be gui l ty of not in te r -
vening to prevent the greater evi l . Having given the creation a mea-
sure of freedom, God has no choice but to allow i t f u l l freedom i f he 
himself is not to become culpable fo r the evi l of i t s suffer ings . 
I t i s this aspect of God's standing back from creation i n 
act ivi ty , i f not through impassibility, that Wiles summarises through 
his insistence that there is only one overarching act of God, worked 
out through the history of creation 3 1 . 
With such an outlook, the question arises exactly how God 
can be said to influence his creation at all i f he may not intimately 
control the ongoing progress of his creation's history. Wiles himself 
specifically rejects four possibilities 3 2 . First , the regulari ty of 
physical laws precludes our speaking of the evolutionary emergence of 
new l i f e as being an act of God. Secondly, the occurrence of the 
miraculous is denied as haying insuf f ic ien t grounds. Thirdly , as was 
noted above, Wiles rejects the double agency favoured by Farrer. 
Finally, the case of someone who f reely seeks God's grace to achieve a 
specific purpose is also rejected as an act of God, through fear that 
supernatural grace might then subsume human freedom. 
I n place of these active interventions, Wiles turns instead to 
the basic religious experience of responding to God. Such responsive-
ness spreads t h r o u g h human society as one believer evokes a 
response i n another: 
"And since the quality of l i f e i n them to which those o th-
ers will respond was i tself grounded i n responsiveness to 
the divine action, we may r igh t ly speak of the events of 
their lives as acts of God i n a special sense towards those 
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of us who are influenced by them... 
"...what we are doing is avoiding the error of th ink ing that 
we can ever describe divine action i n any other context 
than that of i t s experienced response." 3 3 
Thus, i n order to understand the point of interaction between God and 
creation, we must t u r n our attention to the human mind i n which a 
response to God is formed. I n particular, we t u r n to the consider-
ation of prayer, the context i n which a human religious response is 
most powerfully elicited. 
As we may now expect. Wiles does not see i n prayer the 
occasion of an infusion of divine power: 
"Praying to God fo r enlightenment may suggest that we are 
looking f o r a way to understanding that bypasses the 
normal cr i t ica l procedures... that k ind of interpretat ion is 
to be f i rmly rejected." 3 4 
However, shortly afterwards, Wiles goes on to write: 
"Such recognition, and very partial realization, of God's 
purpose as the world has seen i n the past have been p r i -
marily forwarded by those who have used their God-given 
potential to open themselves to and iden t i fy their own 
goals with what they have grasped of the will of God. I n 
the language of process theology, they have responded to 
the lure of the divine love available to them..." 3 3 
There might appear to be a tension between these two statements, 
since i t is d i f f i c u l t to imagine how one may grasp the will of God 
without some sort of divine intervention i n the course of human his-
to ry . Earlier, Wiles had writ ten: 
"We are not looking fo r a divine causation that can be 
neatly f i t t e d i n as a missing factor within our existing 
historical or physical accounts; that would be to t reat God 
as j u s t one more causal agent alongside others in the 
world." 3* 
But i f God is not such a causal agent, i n some sense however quali-
f i ed , then i t would appear that one could never speak of grasping his 
wi l l , since nothing on earth could be known to be directly related to 
his will . At most one could observe the existence of the world i n 
which love is an important experience, say, but that would not amount 
to knowing God's wi l l . I f God does not act direct ly, we cannot claim 
to know whether love or hate the more closely agrees with his wil l : 
God would be disconnected from the universe. As Vernon White writes 
on this point: 
"Just how does God present a goal to his creatures i n a 
non-empirical way? At what point does the act ivi ty of pre-
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senting a goal to a creature imply af ter all some 'eff ic ient ' 
causation?" 3 7 
Yet, upon a closer reading of Wiles, i t is not clear that these 
criticisms are entirely jus t . For, although Wiles does not want God to 
be a causal agent amongst others i n our world, yet i t appears that he 
does not divorce God entirely f rom playing a role i n one's conscious-
ness. In God's hction in the World this is hinted, when Wiles consid-
ers the argument that a change in the weather would involve no less 
of a crude intervention by God than a psychological change induced, 
say, by prayer. Wiles responds, 
" [ th i s ] conclusion does not follow f rom the fac t that psy-
chological changes may always involve concomitant changes 
in the brain circui ts ; [the] argument would only be valid 
i f we were to hold a false form of physical determinism 
according to which psychological changes could only be 
brought about by a prior modification of the brain c i r -
cui ts ."^ 
Wiles then goes on, however, to agree with the substantive point that 
direct psychological change cannot be brought about by God without 
violating our freedom. On the validity of the counter argument con-
cerning brain circui ts , we shall have more to say in chapter f ive . The 
point we note here is that Wiles seemingly is not t roubled by the 
notion that there may be a point of direct communication with God 
within our consciousness. He only argues that we must be careful 
that such interaction does not undermine our freedom. This is then 
the key to understanding Wiles' other statements on the nature of 
divine action. I n particular, i t would surely be needed to be assumed 
i f the following comments are to be comprehended: 
" I have stressed a number of strands that constitute the 
indispensable background conditions of any particular 
experience of grace: God as the ultimate source of the 
conditions i n which our lives are set; the availability of 
an awareness of his purpose of love as a source of gu id -
ance fo r our lives; the ways in which that love, having 
been apprehended and responded to i n the past, is acces-
sible to us now in such forms as the writ ings of the 
saints and the sacraments of the church." 3 9 
" [ I n our prayers fo r grace,] we are involved i n br inging to 
special awareness the fact of the presence to us of the 
God whose wil l we are seeking." 4 0 
I t is tempting to accuse Wiles of deism, but that would not be quite 
f a i r . The essence of deism is a reliance upon the cosmological a rgu-
ment fo r the existence of God; i f that fai ls , there is then no means of 
29 
speaking about God at all , since there is no other route to detect 
God's presence i n our world. Although he remains sl ight ly ambiguous 
on the point, Wiles does allow fo r a direct awareness of God's pur -
poses of love, mediated through our consciousness. I n a scientific 
analogy, Wiles apparently conceives of God's presence as an omnipre-
sent f ie ld to which we respond. His concerns are not those of the 
deist who conceives of the universe as a perfect machine, but those of 
the theodicist. God has given the world freedom, and God should not 
be implicated i n the world's evi l , but he nevertheless assures i t of his 
presence. 
I n terms of the causal jo in t between God and his world, the 
conclusions reached by Wiles appear to be similar to those implied by 
Bultmann. Although Bultmann can speak of God addressing us in a 
way which Wiles would deny, the arena for communication remains 
essentially the same, namely our own awareness. Thus, as with Bult-
mann, Wiles' account requires a point of interaction between the causal 
nexus of the world and the divine. This Wiles concedes, but argues 
as we have noted that such interaction does not violate our under-
standing of the regulari ty of our world. This proposition we shall 
consider i n more detail i n chapter f ive . 
(e) Conclusion 
In this chapter we have reviewed some of the ways i n which 
theologians have proposed that God's action i n our world may be 
understood without doing violence to the patterns of regular causation 
revealed to us by science. However, none of these models has been 
without severe problems, or without i t s own assumptions about the 
limits of scientific description, particularly in relation to the human 
consciousness. 
We have argued that Aquinas' description of secondary 
causes, whilst suggestive of an independent world under God's over-
sight, nevertheless was not intended to grant that measure of auton-
omy fo r which we might look. Secondary causes form part of Aquinas' 
reconciliation of God's gracicusness i n allowing his creation a real 
d igni ty , with his insistence that even what God arranges contingently 
should always come to pass. We shall consider such theological 
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determinism f u r t h e r i n chapter four ; f o r the present we merely note 
that secondary causation is not i n any case an uncomplicated means of 
understanding God's action independently f rom science. 
Austin Farrer gives an attractive account of double agency 
which apparently makes no demands upon the scientific world-view 
whilst also allowing God an unlimited freedom to act. The causal jo in t 
between the two spheres of act ivi ty wil l , i n Farrer 's view, fo r ever 
remain hidden. This understanding of divine agency founders, how-
ever, upon t r y i n g to make sense of how two agencies can simulta-
neously be present i n one event. I n the absence of an adequate anal-
ogy, we suspect tha t the model must be discounted, at least without 
f u r t h e r development. 
Although considering the problem of God's action f rom very 
d i f fe ren t angles 4 1, Rudolf Bultmann and Maurice Wiles appear to make 
similar assumptions i n the matter of the exact point at which humanity 
becomes aware of God. Each allows the human consciousness a f r ee -
dom from physical restraint suff ic ient fo r God to make himself present. 
Indeed, i n the practical outworking of their theology, Bultmann and 
Wiles are surely very close to one another. We have commented, how-
ever, that the assumption of the freedom of the human consciousness 
is i tself not one that can be made independently f rom modern science. 
Indeed, this is one of the points of greatest controversy i n contempo-
ra ry science and philosophy. 
I n the next chapter, we therefore t u r n to an investigation of 
the nature of science, before examining more closely the intersection 
of science and theology relevant to our concepts of divine interaction. 
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Chapter 3s Tfo.e Interpretat ion ai Elodern Science 
Before we proceed in the following chapters to consider mod-
els of divine action i n the l igh t of modern science, in th is chapter we 
shall concentrate upon the philosophy of science. I n recent times, as 
we shall see, influential movements i n the philosophy of science have 
suggested that scientific theories cannot be taken to be hard and fast 
representations of physical reali ty. Some suggest that science cannot 
be understood to be in any way a direct window upon our world, but 
merely a human construct. I f th i s is the case, then science would 
become something of a straw man so f a r as conceiving divine action is 
concerned. For science could be i n no position to place real con-
straints upon the ways i n which we understand God to act, unless we 
can be reasonably assured that scientific f indings f a i t h f u l l y reflect 
some external reali ty. I n fact , we shall argue that science does 
describe such a reality and must therefore be taken seriously i n con-
sidering divine action. 
(a) Scientific induction and causation 
Perhaps i t is arguable that the more profound intellectual 
change at the time of the Enlightenment was not a greater confidence 
i n empiricism, but a greater confidence i n inductive proof. Stemming 
f rom Greek philosophy, medieval th ink ing set store by deductive rea-
soning as the gateway to t r u t h . That way of reasoning was not avail-
able to natural philosophers who had to draw conclusions from a l im-
i ted number of observations, generalizing these particulars into un i -
versal statements. The classical treatment of the new scientific 
method was formulated by Francis Bacon in his Novum Organum of 
1620, which came to be known as Baconian induction. Here was laid 
out the ideal of eliminating human subject ivi ty by means of tabulating 
all the available data, both positive and negative, and comparing every 
case in order to arr ive at a t rue theory 1 . Yet i t was the methods and 
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the limits of reliability of such induction which was to stimulate 
debate up to the present time. 
On the one hand the fact that there is little formal justifica-
tion for induction continues to prompt debate. Bertrand Russell for 
example commented that the fowl which inductively expects to be fed 
each succeeding day will be surprised the day i t is killed to be eaten. 
More recently, Nelson Goodman has proposed a "new riddle of induc-
tion"1 which points out also that how the future is predicted induc-
tively depends crucially upon which particular regularities of the past 
are taken to be significant 2. The problem is not merely whether we 
are justified in expecting an event to recur, but how we can know in 
which ways to extrapolate to future events. To avoid such problems, 
Karl Popper developed a theory of science he claimed avoided induc-
tion altogether, based upon the notion that a scientific theory is one 
capable of empirical falsification 3. His thesis is that falsification does 
not involve any element of induction; all we need, and in practice only 
ever have, is a collection of provisional theories waiting to be dis-
proved. However, i t is doubtful that Popper's intention succeeds: a 
good theory is reckoned by him to be one which is readily falsifiable 
by predicting unexpected experimental consequences. Yet the induc-
tion he seeks to banish has then returned in the need to determine 
what exactly would have been expected in any future experiment i f 
the unexpected is then to be recognised. 
These are all serious problems for the philosophy of science 
and for determining what science can reliably tell us. A dominant 
problem, however, was raised in an extreme form by Hume. In his 
treatment of causality, Hume shows the inherent limits of induction to 
powerful effect: in cases where deduction is possible, we have the 
analytical power to cut to the core of a phenomenon; in the case of 
induction we are in a sense confined to the externals of phenomena, 
allowing us to make predictions at best, but not giving us a weighty 
means to probe further. I t is precisely where induction is weakest -
in accessing the essential nature of a substance - that the claims of a 
modern scientific outlook become strongest. In popular terms, the 
question which lies at the heart of God's interaction with the world is 
whether science has shown the cause of any event to be always noth-
ing more than another cause scientifically described. In the common 
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view, science is concerned with cause; thus i t is to cause that we 
should turn. 
The notion of cause and effect is plagued with difficulties for 
two sets of reasons. First, cause and effect are not primarily techni-
cal terms in our language, but are used informally in different con-
texts. They therefore have a large range of application, from inani-
mate mechanical systems to the apportioning of blame in courts of law. 
Thus i t is not surprising to f ind that philosophical discussion is 
clouded by a lack of agreement as to what should be the fundamental 
role of the word "cause". For instance, R.G. Colling wood argued that 
the primary sense of cause should be something used by a human to 
bring about an effect in nature4. On the other hand, Bertrand Rus-
sell wrote that i t is, "the analogy with human volition which makes the 
conception of cause such a f r u i t f u l source of fallacies."5 In discuss-
ing cause and effect, i t is not clear whether different writers are 
actually considering quite the same thing. 
The second set of reasons making the analysis of the concept 
of cause and effect difficult involves the issues which become linked 
to i t . As we have suggested above, a closely related topic is the 
validity of induction from empirical data. Let us therefore move 
towards presenting David Hume's views, whose writings remain the 
classical treatment of the topic, whether to be applauded or deni-
grated. 
In the Middle Ages and earlier, the term "cause" would 
hardly be recognised by someone brought up in an empiricist environ-
ment. "Cause" was used in Greek philosophy as a term in the under-
standing of the way in which states of various entities may change, 
whilst maintaining their unity of substance. For instance, Plato pro-
posed the existence of two realms: the real, eternal world of perma-
nence and our world of mutability, although their inter-relationship is 
not always clear6. The cause, or explanation, of any aspect of our 
changeable world was to be found in the ideal, eternal form towards 
which that aspect strives. 
I t is against such a background that Aristotle differentiated 
"cause" into four types 7: the material cause (that in which a change 
is wrought); the formal cause (that into which the entity is changed); 
the efficient cause (that which brings about the change) and the final 
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cause (the purpose for which the change is brought about). In the 
modern debate of cause and effect, cause is now identified only with 
Aristotle's efficient cause; the former two types of cause are of 
largely historical interest only, whereas final cause has until very 
recently been out of favour in the discussion in natural science. I t 
was Descartes in particular who f i r s t insisted that final causes had no 
role to play in science8. 
Given that much of the metaphysical background in which the 
concept of causation developed belongs to another era of history, i t is 
not surprising that some have sought to reject causation as being of 
any relevance whatsoever to modern science and thought. Thus, Rus-
sell wrote: 
"The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes 
muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, 
surviving, like the monarchy, only because i t is erro-
neously supposed to do no harm."9 
Russell's contention was that in any advanced science, such as phys-
ics, nothing in its methodology requires the appearance of the notion 
of cause. Yet even were we to allow that cause makes no appearance 
in the formalism of science, i t remains part of the everyday vocabu-
lary of scientists. Thus, scientists still ask questions such as, "What 
causes cancer?" or "What causes the sun-spot cycle to be eleven 
years?" 
The move away from considering cause and effect as funda-
mental to the project of science was decisively begun by David Hume 
in his rejection of the notion of "power". As previously mentioned, 
the idea of cause had been invoked to explain how change occurred 
and so philosophers associated with "cause" a power to bring about 
that change. Thus animals could be described as self-moved and God, 
as the cause of the world, was thought to be all powerful. Causes 
were not only followed by their effects, they in some sense necessi-
tated their effects by the exercise of power. Accepting this, i t is 
clear that cause and effect would lie at the heart of any description 
of the world. 
Hume attacked this view of causation, however, both by 
denying that "necessary" could validly so be used and by denying 
that any power supposedly involved could ever be observed. Let us 
f i r s t consider Hume's attack on the notion of necessity in cause and 
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effect. He wrote: 
"The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; 
because i t can never imply a contradiction, and is con-
ceived by the mind with the same facility and distinct-
ness, as i f ever so conformable to reality. That the sun 
will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, 
and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, 
that i t will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to 
demonstrate its falsehood."10 
Hume regards necessary as implying logical necessity and invites us 
to contrast the sort of necessity we may envisage in natural processes 
with that in a more formal logic. Thus i t seems correct to say that 
whereas i t is impossible to conceive something which is logically or 
mathematically necessary being false (e.g. imagining a square circle), 
this is not the case with natural phenomena. The implication is that 
necessity is not a concept validly used of causation; let us allow this 
plausible argument for the present. 
The second element in Hume's argument from scepticism 
affirms that the supposed power by which a cause brings about its 
effect is never directly observed: 
"When we look about us towards external objects, and con-
sider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a 
single instance, to discover any power or necessary con-
nection; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, 
and renders the one an infallible consequence of the 
other. We only f ind, that the one does actually, in fact, 
follow the other. The impulse of one billiard ball is 
attended with motion in the second. This is the whole 
that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no 
sentiment or inward impression from this succession of 
objects: Consequently, there is not, in any single, particu-
lar instance of cause and effect, any thing which can 
suggest the idea of power or necessary connection." u 
For Hume, the idea that a cause in any sense necessitates its effect is 
merely a habit of thought on our part, a product of our imagination. 
Outwardly, all that is presented to us are several instances of two 
events which are conjoined, which gives rise to our expectation that 
they will always be conjoined in the future. 
An immediate difficulty with requiring a series of events 
before forming an idea of a causal connection is that no such series 
of events actually occurs. Every event in the world is unique: cer-
tainly i f one includes the whole state of the universe at that time, and 
for all practical purposes even i f one does not. Thus there is never 
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in fact a sequence of identical events which one can observe. Hume 
tries to escape this difficulty by making his definition of cause to be, 
"an object, followed by another, and where all the objects 
similar to the f i r s t are followed by objects similar to the 
second."12 
I t is doubtful whether this is sufficient for Hume's argument, since 
one is led to question in which respects sets of events must be simi-
lar in order to count as an example of the same cause and effect. For 
instance, imagine striking three different matches: one is dry, one is 
damp and another is dry but decorated by miniature carving in the 
wood. The f i r s t match lights, but the others do not: how could one 
be justified in holding our "common sense" view that the second 
match was not similar to the f i r s t in the relevant respect of being 
dry, whilst the third match was similar to the f i rs t , rejecting the 
cause of its not striking as being due to its carving? Nevertheless, 
let us assume that the above difficulty can somehow be overcome; 
there are possibly two greater, though related, difficulties. 
First, i f one is to deny any possibility of observing a neces-
sary connection between cause and effect, but simply their constant 
conjunction, then a great number of counter-intuitive causes and 
effects must be allowed. A contemporary critic of Hume, Thomas Reid, 
pointed out that one would have to say that night caused day (and 
vice versa). Another popular example is that of the factory hooters 
which sounded at noon across the country sending workers for their 
lunches. But surely a hooter in Newcastle is not said to cause work-
ers in Bristol to go for lunch, although there is a constant conjunc-
tion? 
Secondly, i t is not clear that Hume's formulation of the 
understanding of causation is any advance in practice beyond a view 
which includes the notion of necessity. I f the newly defined concept 
is to retain any utility, one must argue inductively that what has 
been observed in the past, i t is reasonable to believe of the future. 
But in arguing that what has previously been identified as a cause 
and effect will hold good in the future, one is doing no more than 
assuming some sort of necessary connection which will therefore 
always be observed. In the constant conjunction view of cause and 
effect, all one may observe is a universal of fact: i.e., that as a matter 
of fact, in all observed cases of cause A, then effect B has followed. 
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But does not the notion of causality involve more than simply a mere 
generality which can never be projected into the future? 
On this point, Hume himself seems to be inconsistent. Follow-
ing the definition of cause quoted above, he adds: 
"Or in other words where, i f the f i r s t object had not been, 
the second never had existed."1 3 
This is by no means the equivalent of the f i r s t statement of his defi-
nition, because i f all one can observe is a sequence of events only 
named later as cause and effect by their observer, then one cannot 
deduce anything from the presence or absence of the so-called cause. 
Such a statement of the form, " I f A were B, i t would be C" is said to 
be an 'unfulfilled hypothetical'. I t is statements of this form which 
lay bare to what one is committed by Hume's formulation. 
Consider the statement, 'All the flowers in my garden are 
blue.' From this, is i t valid to say that, ' I f a certain flower were in 
my garden (which i t is not), then i t would be blue.'? This unfulfilled 
hypothetical would be valid i f the f i r s t statement from which i t 
derives is necessary, but invalid i f that f i r s t statement is contingent. 
Applying this test to Hume's definition of cause, does the observation 
that, 'Heavy objects fall to the ground' enable one to say that, ' I f I 
were to throw a plant pot out of the window (which I will not), then 
i t would fall to the ground'? Or, to take a more advanced example, 
Newton's f i r s t law states that an object continues in its state of rest 
or uniform motion unless acted upon by an external force. Since all 
objects in the universe are as a matter of fact acted upon by external 
forces, this f i r s t law is thus an unfulfilled hypothetical. Is Newton's 
f i r s t law therefore merely something 'he feels ... in his imagination'? 
Despite the inconsistency noted above, i t seems that Hume would have 
to answer positively. 
In his consideration of causation, Hume has shown clearly the 
limits of induction and thus empiricism. Few people (and, i t seems, 
Hume himself) f ind i t easy to believe that causal connection cannot be 
known as anything more than the constant conjunction of events. But 
i f we were to accept Hume's sceptical premise that we know only what 
we are able to observe by our senses, then i t seems difficult to deny 
that his conclusions follow. To this day, i t seems that there has been 
no single adequate response to Hume's challenge; at any rate, there is 
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no agreed response. 
Philosophically a number of proposals have been made against 
such scepticism, amongst them that of Kant. Kant allows the world to 
be causally connected, but that world is the one of human experience, 
not the world in itself. This does not lead to solipsism because the 
structure of our experience is not merely dependent upon any partic-
ular individual, but derives from the nature of a human being. Our 
very minds are pre-structured to experience the world in certain 
ways14. Kant's views proved highly influential, feeding into the 
stream of German idealism; however, his writings have not been so 
important in the recent history of the philosophy of science which has 
fundamentally reacted against them. Thus, as we wish to clarify the 
problems for divine action which stem from a modern scientific view, 
we shall consider the influential response to Humean scepticism of the 
positivists. 
(b) Positivism 
Positivism originated with the publication of Positive Philos-
ophy by Auguste Comte in 1830. In the light of the involved and 
apparently unfrui t fu l philosophical debate occasioned by writings such 
as those of Kant, positivism deliberately rejected in principle any 
claims to metaphysical insight. Furthermore, positivism claims that in 
fact an adequate scientific explanation of any phenomenon can never 
be more than merely the best description of i t . Thus i t was that Rus-
sell, standing in the line of such philosophy, altogether rejected 
causality as a scientific notion, as noted above. 
There have been many exponents of positivism, but one of 
the foremost was Ernst Mach. In his The Science of Mechanics (1883), 
Mach set out the positivist point of view: 
" I t is the object of science to replace, or save, experi-
ences, by the reproduction and anticipation of facts in 
thought. Memory is handier than experience, and often 
answers the same purpose. This economical office of 
science, which f i l ls its whole life, is apparent at f i r s t 
glance; and with its f u l l recognition all mysticism in 
science disappears... 
"There is no cause or effect in nature; nature has but an 
individual existence; nature simply is. Recurrences of like 
cases... exist but in the abstraction we perform for the 
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purpose of mentally reproducing the facts." 1 5 
So i t is that a positivist sees science as a short-hand for experience, 
useful for reminding us of past experiences and anticipating future 
experiences. Truth is found only in the individual experiments; scien-
tif ic theory is no more than an aide memoirs, and has no independent 
claim to t ru th . Indeed, in the f u l l development of logical positivism, a 
verbal concept is denied any meaning at all, independent from exper-
imental verification. 
If the positivist scheme is accepted, i t has an interesting 
implication for us. Positivists have tended to exclude terms such as 
God from their vocabulary as having no empirical meaning. But a 
positivist view of science would actually make divine action in the 
world more easily defensible. For i f science can have nothing to say 
about the nature of physical processes beyond what has been 
observed to occur, then i t has no means of declaring which interac-
tions are possible or impossible. For instance, water has never been 
observed to turn to wine (save for one occasion?). However, i f the 
theory that water never changes to wine is simply equivalent to the 
observation that the transformation has not (regularly) been observed, 
then the theory provides no reason to prevent such an occurrence in 
the future, or on some occasion in the past. Only i f a theory declares 
that causally no such event could happen, would the claim be contra-
dicted that water has on occasion been turned to wine. 
But is a positivist outlook sustainable? I t seems not, for 
there are probably insurmountable difficulties. These problems arise 
once again from the threat of scepticism. Any belief that the only 
knowledge available to us is gained via the senses must invest the 
senses with absolute reliability. I f such reliability is not guaranteed, 
then neither is the knowledge gained. Given positivism's declared 
disdain of metaphysics, i t has few resources available to i t for such a 
guarantee; yet Mach and his followers did not wish to be forced into 
scepticism themselves. Their response to the challenge was to follow 
George Berkeley in formulating so-called phenomenalism. Instead of 
proposing that mind has perceptions of some reality "out there", phe-
nomenalism regards reality as being the perceiving mind together with 
its perceptions. This whole forms reality, to be taken without further 
analysis. 
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Having made such a move, however, other problems arise for 
the positivist. The world is not one mind (although Berkeley was able 
to claim that i t is within the mind of God), but i t consists of many 
isolated individuals. I f each individual constitutes its own reality, 
how can we know that those realities correspond with one another? We 
have merely sharpened the problem of scepticism into the related 
problem of relativism. We seem to have no means of being certain 
either that perceptions are uniform, to be repeated in the future, or 
that they are universal, to be the same for different observers. 
Science is founded upon experiments which are supposed to be 
repeatable with the same outcomes. Any theory of science would seem 
to need to embrace some understanding of that constancy, whereas 
positivism eschews any such possibility. 
Another problem for positivism lies in the status i t accords 
to theory. Theories, as we have seen for Mach, are nothing more than 
a short-hand for experience. I t must therefore be possible to decide 
between theories experimentally, by appealing to the facts of the situ-
ation: for a positivist, there is nothing else but empirical fact to 
which to appeal. Yet Irving Copi, amongst others, has doubts that 
such a simple appeal is possible16. He considers the example of an 
experiment to prove whether the earth is flat or curved by observing 
a ship receding on the horizon. One might think that i f i t apparently 
sinks beneath the skyline, then this indicates unambiguously a curva-
ture to the sea's surface. However, the same effect would be 
observed i f light travelled not in straight lines, but in sagging 
curves. As the ship's distance increased, light from its hull would at 
a certain point then curve downwards sufficiently to become 
obstructed by the surface of the ocean, making i t seem to an observer 
to disappear before the masts. Thus, which theory the observer 
already holds about the propagation of light waves crucially affects 
what he or she believes the experiment to have demonstrated. There 
is then no such thing as the theory-free observation which positivism 
needs to affirm. 
(c) Logical empiricism 
Positivism retains influence, but i t is nowadays as likely to 
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be found incorporated into another model of scientific explanation 
proposed by the so-called logical empiricists. In the aftermath of 
logical positivism, Hempel and others became convinced of the need to 
relate scientific theory to experience in a more secure fashion than 
the verification principle had allowed. This principle stated that any 
term or proposition can be made meaningful only through a specified 
experimental or observational procedure, otherwise i t is either mean-
ingless or a tautology. But the problem with such a principle was 
that i t made uncertain the status of general laws in science, which 
being generalisations could not be experimentally verified. Hence the 
logical empiricists saw a need to bring laws into a rigorous under-
standing of scientific explanation and made use of the so-called cover-
ing law model, which has now been a focus of debate for the last four 
decades17. Although various authors have favoured this scheme of 
scientific explanation, including in the past J.S. Mill in his System of 
Logic (1843), recent debate has centred upon the paper published by 
Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim in 194818. 
The central element of the covering law model is the belief 
that scientific explanation is always in the nature of a logical argu-
ment. Furthermore, this argument is deductive in form, deriving the 
occurrence of the particular experience under scrutiny from a more 
general set of "covering laws". Thus the theory is alternatively 
described as deductive-nomological. 
The proposed structure of any scientific explanation consists 
of two parts: the explanandum and the explanans. The former is a 
sentence which describes the phenomenon in question and which must 
be logically entailed by the explanans. The latter is the class of 
sentences which are adduced to account for the phenomenon, divided 
into sentences which state specific antecedent conditions and sen-
tences which represent general laws. The explanans must contain at 
least one general law essentially required for the derivation of the 





To illustrate this form of explanation, Hempel and Oppenheim 
consider the phenomenon of a rowing boat's oar appearing to bend as 
i t enters the water. Here the general laws needed are those of 
refraction and the property that water is an optically denser medium 
than air, whilst the antecedent conditions include those that the oar is 
partially in water, partially in air and that an oar is practically a 
straight piece of wood. From this explanans can be deduced the 
explanandum that the oar will appear bent. 
As a description of the scientific ideal, the covering law 
model has the advantage of being close to science as i t is practised, 
at least in the case of physics. The scientist aims to discover more 
and more general laws under which greater numbers of phenomena 
become explicable. Indeed, this theory of explanation became the con-
sensus view of philosophers of science during the 1950's and 1960's, 
being labelled as the received view. One of its virtues in gaining this 
consensus was that i t returned a form of necessity into explanation 
from the wilderness into which Hume had sent i t . The antecedent 
conditions in a logical sense necessitated the explanandum. Yet i t 
could still be supported by positivists who might point out that the 
general laws themselves needed to be no more than generalisations 
from observed regularities. Hempel and Oppenheim themselves took 
this view. 
The deductive-nomological model is not, however, without its 
difficulties. Some of these are technical in nature, arising from its 
claim to be a complete presentation of the logical structure of explana-
tion. Other difficulties are, perhaps, of a more profound nature. 
The f i r s t group of difficulties concern the nature of explana-
tion. Hempel and Oppenheim insist that, 
"...scientific research in its various branches strives to go 
beyond a mere description of its subject matter by pro-
viding an explanation of the phenomena i t investigates."1 9 
But i t proves unclear that the received view has in fact moved 
beyond a form of positivistic description. Michael Scriven, for 
example, argues that the role of general laws in the logical empiricists' 
scheme is a red herring: mention of such laws sometimes only justifies 
the explanation, but does not form part of i t 2 0 . He gives the example 
of someone knocking over an ink bottle whilst reaching for a ciga-
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rette. The explanation for the resultant ink stain on the carpet does 
not need to involve the statement of Newton's laws; i t is simply that 
the ink bottle was knocked over. 
Furthermore, scientific explanations seem to have an asym-
metry which logical arguments do not. An example of this is consid-
ered by Sylvain Bromberger21. Given a flagpole of a certain height 
standing on level ground and given that the sun is at a certain ele-
vation in a clear sky, then the length of the flagpole's shadow can be 
deduced, assuming the law of the rectilinear propagation of light. Yet 
the covering law model of explanation equally could be used to deduce 
the height of the flagpole given the length of its shadow, which few 
would wish to concede could actually be called an explanation of the 
flagpole's height. 
Functional explanation provides another area of difficulty. 
For instance, a functional explanation is constituted by the statement 
that the role of the heart in a vertebrate is to circulate blood 
through the body. Is this type of explanation valid? Hempel argued 
that i t is not, for the following reason22. I t is possible to assert that 
if the heart beat exists and the vertebrate is in normal conditions, 
then the system which is the vertebrate will function normally. How-
ever, i f the deductive-nomological model is to be followed, we would 
have to deduce from the prevalent conditions and from the fact that 
the living system is operating normally, the conclusion that the heart 
beat is necessary. But this cannot be done, for we do not know that 
some item other than a heart beat could equally well have achieved 
the function of circulating blood. The demand of the covering law 
model that the explanandum is deducible from the explanans remains 
unmet. 
The antipathy of logical empiricism to functional explanation 
is not unexpected, since such philosophy is suspicious of anything 
which approaches teleology. So i f i t were to be found that teleological 
and functional explanations were both needed and valid in science, 
this would be a serious breach in the logical empiricists' case. Yet i t 
does appear that the covering law model is severely restrictive in 
what i t allows as an explanation. As Wesley Salmon comments: 
"Hempel's analysis of functions is, I think, logically impec-
cable... But I have often noticed that, in philosophy as 
well as other human endeavours, one person's counter-
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example is another's modus ponens. Hempel concludes 
from his discussion that functional analysis cannot qualify 
as an admissible type of explanation; at best, i t has heur-
istic value. Others, myself included, would take the moral 
to be that, since functional explanations play a legitimate 
scientific role, explanations cannot always be arguments of 
the sorts endorsed by the received view." 2 3 
This group of criticisms may lead us to conclude that the 
deductive-nomological model has fundamental problems with its notion 
of explanation. On one side, some of its explanations appear to be 
little more than descriptions; on the other, the form of argument to 
the explanandum appears in many cases to be rather artificial and too 
restrictive. 
The second area of difficulty arises with the extension of the 
covering law model to include statistical scientific explanation. Hempel 
and Oppenheim acknowledged from the outset that not all explanation 
is deductive-nomological by nature, but i t was not until 1965 that 
Hempel produced a final scheme for dealing with probabilistic phe-
nomena24. He proposed that statistical explanation should be dealt 
with inductively, so giving the name, the inductive-statistical model. 
Its outline is similar to the deductive-nomological model, except now 
the explanandum is to be expected with a high degree of inductive 
probability rather than with certainty; the general laws in the expla-
nans are accordingly to be statistical in nature. 
However, having the explanandum inductively expected is not 
convincing. Consider a stochastic process, such as a machine which 
randomly selects balls upon which numbers are printed for a game of 
bingo. At the f i r s t draw of a ball, 90% of the numbers which could be 
selected do not end with the digit zero. I t is therefore to be 
expected inductively that the f i r s t number called will not end in a 
zero; thus, i f in an actual game this is so, we have an inductive-
statistical explanation of the occurrence. Yet i t would then seem 
artificial to say that, should the f i r s t number called in fact end in a 
zero, we have no explanation of this fact since i t was not inductively 
to be expected: surely we understand the improbable outcome just as 
well as that which is probable. Statistical explanations intuitively 
remain valid even when the events they describe turn out to be stat-
istically unlikely. This is contrary to Hempel's proposal. 
We have discussed the covering-law model at some length, 
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both because i t has been of major influence in the philosophy science 
and also since i t reveaLs some important points regarding the nature 
of physical laws. First, the attempt to use general laws in an all-
embracing scheme of scientific explanation appears to fai l . There is a 
pluralism of explanation, which in particular includes a functional or 
teleologioal type. I f there are general laws, they cannot be as simply 
interpreted as the nomological-deductive model suggests for their 
explanatory potential to be reaped. Secondly, i f statistical laws exist, 
they pose severe problems for a covering-law type of model. 
These considerations have led a number of philosophers to 
draw the conclusion that some form of causality must again be 
accorded to the world beyond the logical structure we happen to 
choose for our explanations. Explanations are more than sketches of 
our collective observations and have a deeper content. Such is the 
opinion, for example, of Salmon, a one-time supporter of the covering 
law model: 
" [ I ] maintain that explanations reveal the mechanisms, 
causal or other, that produces the facts we are trying to 
explain."2 5 
We are therefore moved towards a realist account of science 
by the inability of other descriptions to lend sufficient weight to the 
conviction that, on the one hand, explanations actually uncover some-
thing about the world, and, on the other hand, that scientific explana-
tion makes use of a whole range of explanatory forms, not simply 
those allowed by any particular model of science. However, a radically 
different understanding in science has been argued for influential!y 
by Thomas Kuhn, which we shall f i r s t briefly mention. 
(d) Kuhnian relativism 
By studying the history of science, Kuhn has claimed that 
which scientific theories are accepted or rejected is largely deter-
mined by social pressures within the community of scientists2 6. 
During stable periods, scientists operate according to a largely 
unstated paradigm consisting of a mixture of theories, accepted proce-
dures and experiments. Within this paradigm, much that goes on can 
be described as no more than problem solving. However, at certain 
times, revolutionary pressures in the scientific community overthrow 
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the current paradigm, replacing i t by another. For instance, in the 
early twentieth century, Newtonian mechanics was overthrown by Ein-
steinian relativity. Importantly, Kuhn argued that any two paradigms 
are incommensurable: scientists working with different paradigms can 
be said not to inhabit the same world in their outlooks. Thus a rela-
tivism is introduced into scientific findings, although Kuhn in fact 
denies the label of relativist. 
The view appears to be overstated, however: f i rs t , pressures 
for change build up over a period of time; secondly, the old paradigm 
is rarely ful ly overturned. For instance, Newtonian mechanics remains 
ful ly understood; in everyday terms, i t is still our view of the world. 
Kuhn's work is a reminder that the path of scientific prog-
ress is not entirely determined by rational considerations. Neverthe-
less, the scientific enterprise is more than a successful, but compro-
mised, group activity in which the participants are limited by 
whichever paradigm currently holds sway. This is also the view of 
scientific realism. 
(e) Scientific realism 
A realist view of scientific explanation is of course open to 
criticism in all the ways available to Hume: in particular, i t demands 
that reliable generalisations be made from limited observations of 
particulars. Perhaps the only adequate response to such a criticism 
is to point out that the available alternative accounts of science 
appear to undermine any meaningful explanation whatsoever. By mak-
ing any explanation of an event equivalent to its description, they are 
ultimately sceptical; yet the last century has seen such progress in 
science, with feats of highly accurate prediction in quantum theory 
especially, that such scepticism can begin to seem nothing less than 
perverse. 
This is not to suggest that the claims of science should be 
accepted at face value. Rather, i t is to discount those theories of 
science which a priori do not accept that our deeper understanding of 
the physical nature of our universe may be advanced. We know now, 
for instance, the chemical basis by which genetic characteristics are 
translated from parent to child, which understanding itself derived 
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from the explication of the many other processes needed in its exper-
imental determination. Such progress in understanding seems to me to 
be incomprehensible unless the trai l of scientific investigation has 
actually engaged with some corresponding reality in the world. 
I t also suggests that, at f i r s t sight, so-called instrumentalism 
is too harsh an assessment of what we can claim to know. Instrumen-
talism contends that, whilst a scientific theory may lead to correct 
empirical conclusions, any terms in that theory which are not directly 
related to observation should not be regarded as having any ontologi-
cal reference. Recently Bas van Fraassen has argued, for example, 
that all we are entitled to conclude is that things behave as i f there 
were some unobserved entities, such as electrons or photons27. I t is 
of no advantage, van Fraassen points out, to our ability to explain 
phenomena i f all we can do is shift unexplained macroscopic regularit-
ies to unexplained microscopic regularities. 
However, Salmon gives as an counter-example the many meth-
ods which exist for empirically determining Avogadro's number, the 
number of molecules in a mole of a gas. Because all these entirely 
different determinations agree, then there are surely good grounds 
for believing in the reality of Avogadro's number and of the molecules 
that i t counts2 8. Caution is needed in dealing with theoretical 
entities, but what at one time is merely a hypothetical construct might 
eventually gain a sufficient variety of empirical backing to become 
accepted as actual. Although - or perhaps because - science is 
always corrigible, its advances are not simply illusory but may be 
substantiated. 
Such a cautious but realist approach to science, known as 
critical realism, has been much advanced in recent years2 9. Some of 
the implications of critical realism will be worked through in the 
remainder of this thesis, but i t is worth noting already that such a 
realism is not an easy option in the consideration of divine interac-
tion. As was pointed out above, positivism is fundamentally agnostic 
concerning the reality beyond us and so actually grants freedom for 
God's action at a physical level. What we cannot in principle know, 
cannot be known to have been violated by God. But there is a f u r -
ther point to be made. Up until the 1940's or so, i t was widely held, 
at any rate in philosophy, that science had no business to explain, 
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but only to describa. This was partly in reaction against the meta-
physical claims of German idealism which wanted to imbue natural and 
historical processes with purpose. Critical realism marks a growing 
confidence that, on the contrary, science can teach not only that 
something happens, but why it comes to happen as well. This confi-
dence finds expression, for instance, in the writings of Jacques Monod 
and Richard Dawkins, to whom we shall turn later. But this new 
scientific realism has little room for divine interaction since it views 
theory as providing a totally reliable map of reality: an interaction 
barred in science's theoretical outlook is also barred in reality. 
The growth of realism is thus a mixed blessing regarding the 
easy formulation of analogies for the observable aspects of God's 
action in our world. The scientific method does indeed reveal an 
ordered world which operates causally according to law-like principles. 
A certain realism is appropriate in accepting the results of scientific 
enquiry, even though such realism remains critical and acknowledges 
that the scientific method is not above question. But the weakness in 
the scientific method, due to the limits of induction, is to be exploited 
carefully, if at all, in delineating divine activity. For the problem of 
induction has not proved to be fatal to science, but merely to be the 
sign of a limitation with which all rational enquiry has to contend. 
Critical realism acknowledges that scientific theory cannot be a strait-
jacket with which to inhibit God's activity; but it also demands that 
scientific insights be treated with utmost seriousness. 
We see ourselves to be living in a world of regular order, 
even if not a world of mechanical determinism. In the next chapter 
we shall investigate whether that regularity may itself be theologically 
fruitful if linked to a theological determinism. 
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Chapter 4; Physical Lare and Tfaeotoqisal DeterTOiadsmi 
In the previous chapter, we argued that science's view of a 
world of regular order needs to be taken seriously, forming the con-
text in which divine action should be conceptualized. We had already 
suggested, in chapter two, that those attempts prove inadequate which 
try to understand God's interaction by entirely side-stepping issues 
of science. It seems one should explicitly relate science and theology 
within one system of thought; thus it might appear that one must look 
to the results of science itself to indicate possible modes of divine 
interaction. This we shall do in due course. 
However, in this chapter we shall investigate a mediating 
position between looking for God's interaction within science and find-
ing God's interaction outside science altogether. Such a position is 
founded upon the classical tradition of theological determinism, with 
the affirmation that such determinism is fully reflected in the regular 
natural order. That is not to say that such order must therefore be 
mechanically deterministic, which it indeed seems not to be. Rather, 
where natural laws are probabilistic in form, then we are merely com-
mitted to the proposition that God determines the outcome of each 
physical event without violating any such laws. 
As a means of allowing some of the issues to emerge, we shall 
begin by considering theological determinism combined with a mecha-
nistically determinist view of science, before also considering the 
introduction of scientific indeterminism. In fact, this is not in any 
case entirely an artificial procedure, for two reasons. 
First, our universe is seen to be deterministic in a number 
of important respects. We look upon the natural world as essentially 
predictable and reliable: the sun will rise tomorrow; a swinging pen-
dulum will continue to mark time steadily. Where there is unpredicta-
bility, such as in forecasting the weather, we consider this to be a 
sign of our ignorance and incompetence rather than a fundamental 
characteristic of our world. Radioactive atoms may decay at random, 
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but this is remote from our immediate experience; indeed, that is why 
random phenomena become so fascinating to us. Thus it is within this 
outward framework of predictability that we experience the divine. Of 
course, we should note that an exception to such predictability comes 
in our experience of the mental life; this will require more detailed 
discussion later. 
Secondly, in the discussion of divine action, the contrast 
with determinism cannot be an indeterminism in the sense of utter 
randomness. God's action is presumably not random but highly pur-
poseful, so that difficulties encountered in trying to discern divine 
action in a highly ordered universe will not necessarily be eased 
merely by introducing an element of randomness. The problem of a 
regular universe, we propose, is in seeing any transcendent meaning 
in events which themselves are known to be fixedly ordered. It would 
be equally difficult to find meaning in utter disorder. 
In considering issues of theological determinism, we turn 
first to its classical exposition by Calvin before investigating whether 
or how such a theology may be combined with mechanical determinism. 
(a) Calvin and determinism 
Calvin is strongly deterministic, claiming that all that hap-
pens is the consequence of God's direct will from moment to moment. 
He does not uphold, however, mechanical determinism, by which we 
mean the belief that everything is determined as the consequence of 
fixed, essentially non-probabilistic natural laws. 
Calvin's determinism stems from a strong view of God's omni-
potence: 
"And, indeed, God claims omnipotence to himself and would 
have us acknowledge it, not such as the sophists imagine, 
vain, idle, and almost asleep, but vigilant, efficacious, 
operative, and engaged in continual action... applied in 
every single and particular movement."1 
Such a strong view of theological determinism immediately 
raises questions of human freedom, especially regarding the freedom 
of the will. Free will encapsulates the notion that our decisions are 
entirely our own, arrived at privately beyond the inspection of others 
and not necessitated by any external cause. We are responsible for 
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our decisions precisely because they cannot be predicted, remaining 
unknown to others until we by our actions reveal them. William of 
Ockham, for instance, defined free will as, 
"that power whereby I can do diverse things indifferently 
and contingently, such that I can cause, or not cause, the 
same effect, when all conditions other than this power are 
the same."2 
So it is that if anyone knows today that Samuel will drink coffee 
tomorrow, then he no longer has free will in that matter. But if God 
disposes all things, then none of us would seem to possess such free 
will. 
Such a view of free will, however, might simply prove to be 
an unrealistic conception of what freedom entails. Thus Hume, who 
was impatient of what he saw as a fruitless debate about free will, 
wrote: 
"By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or 
not acting, according to the determinations of the will... 
Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to 
belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in 
chains."3 
Freedom is then not an attribute of some supposed will, but is pos-
sessed by a creature as a whole when its actions are neither coerced 
nor constrained by external forces or agents. Seen in this way, it 
would be irrelevant to freedom even should someone's internal func-
tioning be determined by predictable causes. Hume favours this "lib-
erty of spontaneity" over the "liberty of indifference", otherwise 
known as libertarian free will. This is the position of the so-called 
compatibilists who claim that freedom is consistent with determinism. 
Much theology has been compatibilist in outlook, including 
Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin. Secular philosophy has been also, in 
the line of Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Mill. I take it that Daniel Den-
nett, for instance, would argue that libertarian free will is more than 
any of us actually needs to believe: it is our ideal, but merely a 
projection from the sort of free will we actually experience. He con-
siders why we might think we are free in our actions, and wonders 
whether it is because a small stimulus can give rise to a large effect: 
"We see the dramatic effects leaving; we don't see the 
causes entering; we are tempted by the hypothesis that 
there are no causes."4 
And, on the other hand, we are tempted to fear unseen manipulators, 
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malign forces ruling our decisions. But Dennett writes, taking a com-
patibilist's point of view, 
"...my conclusion is optimistic: free will is not an illusion... 
When we look closely at the sources of our suspicion and 
dread, we find again and again that they are not indis-
putable axioms or overwhelmingly well-supported, empirical 
discoveries, but unfocused images, hastily glanced at."5 
Donald MacKay has sought to defend compatibilism in a theo-
logical and scientific context. He claims to be able to show that, 
should our world be mechanically deterministic, this would not effect 
our freedom, even should we acknowledge that in principle we could 
predict free actions. 
MacKay's demonstration proceeds as follows5. First he dis-
tinguishes between the "I-story" of some conscious subject A, from 
the "Observer-story" of those around. At time t, A's brain state is 
BS(t). Wow consider the correct description D = "BS(t)", which some 
observer could in principle deduce at an earlier time and predict for 
A (assuming compatibilism to be correct). Now A would be wrong to 
believe D at time t, for in the very act of so doing his brain state 
would alter and D would become untrue. Neither would it be the case 
that D' could command A's logical assent, where D' includes A's 
holding of the belief that D' is correct. For whether D' is true 
depends upon whether A chooses to believe it or not and, MacKay 
argues, this remains true even should we be able to predict whether 
or not A will accept D'. The crux of the matter is that, even when 
physically determined, A cannot logically be compelled to accept any 
statement about what his future brain state (and hence choice) will 
be. MacKay calls this state of affairs logical indeterminacy, and 
writes: 
"What [an observer] is correct to believe about A is some-
thing that would not be true information-for-A if he (A) 
had it. What we have proved is thus an ontological 
rather than a merely epistemological point: it is the non-
existence of a unique solution to the state-equation valid 
for A, and not merely its undiscoverability by A." 
"Thus even in a physically determinate world the outcome 
of A's decision has an immutable - i.e. unchangeable -
specification only for those who are causally uncoupled 
from it until after the event."7 
MacKay's argument seems to be that an observer and a subject will 
always experience events in a different way because the logical status 
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of certain propositions are not the same for each. That which appears 
determined for nne will not be so for the other, because there is in 
operation something like the opposite of a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Some very clever person could sit in isolation and correctly predict 
the future of the universe in every detail; but were he to leak those 
findings in any respect, then they could no longer be valid. 
Thus MacKay's argument supports the conclusion of Dennett 
we quoted above. The fear that compatibilism in some way imprisons 
us and robs us of choice is groundless. 
Issues of free will are perplexing partly because there is so 
much emotion involved. Humans like to imagine they are autonomous 
and that they progress into the future without being tied by their 
past. Both of these interrelated hopes appear threatened by deter-
minism. Our autonomy is undermined, since knowing the state of the 
universe many years ago would seem to allow someone to predict what 
we will be doing tomorrow, as also the whole course of history. 
Adding a degree of indeterminism in the world might counteract such 
a prediction, but only perhaps by adding a source of randomness to 
our actions. Likewise, determinism undermines our sense that the 
future is open and undecided. 
Compatibilism's truth appears to remain undecided, although 
Richard Swinburne suggests that it is losing popularity. It is being 
argued instead, he writes, that both determinism and indeterminism 
undermine any moral responsibility8. Whether or not this is so, 
compatibilism has certainly lost popularity theologically. Partially this 
may stem from a reaction against mechanical determinism in the 
sciences. Largely, however, it arises from the use of the free-will 
defence against the problem of evil, where it is God's gift of freedom 
to his creation which distances him from responsibility for evil. 
Any strong view of God's providence inevitably leads to 
problems concerning human evil, problems of which Calvin was well 
aware. If God disposes all things, then it seems he also disposes the 
evil which any person may enact. How can the implication be avoided 
that God's omnipotence is being used for evil and so how can a human 
be held responsible for God's evil? Although he uses three chapters 
in the Institutes of the Christian Religion in his defence, Calvin never 
appears to resolve the difficulty. In fact, one must say that his 
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inability to make full sense of human responsibility in the light of 
such a strong determinism casts into some doubt the possibility of any 
theologically deterministic Christianity. The following is typical of 
Calvin's defence: 
"If all such persons [e.g. murderers] serve the will of God, 
why should they be punished? I deny that they serve 
the will of God... while the matter and guilt of wickedness 
belongs to the wicked man, why should it be thought that 
God contracts any impurity in using it at pleasure as his 
instrument? 
"[My opponents'] objection - that if nothing happens with-
out the will of God, he must have two contrary wills, 
decreeing by a secret counsel what he has openly forbid-
den in his law - is easily disposed of... The will of God 
is not at variance with itself... while in himself the will is 
one and undivided, to us it appears manifold, because, 
from the feebleness of our intellect, we cannot comprehend 
how, though after a different manner, he wills and not 
wills the very same thing."9 
Paul Helm, a contemporary theologian sympathetic to Calvin, 
admits that God's apparent responsibility for human evil is indeed a 
weak point: 
"It might appear that whatever the merits of compatibilism 
within the assumptions of Christian theism, it has the 
disadvantage of directly implicating God in human evil, 
since God ordains sets of circumstances which are causally 
sufficient for evil actions by human beings. It is true 
that this is a not entirely welcome result..."1* 
However, Helm argues that any theological outlook involves God in 
some responsibility for evil, if only in that he could have refrained 
from creating the universe in the first place. 
The question of compatibilism remains open. However, compa-
tibilism when combined with theological determinism does create prob-
lems in interpreting God's goodness. Those who defend it claim that 
here our human understanding has reached its limits of comprehen-
sion. Thus, Helm writes on a related topic: 
"In dealing with the providence of God, therefore, we are 
dealing with matters of ultimate significance for which 
there is no further explanation... the will of God, and the 
holy and wise reasons he has for the exercise of that will, 
are the highest court of appeal (highest in the logical 
sense). There cannot be a higher court, and so, unsatis-
factory though it may be, we must rest content with that 
ultimate reference to the will of God."u 
This follows Calvin, whose belief was that God in himself is utterly 
beyond anything his creation can comprehend. We only know God by 
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his accommodating (as Calvin terms it) knowledge of himself to our 
weak intellects. Our knowledge of God is entirely dependent upon 
God's own gracious disclosure of himself. Such seems to be the limit 
beyond which we cannot look in considering God's omnipotence. There 
will always be horizons in any theology which allows that no human 
rationality is fully equal to the task which theology itself sets us, but 
those horizons need to be selected carefully. What makes Calvin 
choose divine omnipotence as one of them? 
The proposition is doubtless defensible that the majority of 
the Bible is deterministic in outlook, and it is this which Calvin has 
developed. Yet the question may be pressed why Calvin should 
favour the development of some doctrines above others from Scripture. 
A possible answer is one common to the reformation era: a desire to 
secure the notion of justification by grace alone. If believers are to 
rejoice that they have been redeemed solely by God's grace, then they 
need to be assured that no created agency can thwart that design. 
So Calvin wrote: 
"This rather is the solace of the faithful, in their adver-
sity, that everything which they endure is by the ordina-
tion and command of God, that they are under his 
hand."12 
This statement, to which we shall return, points us to the 
question of revelation. How can the truth of it be known? It is 
important to ask, in the view of a writer who at any rate accepts 
determinism, what his view of the source of such revelation may be. 
When we come to consider mechanical determinism, that will be a cru-
cial question, for we shall find that it is the concept of revelation 
which becomes problematical. 
(b) Calvin's view of revelation 
Calvin allows that there is a sensus divinitatis in all people, 
sufficient to allow them no excuse for being ignorant of God's demands 
(cf. Romans 1). Yet the fall has ensured that such a faculty is now 
utterly corrupted, so much so that any worship of God offered by the 
non-Christian is worse than idolatry. Thus, there is no longer any 
revelation to be gained naturally. For Calvin, the only remaining 
source of revelation available to us is made up of two elements: first 
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Scripture and secondly, with equal importance, the internal testimony 
of the Holy Spirit. 
First, then, Calvin views Scripture as central in all revelation 
of God. If we were not fallen, we could perceive the glory of God in 
his creation around us; but being fallen, we can only see that glory 
when we view the universe through the spectacles of Scripture, to 
use Calvin's favoured analogy13. 
Yet God's word in Scripture is not enough in itself; the sec-
ond necessary element is the present internal testimony of the Holy 
Spirit: 
"For as God alone can properly bear witness to his own 
words, so these words will not obtain full credit in the 
hearts of men, until they are sealed by the inward testi-
mony of the Spirit. The same Spirit, therefore, who spoke 
by the mouth of the prophets, must penetrate our hearts, 
in order to convince us that they faithfully delivered the 
message with which they were divinely entrusted."14 
Although the Holy Spirit is the sole means of validating the Scrip-
tures, nevertheless Calvin presents further "secondary" arguments for 
accepting its authenticity: its arrangement, dignity, truth, simplicity 
and efficacy15. This willingness to indicate further proofs suggests 
in itself that Calvin finds it difficult to identify in what this inner 
testimony of the Spirit consists. It is certainly not clear from his 
works; the uncertainty is further indicated in Calvin's treatment of 
Scripture's inspiration. 
For Calvin, the apostles were, "sure and authentic aman-
uenses of the Holy Spirit"16, and he finds that dreams and visions 
were the "two ordinary methods of revelation"17 by which God's words 
were dictated. Yet Calvin is concerned that the prophets could have 
been misled: 
"Whenever God intends to make known his counsel by 
dreams, he engraves on them certain marks which distin-
guish them from passing and frivolous imaginations, in 
order that their credibility and authority may stand 
firm."" 
"Since Satan is a wonderful adept at deceiving... it was 
necessary that some sure and notable distinction should 
appear in true and heavenly oracles which would not suf-
fer the faith and the minds of the holy fathers to 
waver."" 
As in the case of the testimony of the Spirit to the reader of Scrip-
ture, however, Calvin never tries to fix the 'mark' which distinguishes 
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genuine visions. But it is clear that he feels that some such super-
natural marker is needed for us to be assured that our revelation of 
God is genuine. 
This completes the sketch of Calvin's thought so far as it 
concerns us. It has two major features: the absolute providence of 
God which from moment to moment determines every event which 
occurs; and the revelation of God through the agency of the Holy 
Spirit and the necessary instrument of Scripture. Let us first con-
sider whether the replacement of a theological determinism by mechan-
ical determinism would render Calvin's theology incoherent, and what 
can then be learnt of the implications of such a determinism. 
(c) Mechanically deterministic theology 
Under mechanical determinism, nothing happens in the world 
which is not fully determined by non-probabilistic natural laws. Cal-
vin himself rejected such determinism20, but is his theology inherently 
opposed to it? Our initial answer is surely affirmative. At the centre 
of all that we have been considering is God's downward movement of 
grace, without which humanity is spiritually blind. The focus of this 
grace is found in the Holy Spirit, present to the believer. But a 
believer who is nothing more than a mechanical system is not open to 
any external non-material interaction; there is then no point of inter-
action between the material and the divine. This is not to suggest 
that spirit is some sort of quasi-material stuff, but a means of identi-
fying communication with God. In such a world, the Bible could have 
come to be written, but it would be entirely earth-bound without the 
validation of the Holy Spirit, as Calvin effectively argues. The prob-
lem for Calvin would be, how could one know personally with certainty 
God's good intentions? 
It is the personal aspect of religious faith which causes 
problems. In such a mechanical world, it might be possible to use a 
form of the cosmological and teleological arguments to suggest God's 
existence, but a relationship with such a God would be far from that 
traditionally understood by Christians. Here one must be careful to 
say what is meant, since such a relationship can at most be analogous 
to a personal relationship with another human being. Perhaps there 
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can be a proper meaning to such terminology even in a mechanical 
world if the relationship is only indirectly with God, but directly with 
his creation. Creation would then be interpreted in terms of God's 
intentions towards us. But it is far from clear what the actual 
grounding in God of such a relationship would be. Faith for Calvin 
has a supra-rational content in the knowledge of God21; presumably 
mechanical creation would be subject to rational laws. Even should 
compatibilism ensure our minds were free and rational, nevertheless 
those minds would illustrate the empiricists' dilemma. The only source 
of knowledge for those mechanical brains would seem to be via the 
senses, yet we have seen in the previous chapter that such a model 
of knowledge appears to lead only to scepticism. Whilst such a brain 
could enjoy the fruit of a poetic imagination, in terms of knowledge it 
could only look to the analysis of sense data. In a world where all 
events are determined by mechanical law, these sense data could carry 
no communication from a personal God. 
One strategy to deal with this problem of God's communica-
tion might be to increase the force of one's determinism by supposing 
that the only truth which there is, has been programmed into the 
mechanical system. Just as a computer may complete correctly a 
rational calculation although the machine itself has no inherent 
rational freedom, so all that happens in the world may have been set 
up so that humanity arrives at a correct belief in God even whilst it 
lacks the means to find God independently. Thus one says, "I know 
God's good intentions towards me because I happen to believe in them. 
That I believe this shows itself that God has set up the network of 
mechanistic causation of which I am part in order that I should 
believe. Thus, so far as anything can be known to be true in a 
deterministic system, it is true that God has good intentions towards 
me." This belief is coherent, although it undermines any notion of 
human responsibility, as also the notion of absolute truth. Further-
more, it might in fact not be too far from Calvin's ideas, notwithstand-
ing his dislike of perpetual chains of causes. It preserves our utter 
creaturehood under God's dominion who carefully set in motion the 
series of causes; it also allows Calvin's belief in pre-election: only 
those who have been given the right ears may hear. Nevertheless, 
this view does not hold much appeal, preserving God only by proxy in 
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his creation. 
Perhaps it is possible to save the situation by the introduc-
tion of miracles as the means of God's self-revelation. We could here 
envisage arbitrarily many miracles occurring, although this seems 
implausible on two counts. First, the description of the universe as 
mechanically deterministic would then hardly be accurate, since much 
that happened would not be in accordance with physical law. Sec-
ondly, the adequacy of God's creation would be called into question. 
It would seem that the creation which God saw to be good could only 
fulfil his purposes by its natural order being constantly overridden. 
Indeed, this objection can be raised generally against the occurrence 
of miracles. 
If one wishes to preserve Calvin's view of God as active at 
every point in history, one might think that a very high number of 
miracles would be needed. Yet we suggested above that Calvin's moti-
vation in wishing to preserve God's absolute providence was the 
assurance of our redemption. He wanted to demonstrate the certainty 
of God's salvation in the life of the believer by indicating that noth-
ing in heaven or earth could overcome God's benevolent protection 
and his justice. 
However, if it is indeed the case that Calvin wanted to 
secure justification by grace alone, then it is not fundamentally nec-
essary that the lives of believers on earth should be guaranteed by 
God in every mundane detail. It is sufficient for the individual to be 
assured of ultimate salvation; for Calvin, that assurance consists of 
the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit vindicating the witness of 
Scripture, as we have seen above. Thus it seems that if each individ-
ual experiences once the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, then it 
is possible for the rest of Calvin's theology to remain largely intact. 
Having once been assured about the reliability of Scripture, the 
believer can confidently use Scripture as spectacles for viewing cre-
ation. A version of Calvin's system survives mechanical determinism, 
assuming that God intervenes a minimum of once in the life of every 
believer. 
Of course, this is not to pretend that major changes from 
Calvin's outlook would not then be needed. Quite apart from miracles 
and the sacraments, Calvin sees God's justice constantly at work. Yet 
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on the other hand, certain aspects of mechanical determinism fit in 
well with Calvin's views, especially those on pre-election. The impor-
tance of pre-election in Calvin's theology should not be overstated, 
but is the other side of the coin in emphasising God's omnipotence. 
Calvin also ties into this issue the reformation view of humanity's lack 
of free wiH: 
"If such a barren invention [as free will] is accepted, 
where will that omnipotence of God be whereby he regu-
lates all things according to his secret plan, which 
depends solely upon itself?"22 
Free will here is not so much the will to make the common choices of 
one's life, as the will to choose or reject higher spiritual realities; it 
appears to be consistent with a world of mechanical determinism. 
If this view is accepted, that is mechanical determinism with 
an occasional intervention by God, then we have a picture of people 
living lives without metaphysical free will, some of whom by divine 
favour know themselves to be redeemed, relying upon Scripture for a 
true view of the world. There are wider difficulties with this view, 
but one guesses that such difficulties would not severely worry Cal-
vin. Two of them are as follows. 
First, as Aubrey Moore noted, there are difficulties with any 
doctrine which involves only God's occasional intervention: "A theory 
of occasional intervention implies as its correlative a theory of ordi-
nary absence." Thus a common consideration nowadays is that if God 
could intervene in any one instance, then why did he not intervene to 
prevent Auschwitz? Once we allow God to intervene in the affairs of 
the world, but on only a limited number of occasions, then deep ques-
tions arise about God's own morality, or at least the mysterious ways 
in which he moves. Calvin would no doubt consign such questions to 
the unknowable mystery of God's inner councils. 
A second difficulty is how the inner testimony of the Spirit 
is to be recognised by a believer. This is a problem already present 
in Calvin's original scheme, as we noted: what mark could be given us 
to indicate Scripture's reliability? But it is made more pressing when 
God's direct activity is not commonplace. As Hume argued in the case 
of miracles, the less common an occurrence, the more evidence we 
need to believe it. If God rarely acts, then his action could be 
misconstrued merely as an unfamiliar natural phenomenon. This prob-
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lem is not in essence reduced even if such testimony repeatedly 
occurs, say whenever one is actually reading Scripture. Our experi-
ences are interpreted in a wider framework of beliefs, but there would 
be no wider framework under which to comprehend some effect syn-
chronized with scripture reading. For instance, some such effect 
could conceivably be a warning that Scripture is false and not true; 
there would seem to be no way to know. 
We conclude, therefore, that a theology which proposes that 
creation is mechanically deterministic, with a God who considers him-
self free to intervene, is fundamentally coherent with Calvin's views. 
However, such a theology is not without problems. There is first the 
apparently arbitrary nature of God's actual interventions; more impor-
tantly for us, there is the difficulty of recognising in principle God's 
interactions against a background of regularity. 
(d) Theological determinism raith. physical indetermLnism 
We have been examining theological determinism in the light 
of mechanical determinism. Even if we are prepared to accept theo-
logical determinism, with its weakness in God's apparent responsibility 
for evil, we have found difficulties in its combination with a mechani-
cal determinism. These problems are associated in particular with 
revelation. Let us now consider the case when physical indeterminism 
is introduced. 
First, the form of compatLbilism to which one is committed can 
be modified. No longer need it be straightforwardly a compatibilism 
with mechanical determinism, but rather with theological determinism. 
This may free us from the sense of being absolutely bound by our 
history; God would be able to act graciously to create something new 
in our lives. 
Secondly, it appears that the problems encountered concern-
ing revelation are eased, especially if one is not willing to counte-
nance the presence of miracles. If there are elements of indetermi-
nacy in the world, then God could possibly use correlations of events 
(within the limits set by probabilistic physical laws) in order to 
commune with his creation. However, a point made innocently by 
Donald MacKay gives cause for concern: 
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'"Natural laws' are neither necessary nor even available to 
[God] as an instrument of creation; for he creates by a 
mere word, and what we call natural laws emerge only 
post hoc as features of and within the created order."23 
Accepting this seems to imply that natural laws are something of an 
illusion. They do not actually govern what is happening in our world; 
they are only the regular patterns which God has allowed to emerge 
in his creation. This might be merely curious if the laws involved are 
fully deterministic. But where the laws are in deterministic, there is 
an awkward suggestion that we are deceived by those laws we prop-
erly deduce empirically. There is in reality no such thing as a ran-
dom physical event, since God has determined each one. Why then 
does he arrange the creation so that we are led to believe that inde-
terministic laws actually function? In the absence of some good rea-
son, our belief in a God of truth seems compromised: God would seem 
to mislead us into believing that there is physical significance in the 
probabilistic patterns we observe, when there is none. 
It is noticeable that the problems of mechanical determinism 
are not assuaged merely by the introduction of indeterminism. To be 
intelligible, theological determinism appears to need miracle or a 
peculiar form of physical indeterminism in order to allow for revela-
tion, and either option has difficulties. Before concluding our discus-
sion of determinism, however, one more factor needs to be introduced: 
that of God's timeless eternity. Here, we will suggest both that mod-
ern science might favour such timelessness and also that this itself 
would then imply a theological determinism. 
(e) God, timeless eternity and determnism 
William Alston has stated the principle that, "wherever pos-
sible, we should subordinate ontological categories to God rather than 
subsuming God under the categories."24 One question is therefore 
whether time should be included under this principle, whether God 
himself is bound to experience successiveness as does his creation. 
This is a multi-faceted question with many diverse implications. Fur-
thermore, there is no clear court of appeal to decide the issue. Tra-
ditionally, God is deemed to be eternal, but the meaning of that term 
has been interpreted differently. The Bible itself, for instance, 
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arguably understands eternal to mean everlasting, whilst classical 
theology usually understands eternal in the sense of timeless. 
In our deliberations, we are attempting to take the findings 
of modern science seriously. One of the more startling developments 
of this century has been the theory of relativity; and it seems to me 
that this theory suggests that the flow of time we experience is in 
fact not fundamental to the ordering of any created universe, but 
contingent, for the following reason. 
Special relativity may be derived mathematically from one 
observation (or, strictly, hypothesis). If two people, A and B, are 
standing together when A fires a bullet which B chases, then the bul-
let recedes from B more slowly than from A. However, if, instead of a 
bullet, A "fires" a pulse of light, then no matter how fast B runs, the 
light recedes from B at exactly the same speed as from A, so far as 
they are individually concerned. From this hypothesis flows all the 
results of special relativity, including time flowing at a different rate 
for A and B by virtue of their relative motion. Now it is conceptually 
possible that this hypothesis about the constancy of the speed of 
light should be false; indeed, Newton assumed so. Hence, one appears 
justified in saying that, even if God is in his essence temporal, never-
theless the specific form of his creation's temporality (so far as we 
presently understand it) is contingent. 
Furthermore, relativity implies that someone may observe two 
events to be simultaneous, whilst another observer moving relative to 
the first (in a different so-called frame of reference) sees those same 
events occurring at different times. It therefore becomes a real ques-
tion to ask which frame of reference a temporal God would occupy, 
and so which events across the universe he observes to be simulta-
neous. Again, there would appear to be contingency in God's choice. 
These considerations are not conclusive, of course, in argu-
ing for God's timelessness. There may be some undiscovered reason 
for the laws of relativity to be logically necessary in our universe; 
even if not, to say that the passage of time has a contingent aspect is 
not to show that God is not subject to some other type of temporality. 
However, they do at least point towards time as being not a funda-
mental ontological category under which God should be subsumed, 
thereby implying that God himself is timeless. Such a view finds sup-
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port from classical theology. 
Let us suppose that God is timelessly eternal. Does this 
have any implications for our topic of determinism? We shall argue 
that it does: namely, that the former entails the latter. 
Boethius, following a suggestion of Augustine, famously def-
ined eternity as, "the total and complete possession of unending life, 
all at once."25 Although God's timelessness is strongly motivated by 
considerations of the contingent nature of created time and also allows 
for a strong conception of God's omniscience, it is not without prob-
lems, of course. Some of the problems cluster around whether the 
notion of timelessness is coherent. Anthony Kenny argues it is not: 
"The whole concept of a timeless eternity, the whole of 
which is simultaneous with every part of time, seems to be 
radically incoherent. For simultaneity as ordinarily 
understood is a transitive relation... on St Thomas' view, 
my typing of this paper is simultaneous with the whole of 
eternity. Again, on this view, the great fire of Rome is 
simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Therefore, while 
I type these very words, Nero fiddles heartlessly on."26 
This criticism is not successful, however. "Simultaneous" is itself a 
temporal concept, and so is inapplicable to any notion of timeless 
eternity. Such eternity simply is; it is not at any time or simulta-
neous with any temporal event. An analogy might be with an arith-
metical proposition such as 2+2=4. It is nonsense to say that such a 
proposition is simultaneous with anything, yet it is eternally true. 
However, the difference with such a proposition, it might be 
pointed out, is that God is said to be living. Timeless life is indeed a 
foreign concept to us; but the problems of understanding how God can 
have life if timeless seem no greater than understanding how God can 
have life if outside space. Some might argue that God's spacelessness 
in fact causes equal problems, but nevertheless we generally seem to 
accept that concept without immediately protesting its incoherence. 
Thus, in the same way as we understand that God can act in space 
without himself being in space, similarly he can act in time without 
being within time. Having knowledge timelessly is also within our 
conception through our experience of memory: we know timelessly, for 
instance, mathematical truths. 
Understanding how God responds to his creatures is more 
difficult, however. This is especially so if his creatures are under-
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stood to have libertarian free will. The essence of such free will, as 
we have seen, is for any choice to be unpredictable. Thus we are to 
imagine two identical people in identical circumstances nevertheless 
being able to make different choices. But that means even God must 
logically wait on their response in order to determine his own 
response, which contradicts the notion that God is timelessly eternal. 
From timeless eternity, God could not create a world in which he 
responds to the circumstances of creatures with libertarian free will. 
Even should God be able to know timelessly all our free 
responses, this yet creates a problem. Assuming that God interacts 
with his creation, then from our point of view, God knows today what 
our free choices will be tomorrow. But that very fact means that lib-
ertarian free will has been eroded, for it is no longer the case that 
no one can know what our choice will be. The conclusion appears 
inevitable that a timeless God and libertarian free will are incompa-
tible. This is the conclusion also reached by Paul Helm in his defence 
of God's timelessness: 
"So it emerges that one important reason for maintaining 
that God is in time is that this alone provides scope for 
human in deterministic freedom."27 
(f) Conclusion 
In this chapter we have glanced at the particular example of 
Calvin's theology as one with a high degree of theological determinism. 
Such determinism could be made compatible with any science, since 
God can presumably arrange for the appearance of physical laws to be 
preserved. This is not, of course, necessarily welcome from the point 
of view of science, whose incentive is to lay bear the causal workings 
of the world. Indeed, this element of God preserving aspects of the 
universe for appearance's sake is possibly one of the unattractive 
features of such determinism. 
Other problems with such theological determinism involve 
those of human responsibility and divine responsibility for evil. 
These are weaknesses, although they do not rule such determinism out 
of court. However, we have found that mechanical determinism in par-
ticular does not appear to cohere well with theological determinism, 
particularly through problems of understanding God's revelation. On 
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the other hand, only a deterministic theology enables an omniscient 
God to be timelessly eternal. This could be an advantage, since mod-
ern physics presents some reason for believing the structure of time 
in our universe to be contingent and therefore not part of God's nec-
essary being. 
Let us bear these problems with theological determinism in 
mind whilst turning next to investigate whether modern science itself 
may provide a key to understanding God's interaction with the world. 
This we shall do in the next two chapters, first via a consideration of 
anti-reductionism in science and then through an exploration of the 
newly-found openness of physical systems. 
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Chapter 5; The g i^tL-reductjjqindst topsroaeih to Divine Interaction 
In chapter two, we had cause in passing to remark upon 
Maurice Wiles' brief riposte to an argument concerning God's interac-
tion with his creation. That argument, advanced by Michael Goulder1 
and Stuart Hall2, concludes that we should not regard with any more 
favour the proposition that God only communicates with us directly 
through our minds than that he modifies any other event in our 
world. This makes the the assumption that our minds are constituted 
by the atoms of the brain, so that changing the weather or changing 
our minds each involves God's moving of atoms around. As we then 
quoted, Wiles responds by writing: 
"[This] conclusion does not follow from the fact that psy-
chological changes may always involve concomitant changes 
in the brain circuits; [the] argument would only be valid 
if we were to hold a false form of physical determinism 
according to which psychological changes could only be 
brought about by a prior modification of the brain cir-
cuits."3 
Wiles does not expand upon this response, but, given his concern to 
take full account of the world as regularly ordered, it appears to be 
based upon an anti-reductionist approach to science. Anti-
reductionism is one development in the evaluation of science which, 
whilst being fully consonant with present science, might also allow 
some ways forward in considering divine interaction with the world. 
Where reductionism claims that every phenomenon is no more than the 
sum of its most basic components, anti-reductionism contends that 
genuinely novel phenomena may emerge as physical systems become 
more complex. A vast literature on the subject has been spawned in 
recent years, aimed not so much at discrediting reductionism, however, 
as at trying to construct an adequate alternative4. We shall review 
some of the problems encountered later, with reference to our theolog-
ical interests; first, however, we summarise reductionism, motivated 
largely from a rejection of dualism, before considering its inadequacy. 
These issues are further investigated in a discussion of the mind-
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body problem which has important implications for any concept of 
divine interaction. 
(a) The varistiss of redMctiDxiisim 
Reductionism is perhaps best described as more of a working 
hypothesis than a theory, both because it is adopted by working sci-
entists in rather an ad hoc fashion and also because there are those 
who deny that there are in any case any successful examples of a 
scientific reduction5. Care must be taken to distinguish between the 
different connotations with which the term "reduction" is used, and 
indeed between "reduction" and the strong claims of "reductionism". 
Insofar as reduction refers to a methodological technique, 
then it is hardly a matter of controversy. This technique is to 
approach an analysis of any given system by breaking it down into 
its constituent parts and studying the interactions of these simpler 
entities. No one denies that this has been a highly successful method 
for advancing knowledge. As long as the stronger assertion is not 
made that it is the sole method of valid investigation, by which, say, 
the humanities are also to be judged, then it is benign. 
Epistemological reduction builds upon methodological reduc-
tion by founding the conceptual understanding of any system upon 
deductions from the interactions of its constituents rather than from 
the system as a whole, thereby mirroring the practical analytical tech-
niques of science. Thus, for instance, the valid explication of optics, 
the science of the reflection and refraction of light waves, is taken to 
be derived exclusively from the theory of electromagnetic radiation 
and in terms appropriate to that theory. This type of reduction was 
the springboard of seventeenth-century science, overthrowing final 
causation as the primary category of science in favour of efficient 
causation. In the weaker and less controversial form of epistemologi-
cal reduction, one may observe that as a matter of fact some such 
reductions exist and are at least modestly successful. A stronger 
form, however, asserts that such reductions will always exist and be 
successful for whatever system is under consideration; indeed, if an 
explanation does not consist of such a reduction, then, such reduc-
tionism assumes, it is not a complete explanation. It is this assertion 
69 
which is controversial in contemporary debate, but before it is 
reviewed further, we will set it in the context of a third type of 
reduction, known as ontological. 
Whereas epistemological reduction makes claims about the 
ways in which we can know and understand any system, ontological 
reductionism is a metaphysical statement about what exists. In its 
simplest terms, its proposition is that nothing beyond the most ele-
mentary building blocks of any system has any real existence. Fully 
clarifying the concept of ontological reductionism is not as easy as it 
might first seem, however, since it is no easy matter to define what is 
meant by something having real existence. Indeed, a philosopher such 
as Evandro Agazzi can take it to be to be more or less self evident 
that ontological reductionism is false: 
"[Substance] is not something indeterminate and mysterious 
to which the properties are 'added' or cling. A sub-
stance is the ensemble of its properties and it is differen-
tiated from other substances precisely because it pos-
sesses ontologically different properties... 
"The world ... is full of very different substances ... each 
one characterized by its properties, in part intrinsic, in 
part dependent upon the relations which they maintain 
with other substances, and the various disciplines attempt 
to study them according to limited points of view, each 
one occupied only with certain properties."6 
For instance, Agazzi argues, one of the properties of gold is its value 
in the world's metal markets, but this property must be inaccessible 
to scientific investigation which properly is concerned only with a 
particular range of gold's properties. Thus what it is to be gold in 
all its fulness is not subject to ontological reduction. 
Whilst Agazzi's argument may appear cogent, one can discern 
from it that the question of ontological reduction depends upon a full 
discussion of the general issues of ontology. Happily, for our pur-
poses, we do not need to encompass this complex region of philosophy, 
since ontological reductionism is sufficiently comprehended as a reac-
tion against Cartesian and other forms of dualism; in other words, it 
is a guise of physical monism and it is in this context that the con-
temporary debate concerning epistemological reduction also should be 
placed. 
Cartesian dualism was the metaphysics constructed from the 
desire to avoid scepticism whilst maintaining the newly-gained outlook 
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of a mathematical science. To do this, it proposed a dualism between 
matter and spirit within the human person who is to be the rational 
observer of the objective world, and so gave rise to the so-called 
mind-body problem. It is the difficulties associated with this problem 
which have led to the widespread abandonment of Cartesian dualism, 
and thus to the rise of ontological reductionism. Let us now review 
these problems. 
(b) Cartesian dualism 
Keith Campbell7 summarises the conundrum in the form of the 
following inconsistent tetrad, such that any three of the statements 
are consistent but entail that the fourth is false: 
(1) the human body is a material thing; 
(2) the human mind is a spiritual thing; 
(3) mind and body interact; 
(4) spirit and matter do not interact. 
To find a neutral definition of either spirit or matter is 
neither easy nor has it been accomplished, but we may say, in an 
informal way, that spirit belongs to a class of things of which matter 
is the other member: spirit and matter are two items with an equal 
ontological existence. Accepting propositions (1) and (2) means that, 
for consistency, either (3) or (4) must be rejected; either course of 
action, however, brings difficulties. 
Denying (4) leads to an interactionist dualism in which spirit 
interacts with matter. But this would surely reveal itself through the 
matter of the brain (or wherever the interaction is to be located) 
behaving anomalously with regard to physical law, a discrepancy 
which should be scientifically observable. Thus far, there has been 
found no evidence from physiology of such an anomaly and the com-
mon assumption is undoubtedly that no such anomalies exist. A pos-
sible exception to this expectation in scientific circles is the brain 
scientist John Eccles who remains a dualist. He maintains as a "primal 
certainty... the certainty that one exists as a unique self-conscious 
being," and continues: 
"Since materialist solutions fail to account for our exper-
ienced uniqueness, I am constrained to attribute the 
uniqueness of the Self or Soul to a supernatural spiritual 
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creation. To give the explanation in theological terms: 
each Soul is a new Divine creation which is implanted into 
the growing foetus at some time between conception and 
birth."8 
However, it is not clear what is this primal certainty of uniqueness 
which demands a supernatural creation, and neither does Eccles offer 
any insight into why the soul's activities should never be observable 
scientifically within our brains. He makes the suggestion that the 
mind is analogous to the probability fields of quantum mechanics, 
which have neither mass nor energy9. But interestingly this proposal 
has been made elsewhere, not as an analogy but as a possible actual 
mechanism for mind10. Having given a scientific analogy for mind 
bordering on the explanatory, there seems little reason not to go a 
step further in accepting the possibility of a fully scientific descrip-
tion. Ultimately, it is difficult to see how one can allow a spiritual 
interaction without bringing spirit and matter into the same category 
and within the ambit of science. 
The alternative in this presentation of the mind-body problem 
is to deny (3), leading one to parallelism in which the mind runs 
alongside the body but does not effect it in any way. Either one may 
follow Descartes in claiming that bodily and mental events were always 
in step but totally unconnected, or one may follow the epiphenomenal-
ists in allowing the body causally to determine the mind's state but 
not vice versa. Whichever one chooses is not very attractive, since 
both do violence to our conviction that what goes on in our minds 
plays a crucial role in how we act; indeed, without some notion of 
rationality it is not clear that we act at all, but merely respond. 
Neither do the descriptions appeal through simplicity, since they leave 
us with two separate systems, one material and the other spiritual. 
However, the major objection to any such dualism must 
surely be the conceptual difficulty and elusiveness of spirit in this 
scheme. If spirits are non-material, then they are non-spatial, in 
which case the location as well as the individuation of spirits become 
a problem. One solution which enables each human body to have one 
spirit only, as Locke pointed out11, is to give spirit location but not 
dimension, so that it is located at one point alone in the human body. 
Where that point would be and how it could interact with the whole of 
the brain is still a difficulty. It is known, for instance, that a 
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sensation of pain is associated with an extended and complex pattern 
of neurons firing. 
A further difficulty with this account is that it seems at 
least possible that evolutionary science will successfully trace a 
continuous development of life from complex molecules in a primeval 
soup through to present day humanity. Presumably there is a point 
on that journey where spirit is first required to explain the life form 
then reached, but such a point seems arbitrary. A similar point must 
likewise be reached in the development of any one human foetus some-
time after conception, a point which also appears to be arbitrary. 
None of the above proves that a spirit-matter dualism cannot 
possibly be true, and indeed it continues to be defended by some dis-
tinguished writers12. Yet considerable doubt is cast upon its being 
the simplest explanation possible, so that Occam's razor may be called 
into play. Cartesian dualism does not appear to be any longer ten-
able. 
(c) Emergence and anti-reductionisin 
Having rejected dualism, we may now return to our discus-
sion of reductionism with greater insight. For if one does not have 
any confidence in the existence of spirit in the Cartesian sense, then 
one is naturally inclined towards an ontological reductionism. As we 
have hinted in the example of Agazzi's argument above, such reduc-
tionism is prone to open-ended debate since it is a broad metaphysical 
assertion. However, ontological reductionism reinforces the expectation 
of the success of epistemological reduction, and it is this latter which 
may more easily be tested. If everything in our world is constituted 
of one type of stuff, then we may think that theories which describe 
the fundamental interactions of that elementary matter would allow us 
to understand completely all the complex systems to be made from it. 
This is the expectation which gave rise to the sobriquet "nothing but-
tery" for reductionism: sociology is nothing but psychology; psychol-
ogy is nothing but biology; biology is nothing but chemistry; chemis-
try is nothing but physics. The question is whether this expectation 
has any prospect of being met. 
Carl Hempel formalized the notion of an epistemological reduc-
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tion as follows, taking the example of the reduction of biology to 
physics13. Consider two biological events, Bi and Ba for which B2 
may be predicted given Bi and some biological law. Biology will then 
have been successfully reduced to physics if the terms of Bi and B2 
may be restated in physical terms Pi and P2 and some physical law 
found from which P2 may be predicted given Pi. 
Here we have a logical statement of what a reduction entails 
against which we can test examples claimed to be successful. If, as 
the anti-reductionist asserts, the attempt sometimes fails to describe 
the more complex system purely in terms of laws appropriate to its 
constituents, then it is said that the system exhibits an emergent 
property. For instance, it may be suggested that the quality of water 
which we experience as wetness is emergent because no analysis of 
the physics of water molecules would adequately subsume that prop-
erty. Whether such emergent properties are ontologically real is the 
matter of dispute towards which Agazzi's argument is directed, but it 
is this further consideration, albeit important, which we can here 
afford to ignore14. The relevant point is that the emergent property 
is one which cannot be reduced. Since, however, emergence is some-
thing found only when an analysis at a particular level has failed to 
reduce a higher level, it is by its nature elusive. Proofs of failure of 
this nature are difficult to construct. Karl Popper and Mario Bunge 
provide us with two examples of defining emergent properties more 
closely, but both are open to question. 
Popper takes a very broad view of the existence of emergent 
properties. He claims that even the reduction of chemistry to physics 
fails because the quantity of helium in our universe is inexplicable 
without the irreducible use of cosmology and its hypothesis of the big 
bang at the start of the universe15. Popper speaks of hydrogen fus-
ing to form helium as an emergent property because it is unforesee-
able outside the special circumstances of the big bang. This would 
appear to be an overstatement, however, since surely the properties 
of hydrogen's fusion are always present even should they not be acti-
vated. 
On the other hand, Bunge defines an emergent property more 
closely as one which characterizes a system as a whole and is not 
possessed by the components of that system16. But, as Manfred 
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Stockier points out17, this would commit us to saying that a clock or 
even a chair has emergent properties. Do we really want to say that 
these artefacts cannot be reduced? 
By its nature, it seems, the analysis of emergent properties 
may only be achieved on a case-by-case basis. The point of greatest 
interest, both scientifically and theologically, is the reduction of 
biology to chemistry. It is here that it is most plausible that reduc-
tion fails, and we may illustrate the suggestion through the work of 
Richard Dawkins. 
Dawkins has written a popular and influential book entitled 
The Selfish Gene18. Although he does not discuss reductionism expli-
citly in it, Dawkins' approach is reductionist in that he looks for the 
explanation of the world's diverse life forms to its molecular basis. He 
states: 
"The argument of this book is that we, and all other ani-
mals, are machines created by our genes. Like successful 
Chicago gangsters, our genes have survived, in some 
cases for millions of years, in a highly competitive world. 
This entitles us to expect certain qualities in our genes. 
I shall argue that a predominant quality to be expected in 
a successful gene is ruthless selfishness."19 
Dawkins is a self-proclaimed Darwinist, judging competition within any 
population to be the key to understanding its development. Yet we 
here see how awkwardly such a belief sits with biochemistry. Pre-
sumably Dawkins believes that genes are no more than complex organic 
molecules, but then the description 'selfish' appears to be out of 
place: what meaning can be given to 'selfish' in such a context? Or, 
indeed, what meaning can be given to the statement that we are 
machines created by genes? 
Dawkins himself is impatient of such observations, commenting 
at one point: 
"This strategic way of talking about an animal or plant, or 
a gene, as if it were consciously working out how best to 
increase its success... is a language of convenience which 
is harmless unless it happens to fall into the hands of 
those ill-equipped to understand it... It seems some 
people, educationally over-endowed with the tools of phi-
losophy, cannot resist poking in their scholarly apparatus 
where it isn't helpful."*3 
Yet it is not clear that talk of selfishness and so on is merely a 
matter of convenience, since it is not apparent how one could other-
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wise express the same ideas, whether or not they are correct. 
Indeed, it seems that Dawkins himself is sometimes confused by 
attempting to use terms such as "selfish" at the level of a molecule 
rather than of a complete animal. For instance, compare the following 
statements: 
"Genes "determine" behaviour only in a statistical sense... 
There is no reason why the influence of genes cannot 
easily be reversed by other influences."21 
and: 
"By dictating the way survival machines and their nervous 
systems are built, genes exert ultimate power over behav-
iour... Genes are the primary policy-makers, brains are 
the executives."22 
Thus one suspects that the insights of Darwinism might not be simple-
reduced from the level of herds of beasts competing for food to the 
level of genes within a given animal. There are concepts which are 
simply not applicable to the lower levels of description; "competitive-
ness" and "selfishness" would here be emergent properties, since 
Dawkins' reliance upon them suggests that they cannot be fully 
restated in terms appropriate to biochemistry. 
We are now in a position to understand the importance of 
anti-reductionist claims. As David Charles and Kathleen Lennon point 
out, 
"what is distinctive about these modern anti-reductionist 
strategies is that they are avowedly anti-dualist. While 
defending the autonomy of the particular discourses with 
which they are concerned, they none the less accept some 
form of supervenience [i.e. emergence] or dependence 
claim, grounding such discourses in underlying materialist 
or naturalist ones."23 
Modern anti-reductionism is thus not claiming that biology cannot be 
reduced to chemistry because, say, there is some quasi-vitalist consti-
tuent of life, but rather it is claiming that the discourse appropriate 
to biology is not simply some conglomerate of discourses appropriate 
to chemistry. This may sound warning bells as we now turn to the 
contemporary discussion of the mind-brain problem. For whilst, as 
Wiles has indicated, we may find that mind is an emergent property 
not describable in the physical terms appropriate to atoms and mole-
cules, yet the grounding for this is nevertheless materialist. If God 
acts in our minds, he would still do so within the matrix of an 
entirely physical system and so the arguments of Goulder and Hall 
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may not be so readily dismissed as Wiles seems to suggest. We now 
turn to these issues more specifically in discussing the modern philos-
ophy of mind. 
(d) Mind-brain theories 
One possible theological hope of an anti-reductionist approach 
to the description of mind might be the preservation of the traditional 
Christian theology of a God both transcendent and immanent, without 
at the same time contradicting the modern scientific viewpoint on the 
nature of creation. If it turns out that the mind must be described 
irreducibly relative to its physical substratum of the brain, then 
perhaps here is an opening for God's interaction with the world with-
out the violation of any physical law. God might then influence our 
minds without disrupting the causal nexus of our brains. 
This would maintain what may be called physical monism. Of 
course, to allow our requirement of a transcendent God means that one 
cannot be a true monist: there must be a dualism between God and the 
world. Nevertheless, we shall use the term as differentiated from 
Cartesian dualism. A physical monist admits only one substance in the 
created order, that of matter. Part of the reason for holding to 
physical monism in our case will be its widespread acceptance in the 
modern Western world, the background against which we are attemp-
ting to conceptualise our theology. Yet, as we summarized above, 
there is also good reason for rejecting as its alternative a dualism of 
spirit and matter. 
In essence we are thus considering the question whether a 
traditional theism can be compatible with a physical monism of the 
created order, demanding as it does an explanation of where and how 
the divine and created realms might interact. We concentrate on the 
mind-body problem for two reasons. First, it is in any case a problem 
where, in certain theories of the mind, physical monism is severely 
tested as a coherent possibility in a context separate from theology. 
Secondly, intuitively it would also seem that the mind is crucial to an 
understanding of the revelation of God. 
We have mentioned that, in one sense, any theist must be a 
dualist. Thus, our question seems unavoidably couched in terms of 
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interaction: how do two substances interact? This is also the question 
at the centre of the mind-body problem, where the substances 
involved are the mental and the physical. As with matter and spirit, 
however, there are immediately problems of definition because it is not 
clear how the mental and the physical may be defined so as not to 
entail the conclusion towards which one wishes to argue. This 
becomes apparent as we review some of their possible definitions24. 
Mental items are often categorised as being characteristically 
either sensations or propositional attitudes. A propositional attitude 
may be recognised by propositions which include the word 'that' and 
a 'mental verb', such as 'believe' or 'desire'. Already, there is a 
difficulty here, in that sensations and propositional attitudes seem to 
be fundamentally different, so as not to be easily circumscribed by 
one conception of the mental. Two definitions of the mental incline 
towards one or other of these aspects: the criterion of intentionality, 
and the criterion of the 'direct' or privileged access to experience. 
The epistemic definition of the mental identifies, as mental, 
events of which a subject is directly aware. This suffers from two 
problems in particular. First, contexts in which such epistemic terms 
occur do not sustain substitution of co-referential or logically equiva-
lent terms: they are non-extensional. For instance, it may be true 
that I am directly aware that this pen (which in fact caused Jones' 
death) is red, yet false that I am directly aware that the pen which 
caused Jones' death is red. This indicates that the class of mental 
events, so identified, is not well defined. A second problem is that 
direct awareness applies readily to sensations, but less obviously to 
propositional attitudes. For instance, I may think that I have direct 
awareness that I prefer oranges to apples, whilst this preference 
could be shown to be false if it were observed that I eat more apples 
than oranges. 
The criterion of intentionality also has its difficulties. This 
criterion in its linguistic form identifies, as mental, propositional 
attitudes which vary markedly in their semantic behaviour from physi-
cal propositions. Thus, propositions including a mental verb sustain 
neither the substitution of co-referring expressions in its sub-clause 
nor the existential generalization of that sub-clause. Donald Davidson, 
whose theory of anomalous monism is described below, then defines an 
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event as being mental if it is describable by an expression which con-
tains some 'mental1 verb non-eliminably. However, now the problem 
arises that in fact such a definition is too wide. Surprisingly per-
haps, it can be shown that as long as there is a mental event spatiot-
emporally related to every event, then any event counts as mental. 
For instance, the description of the sinking of the Titanic, "The 
Titanic sank at the same place that, ten years later, John realized that 
the world is round," must count as mental. 
It may seem that such problems are at the level of logical 
nit-picking. Yet they have serious consequences if one tries consis-
tently to propound an identity theory of mind and matter. If all 
physical descriptions can be formulated in terms of mental descrip-
tions, then the truth of some form of identity theory is thereby 
entailed. One needs also a strong conception of the physical, yet 
there are equally great difficulties in defining what one might mean 
by physical. 
One possibility is to say that for a predicate P to be physi-
cal, then 'x has P' entails 'x has extension' or 'x has spatial location'. 
But this does not prove to be so straightforward a defuiition, since 
extension or spatial location is only entailed by the use of what may 
be called 'meaning postulates'. Thus, 'x is 50 kg' does not directly 
entail that x has extension: we make the assumption from our science 
that anything with mass has extension, which is then a meaning post-
ulate. But these assumptions are admitted in interpreting such state-
ments, we need to draw further boundaries. For one may now argue 
that 'x is a perceptual experience' must involve the perceiver's eyes 
and therefore also entails spatial location. Likewise, if one denies the 
existence of a mental substance, 'x is a thought' must have spatial 
location if it involves a person's brain. 
Another possible definition of the physical is that an event is 
physical if it instantiates a physical law. But there is here a great 
danger of circularity introduced through the notion of a physical law: 
for instance, presumably a physical law is partially recognized by its 
physical terminology. But this assumes one already knows what is 
physical terminology. Also, it defines the physical as that which 
exhibits law-like behaviour, whereas this certainly is not a primitive 
observation of the material world about us. 
79 
The analysis of the world into physical and mental items is 
therefore not at all self-evident and so a positive statement of physi-
calism, functionalism and anomalous monism, three schools of thought 
on the origins of mind, is not straightforward. Their negative state-
ment is slightly simpler: against Cartesian dualism, they each deny 
that there is ontological content to the concept of a spiritual mental 
substance; against behaviourism, they deny that mind is an otiose 
concept. 
We have ourselves argued against Cartesian dualism above; 
before noting the characteristic features of these three theories, we 
turn briefly to the position of behaviourism. The behaviourist repre-
sents the opposite extreme from the spirit-matter dualist by denying 
the existence of mind at all. Rather, it is claimed, the mental state is 
identical with the outward behaviour, so that, "references to the 
causes of behaviour are transformed into descriptions of patterns in 
the behavioural effects themselves."25 While such an explanation is 
simple and dismisses the mind-body problem, it is undoubtedly over-
simple. Consider the person who only pretends to be in pain: the 
behaviourist seems committed to saying that either, against common 
sense, such a person is in fact in pain, or that a perfect pretence is 
not possible so that we can tell that real pain is not being suffered. 
But even if perfect pretence is not possible, nevertheless there 
appears to be something amiss with a theory which can only distin-
guish between true pain and pretended pain through the minutiae of 
the behaviour, distinguishing between pretence-pain behaviour and 
non-pretence-pain behaviour, but not allowing the existence or other-
wise of an actual pain. 
If we thus reject behaviourism as well as Cartesian dualism, 
let us therefore sketch the alternative theories we have mentioned. 
Physicalism (or materialism or type-type identity theory) 
affirms that any statement about the mind can be formulated without 
remainder as a statement about the physical state of the brain. We 
might find, for instance, that 'pain = brain state a', in which case 
observing a brain in such a state we know immediately the contents of 
the associated mind. But this theory, associated particularly with 
J.J.C. Smart26 and D.M. Armstrong27, is now widely thought to present 
two insuperable problems. 
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First, it is difficult to imagine how the qualia of mental 
phenomena can be translated without remainder into the language of 
physics. Thus, how can 'dull' as applicable to pains be also applicable 
to brain states? In reply to this objection, Smart explained that the 
report of a dull pain happens to be the report of a particular brain 
process 2 8. There is no such object as a pain which can have quali-
ties such as dullness; there is only the experience of a dull pain 
which is contingently identical with a particular brain state. This 
contingency is needed because the relationship of a dull pain to, say, 
a sharp pain has a different logical description to the relationship 
between the corresponding brain states. Yet Saul Kripke objects that 
the notion of contingent identity needs to be handled carefully. He 
introduced the concept of a rigid designator, that which names an 
object not only in this world but in every possible world in which 
that object exists. Identities involving rigid designators are then 
necessarily, not contingently, true. Now, the so-called Cartesian 
intuition supposes that pain, say, might have existed apart from any 
physical type of the phenomenon; pain is therefore a rigid designator. 
Thus, statements identifying pain and a physical brain state are, in 
fact, necessarily true if true at all. Hence the original objection 
stands that the qualia of mental phenomena cannot be identical to a 
physical state, so long as one accepts the Cartesian intuition that the 
very nature of pain is in its phenomenal properties. 
The second objection is that of variable realizability. To 
continue with the example of pain, it seems intuitively correct that 
many different animals, as well as many different humans of different 
dispositions, all feel pain as the same thing. Hence, pain cannot be 
identified merely with any one physical state. It is open to the type-
type identity theorist to propose that pain is not identical to one 
brain state, but to a disjunction of many different brain states. 
However, the theory itself would then appear to be seriously 
stretched, if not completely undermined, if it has to be imagined that 
pain is only identical with a possibly infinite disjunction of heteroge-
neous physical states - the identity of pain with no particular state. 
Further, it would seem unlikely that empirical science could ever find 
such a series of states in practice. 
This brings us to the second category of identity theories, 
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that of the causal-role or functionalism, which seeks to overcome the 
problems of variable realizability in particular. In fact, there are 
many versions of these theories, so our present treatment is very 
much a simplification. The theory is parallel in some ways to behav-
iourism, in that it is primarily concerned to understand the connection 
between any stimulus and the response of a system such as the brain. 
However, unlike behaviourism, it allows that there is indeed something 
we may call 'mind' which plays an active part between the input and 
output of the system. The approach is modelled closely on the idea of 
a computer system and especially the so-called Turing machine which 
Alan Turing believed could in theory model a human person to a high 
degree of accuracy. 
In an article called "Mad Pain and Martian Pain" 2 9, David 
Lewis describes a thought experiment supposing that Martians exist 
and behave like human beings. Yet they might not have brains at all; 
it might be that Martians have hydraulic feet and that pain for them 
goes with an increase in hydraulic pressure rather than anything 
going on in their heads. Thus, rather than saying with the physical-
ists that 'pain = brain state a', we should say that 'pain for S = brain 
state a', whereas 'pain for T = brain state [3' and so on. 
However, to this proposal, it may be objected that there 
remains no such state as the one occupant of the causal-role defini-
tive of pain. Thus it is not clear that the description of pain is 
properly fixed; there is no uniqueness of reference. But there are 
further problems even should one be able properly to define causal-
roles. John Searle 3 0 considers someone who only speaks English 
locked in a room with a two-way video communication system to the 
outside world. In the room are batches of what is in fact Chinese 
script. There are also instructions in English which tell that person 
to hold up certain of the squiggles in response to people outside the 
room holding up certain squiggles, identified through comparison with 
one of the batches of squiggles inside the room (in fact, questions 
written in Chinese). Upon becoming proficient, a Chinese speaker out-
side the room could not tell that the person within the room does not 
know Chinese. Searle then claims that a functionalist would have to 
say that such a person effectively can communicate in Chinese, 
although clearly that person has no understanding of Chinese. The 
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objection from phenomenal properties thus re-emerges in a slightly 
different guise. 
The final identity theory we consider is that of Donald 
Davidson3 1. As mentioned above, he defines what it is for an item to 
be mental through reference to intentionality. He then formulates 
three principles. First, the Principle of Causal Interaction states that 
some mental events, at least, cause physical events, and vice versa. 
Secondly, the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality states 
that wherever there is causality, it must be expressible via a causal 
law. Finally, the Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental states that, 
because of intentionality, no laws may explain or predict mental 
events. These three, apparently contradictory, principles lead David-
son to a sort of dualism he calls anomalous monism. Mental intention-
ality results in two different kinds of vocabulary, one of which formu-
lates scientific laws, and the other which is unsuitable for making 
law-like statements. Yet, Davidson writes, 
"although the position I describe denies that there are 
psychophysical laws, it is consistent with the view that 
mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or 
supervenient, on physical characteristics." 3 2 
How this theory might practically be understood is not clear, however, 
since it is more of a statement of expectation than of explanation. If 
mental characteristics relate to physical characteristics, and if one 
physical state is related to another by law-like causal statements, it is 
difficult to see how there can be no laws relating successive mental 
states. As Teichman points out, there is a difference between a dual-
ism of description and a dualism of explanation, and indeed it is this 
which lies at the heart of problems of formulating an adequate theory 
of explanation in opposition to epistemological reductionism. 
(e) The relationship of imind, brain and God 
The above constitutes no more than a glance at the contours 
of some of the recent approaches towards a mind-body theory which 
affirms physical monism. A full assessment of their merits is clearly 
beyond the scope of this work, especially since it is immediately 
apparent that none of them are without considerable problems: the 
mind-body problem is still the centre of lively debate. But one may 
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discern one characteristic towards which the theories are inclining. 
That is an irreducibility of description between the mental phenomena 
and the physical descriptions: a certain looseness of fit between the 
two, one might say. This is shown by the variable realizability inher-
ent in functLonalism and the dualism of description used in Davidson's 
theory. The powerful objection from phenomenal properties also 
points towards a gap between the present-day physics of the brain 
and the experience of the mental, thus placing physical monism under 
strain. However, at the same time, these theories exhibit the refusal 
to countenance a Cartesian dualism we have noted is characteristic of 
modern anti-reductionism. So what implications might this have for an 
understanding of God's interaction with the world? 
To begin with, we have seen above that the division between 
the mental and the physical is not easily defined. It seems that the 
simplest working definition for the physical is that which obeys law-
like principles determined in science. Such a definition, however, 
appears to be an inadequate foundation for the questions with which 
we are dealing, at any rate without further substantiation. Its major 
weakness is its circularity: physics sets out to discover the laws of 
nature, and in so doing disregards any non-law-like behaviour. But 
this does not need to mean that science regards only that which 
obeys natural laws as being physical reality. Indeed, we all have a 
notion of what is physically real which is quite independent of 
whether it obeys laws or not. Also, construing physical monism to 
mean that the contents of the world obey laws is quite different from 
construing it to mean that there is only one category of substance in 
the world. If physical monism leads to problems understanding how 
God can be immanent in the world, then it must be clear whether or 
not this arises only from assuming that to be physical is to obey laws. 
Having stated that, however, it has been conceded that a 
motivation for physical monism is the success of modern science with 
its law-like generalisations. Can the difficulties we have reviewed 
above of maintaining such a tight brand of monism whilst allowing for 
our experience of freedom in the mental be exploited in understanding 
how God could be present in such an environment? Could this be a 
way of holding a physical monism of science whilst allowing God's 
interaction via some sort of mental inspiration? Regrettably, I suspect 
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that the answer is no: let us consider each of the three classes of 
theory mentioned above. 
First, the physicalist theory is easily disposed of as giving 
no possibility of God's communicating with mind without directly 
changing the corresponding physical brain state, since the two are 
identical. In this case, therefore, God can only communicate with his 
universe by direct intervention, overcoming his own created laws, 
which is the outcome we had hoped to avoid. We may also note par-
enthetically that, if the physical is defined to be merely the law-like, 
it is then not possible for God to intervene without thereby destroy-
ing the physical. 
Secondly, functionalism, although it is much freer in its 
identification of mental items with particular physical states, neverthe-
less maintains in any particular instance such an identity. So far as 
God's communication is concerned, therefore, the case is the same as 
with physicalism. 
The most promising theory to consider is mental anomalism, 
where it is claimed that physical law-like causality does not need to 
imply a similar constraint upon the mental, exploiting an anti-
reductionist approach. Not surpris ingly, therefore, this theory 
appears most amenable to a theistic understanding of the world with 
direct divine communication, albeit with a degree of caution: the 
theory itself does not seem to get to grips with explicating how mental 
life may in fact wriggle free of the causality inherent in its physical 
substratum. 
In order to illustrate the situation, consider someone whose 
mind is in some state P and whose brain is correspondingly in state K. 
Suppose that this state involves the making of some choice, so that 
shortly afterwards the mind is either in state A (with the brain in 
state a) or in state B (with the brain in state |3). It does not matter 
for our purposes whether a brain state uniquely determines the mind 
state or not. In this formulation, Davidson is asserting that (abbrev-
iating the notation) from K one cannot deduce whether a or (3 will fol-
low; one can only begin to make such a deduction from knowing P. 
Say that, after the choice, the mind is in state A, so that in fact % is 
followed by a. Then one cannot explain % -> a directly, but only via 
% -> P -> A -> a irreducibly. A physical description alone is not 
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sufficient. 
Now we are in a position to clarify what we require of divine 
interaction. Such interaction must not affect directly the evolution of 
% to a or 3, since this would involve the physical intervention by God 
which we wish to avoid. If, however, divine interaction could influ-
ence whether A or B is the outcome from P without a physical interac-
tion, then we would have achieved our object of conceiving how God 
can act without violating physical law. But this is precisely wherein 
the ambiguity of Davidson's proposal lies: is it a matter of description 
or of causality that we have to take the route x -> P -> A -> a irre-
ducibly? It would seem to be the former. As we have seen, the 
recent moves against reductionism are concerned not with any inade-
quacy in assuming that the world is constructed out of some elemen-
tary matter, but with epistemological reductionism and the inability to 
express certain higher level theories in terms of lower level 
theories. Denying epistemological reductionism does not thereby 
enable us to conceive of some nexus of causation apart from the phys-
ical. Mind is supervenient upon the brain, not completely free of the 
brain. Therefore any external influence upon the mind is still to be 
mediated through the mind-matter unity of the brain, which is indivis-
ible. 
That is not to deny that our minds may be, in some sense, 
genuinely free and rational and of a different kind to the brains 
which are their physical form. Nor is it to deny that God should be 
understood analogously to our minds. The point at which this concep-
tion of God's interaction fails is its suggestion that two minds (even 
where one of them is divine) can communicate directly with one 
another in isolation from any physical factors. Telepathy would seem 
to be a logical impossibility, at any rate in the absence of some 
underlying physical process. 
The notion has been used of level autonomy in describing the 
relationship of the mind to the brain, or vice versa, in order to make 
plausible the ability of the mind to roam free of the causal network 
which is the brain. But this is a descriptive autonomy, not an onto-
logical autonomy. Thus it is one thing to say that one cannot 
describe the mind in terms appropriate to the lower-level interactions 
of the brain; it is quite another thing to say that the mind is not 
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constituted by a complex amalgam of those lower-level interactions. 
As an illustration which in important respects parallels our 
discussion, we may consider a tape recorder playing a tape of a 
Beethoven symphony. There is no doubt that this constitutes a 
purely mechanical system whose workings can readily be described 
using only a physical vocabulary: a magnetic field, previously 
imprinted upon a ferro-magnetic tape, is converted to a varying elec-
trical signal, which in turn is converted by a loud speaker into 
mechanical oscillations in the surrounding air. On the other hand, 
there is equally no doubt that the resultant sound - that of a Beeth-
oven symphony - cannot be described in terms of the vocabulary of 
physics. One may list the frequencies of the various portions of the 
sound in the order that they occur, but that of course does not 
approach a true description of the music. Thus, such a tape recorder 
is a simple example of a system which is entirely constituted by low-
er-level, physical elements, but which nevertheless is not fully 
describable in those terms. But it would be a mistake thereby to con-
clude that it is conceptually possible somehow to interact with the 
music without at the same time interacting with the physical system 
which constitutes it. It may be said, of course, that the music does 
indeed interact at a higher level with the mind of the one who hears; 
that is correct. Yet the analogy is formed with the tape recorder 
corresponding to the human mind, and the mind of the listener corre-
sponding to God. As God is said conceptually to be able to interact 
with our minds, then, in the analogy, it must be that the listener is 
able to affect the music as produced by the tape recorder. That is 
clearly only possible with some form of physical interference with the 
tape machine. Even though the tape recorder exhibits an irreducible 
emergent property (the Beethoven symphony), nevertheless no interac-
tion is possible which bypasses the physical lower levels of the sys-
tem. 
In treating the mind as an emergent property of an advanced 
nervous system, it is tempting to understand the mind as having 
gained some sort of causal freedom from the brain. That is misleading 
in the context of the contemporary theories of mind and brain with 
which we have been concerned. It is not that either the brain causes 
the mind, or indeed that the mind causes the brain. Rather, brain 
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and mind are two different descriptions of one and the same reality; 
emergence is in no sense a term of independence. Thus, it is not 
even conceptually possible for God to interact with one level of 
description rather than another; there exists only one reality with 
which he may interact and the causal basis of that reality remains 
physical. 
(f) Conclusion 
One may sometimes be tempted to assume that anything which 
places a question mark against science's omnicompetence must make it 
easier to advance a theistic understanding of the world. At first 
sight, this appears to be especially so of the recognition that scien-
tific reduction is not sufficiently subtle to lay claim to the whole 
truth about the complexities of the universe. There is more to the 
world than the interactions of atoms; there are aspects to life of 
which the discipline of physics can know little, if anything. 
This is undoubtedly very significant, but it is dubious 
whether it is of help in conceiving of God's action in the world in a 
traditional sense. For the foundations of this anti-reductionism are 
firmly anti-dualist, with the consequence that God's interaction neces-
sarily remains outside its scheme so long as God himself is conceived 
in dualistic terms. Anti-reductionism's attraction is precisely in 
promising an understanding of how this complex world may neverthe-
less be built up from the simplest of foundations. In particular, 
modern theories of mind aim to understand the irreducible character-
istics of the mental as arising from a physical substratum, not from 
some other source. 
Thus the dismissal by Wiles of the claims of Goulder and Hall, 
with which we began this chapter, does not convince to the extent 
that it seeks its support from modern scientific views. It may be 
true, as Wiles asserts, that we need not commit ourselves to a physical 
determinism in the relationship between brain and mind, the latter 
dragged along by the former. But this enables us to say neither that 
the mind is therefore independent of the brain, nor that it can be 
free in its interactions, save through the medium of the physical. 
Although the recognition of the inadequacies of reductionism 
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thus cannot overcome at a stroke any of the difficulties in conceiving 
divine interaction against the background of modern science, never-
theless the insights won contribute towards a wider scientific picture 
of the world presently gaining currency. In this, matter is viewed as 
being more fecund than previously imagined: not the dead and dry 
constituent of mechanical processes, but active and creative. The 
emergence of new properties, indeed of life itself, is then understood 
as nothing less than the inevitable realization of matter's natural 
potential. 
Some recent writers have made great use of this newer pic-
ture of our world, also incorporating anti-reductionist concepts. It is 
to this wider scheme that we turn in the following chapter. 
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Ch^tMK 6; Modern Science as gat Opemmei f o r Diwine Interacfc&om 
In the previous chapter we saw how reductionism in science 
is now treated with greater caution and considered some of the impli-
cations this may have for a theistic view of the world. However, the 
unease with reductLonism forms only part of recent developments in 
science, to which we now turn. Through the course of the twentieth 
century, it has become apparent that the mechanistic view of classical 
physics is merely a simplified approximation to physical reality. 
Classical physics remains valid in many circumstances, yet it is inade-
quate even to understand the workings of a modern radio. 
The importance of this development is difficult to overstate. 
Not only has it changed the outlook of physicists, it has also begun to 
change the perception of the world by society in general. Much of 
the history of modern Western thought has been driven by an alien-
ation between the arts and sciences, engendered by the success of 
the mechanistic world-view. It might even be said that humanity grew 
to be alienated from the universe: the former was aware of beauty, 
love and value, whilst the latter appeared to be indifferent to huma-
nity's values and existence. 
Such alienation is detectable in the work of Jacques Monod 
which we consider below. However, more recent science has begun to 
overcome this alienation. An extreme reaction against classical physics 
is seen in the work of Fritjof Capra, to whom we also turn. Whilst 
perhaps overcoming a perceived barrier between animate and inanimate 
matter, however, the religious effect of these developments is less 
straightforward. A perception of a unity between humanity and the 
rest of the world may draw one towards a mystical monism, but this is 
far from the Christian notion of the world as being, at least in part, 
the arena for God's action. In the latter part of this chapter we 
therefore investigate the thought of John Polkinghorne and Arthur 
Peacocke who propose conceptions for specific divine action. 
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(a) Jacques Monod and a creation without meaning 
Jacques Monod's influential book, Chance and Necessity1-, 
considers the implications of modern molecular biology in a popular 
Darwinist account of the genetic mechanism. The biochemical mecha-
nism uncovered by the pioneering work of Crick and Watson turns out 
to have two crucial properties, so far as Monod is concerned. First, 
the mechanism is apparently entirely explicable in terms of chemistry. 
Thus, it is argued, reductionistic science shows itself capable of 
laying bare seemingly the most complex and mysterious of phenomena, 
even life itself. Secondly, it is demonstrated that this mechanism 
allows the generally accurate reproduction of genetic material in cell 
replication ("necessity"). Yet random genetic mutations also occur, 
resulting in the pool of genetic variety from which natural selection 
may draw ("chance"). Thus, the evolutionary hypothesis is supported. 
Monod's description of molecular biology is compelling. How-
ever, it is not without polemical intent, corresponding to the two 
aspects noted above. First, Monod asserts that science is the only 
means to objective knowledge. Secondly he stresses that the evolu-
tion of life has followed undirected chance. When the process of evo-
lution started, Monod argues, it would not have been possible to pre-
dict its outcome; therefore any notion is false which supposes huma-
nity to be more than an improbable and meaningless accident in the 
universe. We shall take these two assertions in order. 
Monod's view of science is apparently clear; he expresses it 
in his "principle of objectivity", which states, 
"that nature is objective, that the systematic confrontation 
of logic and experience is the sole source of true knowl-
edge.'^ 
What is meant by "objective" or "experience" is not stated, but Monod 
goes on to make a distinction between knowledge and values, writing: 
"Knowledge in itself is exclusive of all value judgment 
(except that of 'epistemological value') whereas ethics, in 
essence nonobjective, is for ever barred from the sphere 
of knowledge."3 
Yet there remains for Monod a relationship between values and knowl-
edge: 
"True knowledge is ignorant of values, but it has to be 
grounded on a value judgment, or rather on an axiomatic 
value. It is obvious that the positing of the principle of 
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objectivity as the condition of true knowledge constitutes 
an ethical choice and not a judgment reached from knowl-
edge ... To assent to the principle of objectivity is, thus, 
to state the basic proposition of an ethical system."4 
This implies a fundamentally sceptical philosophy, where knowledge 
arises from an ethic which is itself not true knowledge. If, as we 
shall see, we are the products of blind chance, nevertheless for Monod 
that knowledge seems to be gained only in blind faith. 
In practice, however, Monod's view of science closely matches 
that of so-called naive realism, with the suggestion that science 
uncovers what is around us in an unqualified way. His treatment of 
biological evolution is certainly consonant with this. 
Yet there are well known difficulties with such an outlook5. 
For instance, any finite set of data is always consistent with more 
than one theory, so that a choice of theory requires further selection 
principles. The collection of data is also problematic, since observa-
tions are themselves theory laden, especially when built upon other 
previously established theories. Further, as Monod himself stresses, 
the fundamental choice of the scientific method is open to the charge 
of being arbitrary, at least when it seeks to be the sole measure of 
truth. 
In the discussion in chapter three, we suggested that a crit-
ical realism is the best interpretation of modern science. This realism 
is cautious and modifies naive realism by taking seriously its defects 
and the uncertainties inherent in any human activity. Quite apart 
from its adequacy in the philosophy of science, the adoption of critical 
realism also has implications for the exploration of the relationship 
between science and the diversity of human experience, for two rea-
sons. 
First, accepting a critical realism renders false the absolute 
distinction which Monod attempts to make between objective knowledge 
and values. No clear separation can be made between different vari-
eties of knowledge, since each involves the whole spectrum of human 
experience. But this leaves the way open to incorporating both 
science and the humanities within the same body of knowledge. Each 
is limited in its grasp and both are founded upon the same resources 
of human understanding. 
Secondly, science's pre-eminence over other disciplines may 
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now be subtly overturned. The dominance of science is not caused by 
the priority of its truth claims, but because it happens to be a rela-
tively simple discipline in its methodology and in the assurance given 
by its results. As David Bartholomew puts it in the context of 
theology, 
"...the truth which comes through scientific endeavour is, 
in a sense, simpler and more easily recognized for what it 
is than are the more subtle and elusive truths of the 
spirit." 6 
Monod's view of scientific truth is therefore unsatisfactory. 
A more inclusive view of the range of knowledge needs to be 
deployed, since human knowledge forms one whole. The alienating 
divide between the disciplines of science and the humanities cannot 
then be maintained. 
The second of Monod's assertions mentioned above is that the 
evolution of life on Earth came about entirely by chance and could not 
have been foreseen. It is therefore incredible, Monod argues, that 
anyone should now think that God created the universe as a means of 
creating humanity. 
The evidence is twofold for Monod's conclusion. On the one 
hand, the sequence of amino acid residues strung together to form a 
polypeptide protein molecule bears no relationship to the function that 
molecule has in the organism's metabolism. This follows because a 
molecule's function is largely determined by its shape relative to other 
organic molecules, and this shape cannot be predicted from a given 
sequence of residues: the chain of molecules folds itself up into a 
three-dimensional ball in a wholly unpredictable fashion. Thus one 
could not plan beforehand a protein molecule to fulfil any required 
function. On the other hand, if many proteins are studied, the 
sequence of amino acid residues in each is found to be indistinguish-
able from a similar set of proteins constructed by the completely ran-
dom combination of amino acids. Thus, Monod writes, 
"... protein is already at the molecular level a veritable 
machine - a machine in its functional properties, but not, 
we now see, in its fundamental structure, where only the 
play of blind combinations can be discerned: random 
chance, caught on the wing, preserved, reproduced by the 
machinery of in variance and thus converted into order, 
rule, necessity."7 
"Pure chance, absolutely free but blind, at the very root 
of the stupendous edifice of evolution: this central con-
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cept of modern biology is no longer one among other pos-
sible or even conceivable hypotheses,, I t is today the sole 
conceivable hypothesis, tho only one compatible with 
observed and tested fact. 
"There is no scientific position, in any of the sciences, 
more destructive of anthropocentrism than this one, and 
no other more unacceptable to the intensely teleonomic 
creatures that we are." 8 
Mary Midgley has written of a new puritanism i n our scien-
tific culture, which requires us to believe the worst about our situa-
tion in the universe 9. We are told that we must look with clear heads 
at the facts presented to us and not flinch from drawing uncomfort-
able solutions: if we find comfort, then we have most probably erred 
i n our reasoning. Monod, too, finds a nobility in facing the bleakness 
of our existence, but the question is whether he himself has been 
influenced by such a puritanism. As we shall see, Bartholomew, for 
one, does not find Monod's case convincing. 
One approach in answering Monod is to question what might 
be involved in 'pure chance'. Chance is the description of events 
where no cause is apparent, so that it might appear meaningless to 
attribute anything to chance as an explanation. Donald MacKay uses 
this to argue that nothing in fact happens without God's direct doing 
and hence evolution is fully within his providence^. The penalty, 
however, of such a logically coherent approach is the further difficul-
ties it entails for understanding human freedom, as we mentioned in 
chapter four. 
Bartholomew, in his reply to Monod, chooses another route by 
not denying there is such a thing as chance. Where two independent 
causal sequences interact unexpectedly, this is chance. For instance, 
if, when in Australia, I should happen to meet a friend who also nor-
mally lives in England, then this is a chance occurrence despite the 
fact that there is nothing mysterious in the causal chains which led 
each of us to travel to Australia unknown to the other. Bartholomew 
is agnostic whether 'pure chance' may also exist, such as that envi-
saged in some interpretations of quantum theory. Yet, although 
chance exists, Bartholomew argues that it is consonant with order 
when considered in aggregate. One of many examples he considers is 
the operation of market forces where random choices by individual 
consumers nevertheless gives rise to predictable outcomes as a whole. 
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This leads him to make the suggestion that chaos and order are com-
plementary: one implies the other 1 1. Now a way is clear in the reply 
to Monod's case. The precise route taken by evolution from inanimate 
matter to higher organisms may indeed be random, but this does not 
imply that the outcome itself is necessarily random. In the same way 
that molecules in a gas move randomly whilst the gas as a whole nev-
ertheless obeys the gas laws, so the outcome of evolution might actu-
ally be determined. So long as we view evolution as a process invol-
ving the chance interactions of individual molecules, we are liable to 
be incredulous at the notion that there was anything inevitable about 
the whole process. But it is possible to look on a larger scale where 
individual chance behaviour results in highly ordered structures. 
The argument that the outcome of the evolutionary process 
was inevitable does not depend upon any belief in a creator God; it is 
a fully scientific hypothesis. Whilst David Bartholomew explicitly 
promotes a theistic understanding of the universe, Ilya Prigogine and 
Isobelle Stengers do not. Yet whilst Monod writes: 
"The thesis I shall present in this book is that the bio-
sphere does not contain a predictable class of objects or 
of events but is a particular event, certainly compatible 
indeed with f irst principles, but not deducible from those 
principles and therefore essentially unpredictable,"1 2 
Prigogine and Stengers state: 
"We are tempted to go so far as to say that once the con-
ditions for self-organization are satisfied, life becomes as 
predictable as ... a falling stone. It is a remarkable fact 
that recently discovered fossil forms of life appear nearly 
simultaneously with the first rock formations."13 
The basis of Prigogine and Stengers' intuition is their work on so-
called dissipative systems. The second law of thermodynamics states 
that entropy, a measure of disorder, must always increase with time. 
This would seem to condemn the universe to decay as the highly 
ordered matter of living systems cannot forever survive. However, 
whilst this law may be valid for the universe as a whole, it does not 
preclude regions of decreasing entropy if these are suitably balanced 
by an increase of entropy elsewhere. Life on Earth is one such 
pocket of increasing entropy which is maintained by exchanging 
energy with other regions; it is known as a dissipative system. 
Dissipative systems exist far from equilibrium with a 
consequence that they are more difficult to analyse mathematically. 
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Classical physics concerned itself almost entirely with equilibrium 
situations; only snort; recently (especially since the advent of comput-
ers) have non-equilibria been studied and a new range of unexpected 
phenomena come to light. 
The mathematical description of many of these phenomena is 
included under the general heading of chaos theory. This is the class 
of mathematical equations whose solutions are exquisitely sensitive to 
the input variables. They have the characteristic that, for two differ-
ent opening values no matter how numerically close to one another, 
the solutions diverge. A common example of a physical system 
described by such equations is the weather. It will never be possible 
to forecast the weather more than a few days in advance, for beyond 
that interval the minutest of effects (such as the flapping of a but-
terfly's wings, it is often said) would change the resultant weather 
patterns beyond recognition. A further example is the prediction of 
the positions of molecules in a gas. Picturing a gas as a collection of 
billiard balls bouncing off one another, then the position of any mole-
cule after a short time interval is highly sensitive to the exact angles 
of collisions with other molecules within that time. A typical molecule 
undergoes fifty collisions in 10~10 seconds; even after that time, the 
outcome would be affected by the presence of the gravitational field 
due to a single electron at the other side of the universe 1 4. 
It is this unpredictability which suggested the name chaos 
theory, although the mathematical equations themselves remain entirely 
deterministic. There is no contradiction between accepting chaos 
theory and believing the world to be deterministic. Chaos theory is a 
misnomer, furthermore, if the name suggests that the outcome of such 
equations is truly chaotic. There is an element of randomness, but 
this is only a cloak for some highly structured behaviour. In certain 
conditions, these equations can produce the most surprising of 
results. 
One such phenomenon studied by Prigogine is a chemical 
clock 1 5. This consists of two chemicals, say A and B, mixed together 
and undergoing certain reversible reactions which change A to B and 
vice versa. It is found that, for certain initial concentrations, a 
remarkable cycle is set up spontaneously. After a certain time, the 
chemical clock switches from being almost entirely A to being almost 
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entirely B and after another length of time reverts to being A. The 
timing of this cycle remains constant. There is no gradual change 
from A to B and back again, but billions of molecules change from one 
type to the other in a co-ordinated jump. 
Nothing mysterious is happening in such systems which is 
not understood by physics. Rather the type of dynamics which a few 
decades ago was assumed to lead to predictable and uninteresting 
results is now found in certain circumstances to lead to complex and 
unexpected behaviour. As the complexity of the systems increases, 
new behaviour constantly comes to light. Prigogine and Stengers 
summarize their findings: 
"Order and disorder are complicated notions: the units 
involved in the static description of dynamics are not the 
same as those that have to be introduced to achieve the 
evolutionary paradigm as expressed by growth of entropy. 
This transition leads to a new concept of matter, matter 
that is 'active', as matter leads to irreversible processes 
and as irreversible processes organize matter."16 
We have taken Monod as illustrative of a traditional view of 
science. He maintains a barrier between the humanities and science, 
taken to be an heroic choice of ethic, finding the life-forms of the 
world to be unpredictable and arbitrary. As Monod writes of the idea 
that "objective knowledge" is the only source of real truth: 
"Cold and austere, proposing no explanation but imposing 
an ascetic renunciation of all other spiritual fare, this 
idea could not allay anxiety; it aggravated it instead." 1 7 
Other scientific authors take a similar point of view. For instance, 
the physicist Steven Weinberg has written: 
"The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it 
seems pointless... The effort to understand the universe is 
one of the very few things that lifts human life above the 
level of farce, and gives it some of the grace of 
tragedy."1* 
This fundamental pessimism is beginning to look misplaced, however. 
Not only is the scientific endeavour not to be isolated from the rest of 
human learning, thus perhaps removing all values from human life, but 
modern science is also beginning to see the organic complexity needed 
for life as being spontaneously generated by the universe. Human life 
is not a miracle beyond comprehension in an alien universe; rather, 
life is the natural outcome of active and creative matter. It is this 
shift in perspective which has been so important in these last few 
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decades. At the core of this shift is the realisation that chance may 
be generated even i n a Newtonian world, but that such chance is not 
corrosive of stability: rather, i t may actually be the means of large 
scale order. 
(b) F r i t j o f Capra, plhysies and Eastern mysticism 
Fritjof Capra exemplifies a position at the other end of the 
scientific spectrum from Monod. He is of interest through his reli-
gious response to modern physics which he believes enables him to 
bring about a unity between science and other areas of human life. 
He writes of an experience at the heart of his vision of the world: 
" I was sitting by the ocean one late summer afternoon, 
watching the waves rolling in and feeling the rhythm of 
my breathing, when I suddenly became aware of my whole 
environment as being engaged in a gigantic cosmic 
dance... As I sat on that beach my former experiences [of 
theoretical physics] came to life; I 'saw' cascades of 
energy coming down from outer space, in which particles 
were created and destroyed in rhythmic pulses; I 'saw' 
the atoms of the elements and those of my body partici-
pating in this cosmic dance of energy; I felt its rhythm 
and I 'heard' its sound, and at that moment I knew that 
this was the Dance of Shiva, the Lord of Dancers wor-
shipped by the Hindus."1 9 
Capra's thesis is that there is a close parallel between the insights of 
Eastern mysticism and the insights of modern physics, both pointing 
to a unity and interrelatedness of all things. 
Rather too easily 2 0, Capra suggests that the basic teachings 
of all the mystical religions are the same, namely that reality is a 
unity beyond any rational capability we may have to grasp it. Ulti-
mate reality - the Brahman of Vedantic Hinduism - is the oneness of 
all things, a unity hidden by the illusions to which we are prey. Yet 
modern physics, especially in its development of relativistic quantum 
field theory, points in the same direction, Capra contends: it reveals 
the basic connectedness of all things in a way which stretches our 
imaginations and which suggests that what we observe under normal 
circumstances has no relationship to the underlying quantum reality. 
There are numerous difficulties with Capra's presentation of 
his ideas, arising largely from a contradiction between mysticism's 
unapologetically non-rational view of the world, and the view of phys-
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ics derived from a strictly rational discipline. For instance, Capra 
states that mysticism understands reality to be indeterminate and 
undifferentiated 2 1, yet as a product of its mathematical methodology, 
modern physics unavoidably sees reality to be structured, in however 
strange and wonderful a way. 
Additionally, quantum theory does not always tie in as neatly 
with mysticism as Capra assumes. The interpretation of the mathemat-
ical formalism of quantum theory remains a matter of controversy, with 
the widely-taught Copenhagen interpretation proposed by Weils Bohr 
vigorously opposed by some and viewed as unsatisfactory by many22. 
Problems arise because quantum theory involves the conjunction of 
two different procedures. In isolation from an observer, a wave-like 
quantum system evolves in accordance with wholly deterministic equa-
tions. Only with an observation are particles reified, when the wave 
equation is used to calculate the probability of a particle being found 
in any particular location and state. 
The Copenhagen interpretation insists that this is the way 
nature is: that particles are only made "real" in the act of our 
observing them. However, what is so perplexing about this interpre-
tation is what constitutes an observer. The Copenhagen interpretation 
divides an experiment into the observational apparatus, which is 
describable by classical physics, and the object of the observation 
which is not. But when an electron, say, is detected, it is surely 
detected by a part of the apparatus which is itself subject to quan-
tum theory, so that a division between classical and quantum elements 
appears arbitrary. 
This awkward division has led some, such as David Bohm23, 
to propose theories whereby particles have a real existence all along. 
It must be said, however, that such theories themselves seem mathe-
matically contrived. Others believe that the "collapse of the wave 
function", as this strange phenomenon is known, must be caused not 
by the observation as such, but by other large-scale and as yet 
unknown factors; for instance, it has been proposed that it is caused 
by gravity 2 4 . 
Capra, however, is happy that the observer plays a funda-
mentally important role. He quotes with approval Eugene Wigner's 
controversial proposal that the distinguishing factor about the 
99 
observer in quantum theory is his or her consciousness 2 5. Thus 
Capra writes: 
"In modern physics, the universe is thus experienced as a 
dynamic, inseparable whole which always includes that 
observer in an essential way. In this experience, the 
traditional concepts of space and time, of isolated objects, 
and of cause and effect lose their meaning. Such an 
experience, however, is very close to that of the Eastern 
mystics."2 6 
It may be felt that the invocation of some metaphysical concept of 
consciousness to settle a scientific question is unwarranted; neither 
does it solve some of the paradoxes of the theory. For instance, the 
result of a quantum measurement might be recorded by a photograph. 
But prior to developing it for conscious observation, Wigner would 
seem to have to say against all intuition that the photographic image 
remains indeterminate. 
Even should we accept Capra's assessment of quantum 
theory, it is not clear where these ideas are leading. For it would 
seem that introducing an essential division between observer and 
observed creates a dualism which Capra is anxious to avoid. It is 
confusing to find him writing, 
"the Cartesian partition between the I and the world, 
between the observer and the observed, cannot be made 
when dealing with atomic matter. In atomic physics, we 
can never speak about nature without, at the same time, 
speaking about ourselves." 2 7 
It would only seem that Capra's argument must end in a form of ideal-
ism, although he never states this and nothing in his view of physics 
suggests it. 
Capra's thesis therefore does not stand up to close inspec-
tion. It is never quite clear what is the exact relationship between 
mysticism and physics for which he is arguing. Yet his work is an 
illustration of a changing perception of modern science, not only in 
the biological sciences but also in physics. Capra states: 
"This book aims at improving the image of science by 
showing that there is an essential harmony between the 
spirit of Eastern wisdom and Western science. It attempts 
to suggest that modern physics goes far beyond technol-
ogy, that the way - or Tao - of physics can be a path 
with a heart, a way to spiritual knowledge and self-
realization."2 8 
There is here the recognition that science has lost much of its pre-
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stLge even whilst its truth-claims go largely unchallenged. But what 
is of significance is not whether its image may be improved by an 
association with mysticism, but that a physicist should feel able to 
describe the world in a way which makes that association possible. As 
in the work of Prigogine and Stengers above, matter is no longer seen 
as lifeless, but as energetic and vital. The barrier is being dis-
mantled between humanity's spiritual existence and a universe once 
seen to be spiritually barren. 
The recovery of a view of the natural world as being inher-
ently life-giving and sympathetic to human life is significant in a 
scientific context, but such a view is, of course, neither historically 
new nor specifically Christian. The enchantment of nature is an 
ancient religious instinct revived to some extent in the West by the 
Romantic movement of the last century. Although, as Capra argues, 
such a vision may appear compatible with mystical religion, this is 
because mystical religion itself has a tendency towards pantheism. In 
short, the new outlook of science can be used to justify a return to 
the religious concept of Mother Earth. 
This is perhaps best illustrated through the controversial 
work of James Lovelock. His Gaia hypothesis emphasises that the 
Earth possesses a complex feed-back mechanism by which the bio-
sphere compensates for any environmental changes. It is suggested 
that in this way the biosphere nurtures and protects life by evolving 
alongside the life forms themselves. Although Lovelock denies that 
this is anything more than a scientific hypothesis, his own pictu-
resque use of language frequently suggests otherwise. Thus he wri-
tes: 
"... Gaia is the largest manifestation of life. The outer 
boundary is the Earth's atmospheric edge to space. The 
boundary of the planet then circumscribes a living organ-
ism, Gaia, a system made up of all the living things and 
their environment."29 
"When I first saw Gaia in my mind I felt as an astronaut 
must have done as he stood on the Moon, gazing back at 
our home, the Earth. Thinking of the Earth as alive 
makes it seem, on happy days, in the right places, as if 
the whole planet were celebrating a sacred ceremony."30 
It is not surprising that Lovelock's ideas are popular with the New 
Age movement31. However, whilst acknowledging the controversial 
nature of the Gaia hypothesis and its lack of respectability in the 
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scientific community, its importance from our point of view is again 
the readiness with which consciously scientific reasoning has been 
used to support what develops into essentially a religious view of the 
world. 
The question is therefore whether this rapprochement 
between science and some element of spiritual awareness may garner 
fruit in the understanding of God's action of the world. Lesslie New-
bigin, however, has sounded a perceptive warning note in the Chris-
tian context when he ponders why the Eastern religions should enjoy 
popularity in our Western scientific culture: 
"The reason is clear. The Eastern religions do not under-
stand the world in terms of purpose. The symbol of the 
dance is an interpretation of movement and change with-
out invoking the idea of purpose. The Bible, on the other 
hand, is dominated by the idea of divine purpose."3 2 
Mysticism tends to emphasise the unity of all things, but less easily 
envisages either an historical purposefulness or an eschatology. This 
is clearly congenial to the modern scientific outlook which may also 
see the universe as a fruitful and interconnected whole, whilst shying 
away from any teleology. But it is doubtful whether a traditional 
Christian theism can take such a view. There is indeed a Christian 
mystical tradition, but even here there is an element of purposeful-
ness: the burgeoning of new resurrection life directed towards the 
incoming of the kingdom of God, the telos of the creation. Chris-
tianity believes God to be both transcendent and immanent; whilst the 
new openness of science may allow us to conceive more readily of 
some immanence of God in creation, problems of how a transcendent 
God may interact with his world are not addressed. There is still a 
further step to be taken in bringing God and creation together. 
One way in which some have attempted to bridge this gap is 
by associating teleology entirely with God's immanence, allowing the 
processes of creation to have their own inner purpose. We shall dis-
cuss this, the approach of process theology, in the next chapter. At 
present, however, we shall consider a more traditional theism and, in 
the thought of John Polkinghorne, one who wishes to retain in Chris-
tianity both providence and miracle in their full senses. 
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(c) John PolMmgtarae said the emergent simplicity of p h f sacal laras 
In considering divine interaction with creation, Polkinghorne 
has two related concerns. First, he perceives a danger that too great 
an emphasis on natural theology may lead one into deism, viewing God 
merely as the Great Mathematician33. For Polkinghorne, science is by 
no means to be the highway to God, but must be carefully balanced 
by the other resources available to a theologian: 
"It is, of course, clear that natural theology by itself could 
never lead us to the Christian God. It is a limited kind 
of investigation, based on certain general ideas about the 
pattern and structure of the world, and so it is only 
capable of affording limited insight." 3 4 
Secondly, however, Polkinghorne eschews any view of God as a super-
natural agent working in defiance of physical law. He writes: 
"The picture of the divine clock maker, from time to time 
interfering to adjust the hands of the steadily ticking 
cosmic clock, is not one that commends itself to Christian 
theology. God's relationship with the world must be con-
tinuing and not intermittent; it can have nothing capri-
cious about it, but it must be characterized by the most 
profound consistency."3 5 
Polkinghorne has a high regard for the regularity of the world, which 
is the deep-seated faith of all scientists. Indeed, it is in this 
regularity that Polkinghorne sees a reflection of the rationality and 
faithfulness of the universe's creator. Yet, between Polkinghorne's 
two proper concerns to protect Christianity from deism and to take 
full account of the world's regularity, there is a fundamental tension. 
That tension lies at the centre of the problem of conceiving of God's 
action: the more one emphasises the regularity of nature, the more one 
is inevitably led to think of God as the Great Mathematician. We shall 
see that Polkinghorne does not escape this inherent contradiction. 
In attempting to gain an understanding of how God's provi-
dence might work within the continuing world of physical interactions, 
Polkinghorne dismisses the possibility that quantum uncertainty might 
provide the key. He agrees with Bartholomew that what may be ran-
dom on one level is in any case highly ordered on another, the prin-
ciple upon which actuaries make their livings; also, the effects of 
quantum uncertainty are lost at the levels we experience in the 
world 3 6. Rather, Polkinghorne looks towards complex dynamical sys-
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terns, those described by chaos theory, as a more promising field. 
As we have seen, these systems have the properties both of 
being unpredictable and also of having large scale and sometimes 
stable behaviour such as Prigogine and Stengers' chemical clock. Pol-
kinghorne finds the structured openness of these dynamical systems 
to be suggestive of how human agents themselves experience their 
freedom in the world. Analogously, he tentatively proposes, the cos-
mos might be capable of sustaining the "acquiescent, economic and 
purposive wills of its Creator, within the flexibility of its lawful 
process.'"37 
This is the recasting of the soul-body/God-world analogy of 
divine action into a modern form, avoiding the difficulties of Cartesian 
dualism. However, if it is to bite, it must provide some understanding 
of how God interacts with his world without the directness of action 
exhibited by creatures. We ourselves may have freedom of action, but 
we act from within the physical system, subject to the constraints of 
energy conservation and so on. Yet if God's actions also involve the 
transfer of energy, in principle detectable by experiment, this would 
be the type of intervention which Polkinghorne resists. 
To illustrate the manner of God's interaction, Polkinghorne 
considers a bead precisely balanced at the top of a vertical U-shaped 
wire. It may fall either way depending upon how it is infinitesimally 
disturbed, without any energy difference to make it more likely to fall 
one way than another: 
"That is typical of much more complicated cases. If God 
acts in the world through influencing the evolution of 
complex systems, he does not need to do so by the cre-
ative input of energy. Of course, such divine energetic 
interaction is not to be excluded theologically, and it 
could be so bidden in complex process as not to be per-
ceivable scientifically, but we have no need to invoke it. 
Moreover, it is probably wise not to do so, since it would 
risk turning God into a demiurge, acting as an agent 
among other agents."3 8 
There appears to be three areas of weakness, however, in this sug-
gestion. 
First, the fact remains that chaos theory is deterministic. 
Polkinghorne is himself clear about this, but believes nevertheless 
that the manner in which it gives rise to apparently random behaviour 
points to a broader reality. In a later book in which Polkinghorne 
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attempts to clarify his position, he writes, 
"...it seems to me Lo be a coherent possibility to interpret 
the undoubted unpredictability of so much of physical 
process as indicating that process to be ontologically 
open. 
"The option is there, but it is not, of course, a forced 
move to choose it. The case for doing so is greatly 
enhanced if one acknowledges the necessity of describing 
a physical world of which we can see ourselves as inhabi-
tants. "39 
But this is to undermine the strength of his own case: contemporary 
science may be suggestive of a greater reality, but that reality is not 
yet a part of present science. In relying upon a possible development 
of scientific insight, Polkinghorne thereby appears to concede the 
insufficiency of science as it is presently understood to admit of 
divine action. 
Furthermore, what that development must entail is not clear. 
Polkinghorne argues, as we have seen, that in certain physical situa-
tions several of the possible outcomes involve the same amount of 
energy. Thus it is suggested that God might act by favouring one of 
out of these energy-equivalent results, whereby, 
"the 'choice' of path actually followed corresponds, not to 
the result of some physically causal act (in the sense of 
an energy input) but rather to a 'selection' from options 
(in the sense of an information input)... 
" I do not believe that God is contained within the 
mind/matter confines of the world, but it is entirely con-
ceivable that he might interact with it (both in relation to 
humanity and in relation to all other open process) in the 
form of information input." 4 0 
The concept of information has become of interest in science recently 
largely through work on computing systems and artificial intelli-
gence4 1. Yet in any example of making a choice over the future of a 
physical system, it is nevertheless doubtful whether anyone could 
ensure a desired result without some energy input, however slight. 
The bead falling off the top of a U-shaped wire needs some impulse to 
move one way or the other, otherwise it would remain static. Polking-
horne seems to envisage a situation where no energy at all is needed 
on God's part, but talking of information input does nothing more than 
hide the problem of how this can be. 
A second weakness in Polking home's proposal is its depen-
dence upon small, microscopic ef fects having macroscopic 
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consequences. To take a simpler case f i r s t , William Pollard has pro-
posed that God's providence is made present i n the world by his so 
manipulating sub-atomic events that, i n aggregate, the statistical laws 
of quantum theory are not violated4 2. There are a number of difficul-
ties with this view, amongst which is the necessity for truly random 
events to lack any correlation between themselves. If God is actually 
to maintain such a degree of randomness in his sub-atomic dealings, i t 
is not possible to arrange any particular outcome. 
However, another objection is made by Bartholomew43, who 
argues that the product of any such action by God would be beyond 
even his control. For each time God were to rig, so to speak, the 
outcome of a microscopic event, the causal chain so started would also 
intersect with other chains leading to unlooked for coincidences and 
sparking off various accidents. It could be argued, of course, that an 
infinite God could cope with all these interconnecting chains of events, 
but one would wonder whether that might be a logical impossibility. 
Any one chain of events, when worked through to its conclusion, 
might make another chain of events impossible. Even were this to 
prove not to be the case, such action from the lowest levels would be 
highly inefficient and leaves one feeling that it is too inelegant to be 
worthy of an infinite God. 
Polkinghorne's proposal is not the same as that of Pollard. 
Rather than a multitude of sub-atomic events being controlled in order 
to guarantee a particular outcome, Polkinghorne's scheme might only 
require one minimal event to select a macroscopic outcome in a complex 
dynamical system. Nevertheless, surely a similar objection is valid. 
Chaotic systems are highly sensitive to their environment, which 
means that if God guided the evolution of one system, it would trigger 
countless effects elsewhere and these effects would often be inher-
ently unpredictable. If chaotic events are unpredictable by us, they 
would have to be predictable by God in order to be of use to him. 
Now, what should be within God's omniscience is a question 
too large to be entered upon here. Suffice it to say that Polking-
horne himself accepts a position whereby God freely limits himself 
within time so that he cannot know the future where this is not logi-
cally possible4 4. This conclusion is reached from arguments concern-
ing the free evolutionary development of the world and the necessity 
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of its maintaining a degree of real freedom apart from God. Thus the 
defence would not be open that God infallibly knows the future in any 
case; rather, it strengthens the insistence that the future is open and 
unpredictable. So it is uncertain that, even were the mechanism of 
information input available to God, he would be able to use it with 
assurance. 
A final weakness in Polkinghorne's case concerns his conten-
tion that God does not intervene, but interacts with his creation. It 
is doubtful whether this distinction is actually maintained. For 
example, Polkinghorne writes: 
"The motions of the solar system are mechanical in nature, 
with a predictability over long periods of time which per-
mits the construction of almanacs. Thus the succession of 
the seasons will be guaranteed by transcendent divine 
reliability and it would indeed be foolish to pray for their 
alteration. The generation of weather is a much more 
complex process, within which it is conceivable that small 
triggers could generate large effects. Thus prayer for 
rain does not seem totally ruled out of court. In this way 
one can gain some rough comprehension of the range of 
immanent action. It will always lie hidden in those com-
plexes whose precarious balance makes them unsusceptible 
to prediction."4 5 
But one may well ask what the difference in principle is between 
altering the course of a planet and changing the weather: according 
to Polkinghorne, it seems the only real difference is that we ourselves 
do not notice the latter. In other words, the physical universe is so 
structured that God can intervene in some circumstances without our 
being able to notice. But surely it remains an intervention, whether 
directly detectable our not. 
In his later writing, Polkinghorne develops further his think-
ing against such criticisms as these 4 5. He emphasises more that the 
openness observed by modern science is actually an indication that 
reality is far more complex than previously assumed, as we touched 
upon above. Polkinghorne takes his cue from the failure of reduc-
tionism to account for emergent properties, from the bottom up. In 
fact, he writes: 
"It is by no means clear that this is more than a trick of 
intellectual perspective. In other words, the characteris-
tics of the elementary level (whether deterministic, or 
quantum mechanical, or whatever) may be as much emer-
gent properties (in the direction of increasing simplicity) 
as are life or consciousness (in the direction of increasing 
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complexity)..." 
"To address the issue blunt ly : i f apparently open behav-
iour is associated with underlying apparently determmistic 
equations, which is to be taken to have the greater onto-
logical seriousness - the behaviour or the equations? 
Which is the approximation and which is the reality? It is 
conceivable that apparent determinism emerges at some 
lower levels without its being a characteristic of reality 
overall."^ 
This new suggestion, however, which sees present science as a simpli-
fied extraction from physical reality, brings its own difficulties. 
First , Polkinghorne, in his construction of a natural theology, 
tries to take full account of modern science, although he is distrustful 
of too great a reliance. But in the proposal that present-day science 
is a simplification of reality and thus will be seen eventually to be 
inadequate, Polkinghorne seems to have crossed the line into allowing 
his theology to dictate his science. He may be right that science is 
inadequate, but he can no longer claim that he is doing nothing more 
than constructing a natural theology within the bounds of contempo-
rary science. 
Secondly, we saw in the previous chapter that the rise of 
anti-reductionism, with new properties emerging from simpler systems, 
has been primarily driven by a physical monism. But, against such a 
background, it is not straightforward to say that emergent complexity 
is merely the reverse side of the coin to emergent simplicity. The 
assumption which underlies anti-reductionism is of a basic simplicity 
made plausible by scientific successes, leaving the world's complexity 
in need of explanation. The assumption of a basic complexity to our 
universe needs arguing for against such a view. Additionally, 
whereas the notion of emergent properties has some grounding in 
science, the concept of emergent simplicity remains merely an empty 
concept, unless some specific examples may be found to make it cre-
dible. 
Thirdly, at the heart of his natural theology, Polkinghorne 
places much weight upon the rationality of the universe as reflecting 
the rationality of its creator. Thus he has written: 
"The rational order that science discerns is so beautiful 
and striking that it is natural to ask why it should be so. 
It could only find an explanation in a cause itself essen-
tially rational. This would be provided by the Reason of 
the Creator, which establishes the common ground for the 
observed rationality of the world and the experienced 
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rationality of our minds, guaranteeing their mutual coher-
ence."4* 
But the force of this assertion is undermined if the rationality suc-
cessfully employed by science gives illusive results. The insights 
gained by science would be, in this view, no more than simplifications 
of a greater reality. It is no longer clear that this greater reality is 
rational in the manner which Polkinghorne argues is so striking. 
Finally, the adoption of this view would not necessarily help 
in the point which seems to be at issue. However complex physical 
reality may turn out to be, God would still be intervening in it. To 
avoid that conclusion would involve going down the road of process 
theology in which God's will is immanently present within the physical 
processes themselves. 
(d) Arthur Peacocke and top-dotra causation 
The position taken by Polkinghorne, of preserving a tradi-
tional theism without wishing to over-ride the energies and causality 
of physics, seems to have major difficulties which stem from its basic 
assumptions. It appears that interaction must always be intervention 
in such a picture, for it presents science as being a self-sufficient 
description of our world. 
Arthur Peacocke believes, however, that a model of the world 
can be presented in which no violation of physics occurs. This model 
makes extensive use of an anti-reductionist agenda, and in explicating 
it Peacocke makes use of two examples in particular. 
Peacocke takes his first example from the work of Donald 
Campbell49. Termite colonies have a complex social organization, with 
different sub-groups of workers having jaws adapted to the work 
each undertakes. At one level, the biological structure of any ter-
mite's jaw is determined directly by the DNA sequences in its genes. 
Yet it is equally true to say that these anatomical structures have 
been determined over many generations by the forces of natural 
selection. Thus, the DNA sequences themselves have been determined 
by the operation of higher-level laws operating at the level of colonies 
of animals. Campbell therefore speaks of "downward" or "top-down" 
causation. This seems to be an example of irreducibility going one 
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stage further: the composition of the DNA sequences can only be 
explained by reference to the higher-level laws, not by the biochemi-
cal processes involved in their generation. 
The second example Peacocke takes of top-down causation is 
the human person 5 0. In one view of human consciousness (although, 
as we have seen in the previous chapter, only one of many), it is the 
state of the brain as a whole which determines the state of any par-
ticular neurone. Consciousness is a collective, higher-level phenome-
non of the brain which prompts, say, an arm to move by top-down 
causation. A similar case can be made using other views of conscious-
ness. 
Peacocke aims to use this notion of top-down causation in 
conceiving how God acts in the world: 
"According to this suggestion the state of the totality of 
the world-as-a-whole (all-that-is) would be known only to 
the omniscience of God and would be the field of the 
exercise of his omnipotence at his omnicompetent level of 
comprehensiveness and comprehension... In this model, 
God would be regarded as exerting continuously top-down 
causative influences on the world-as-a-whole in a way 
analogous to that whereby we in our thinking can exert 
effects on our bodies in a 'top-down' manner."51 
This model appears to have none of the weaknesses of Polkinghorne's 
concept of God intimately involved at every point of creation; rather, 
there is an elegance to the concept of the world being one system 
with which God interacts as a whole. Additionally, Peacocke is able to 
give a clear account of what is involved in top-down causation. 
Yet, whilst the model is attractive, its simplicity may be 
deceiving. For by introducing his action at higher levels, the model 
has the effect of distancing God from the stuff of physical interaction. 
But this is illusory. In the examples of top-down causation given by 
Peacocke, at the higher levels it is not a question of no physical 
interactions being required, but a multiplicity of simple interactions in 
a complex inter-relationship. Thus, the brain state is described as 
the totality of all the individual neurones' states. The higher-level 
activity actually requires more physical interactions than those at a 
lower level, not fewer. 
In a similar way, when one tries to envisage what it would 
mean for God to interact at a higher level with the world as a whole, 
it only becomes meaningful by conceiving of God being involved in 
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many physical interactions at once in a highly correlated way. But 
now the advantage is less easy to see of this conception over that of 
Polkinghorne. Both require extensive direct action by God. 
Although Peacocke skirts around this problem by talking of 
God's action as an information input, he does admit it when he dis-
cusses where the 'causal joint' might lie: 
"How can God exert his influence on, make an input of 
information into, the world-as-a-whole without an input of 
matter/energy? This seems to me to be the ultimate level 
of the 'causal joint' conundrum, for it involves the very 
nature of the divine being in relation to that of 
matter/energy and seems to me to be the right place in 
which to locate the problem, rather than at some lower 
levels in the created order at which divine 'intervention' 
would then have to be postulated with all of its difficul-
ties.'^ 
Although Peacocke's model is attractive and reinforces a conception of 
the world as being essentially a unity, it is nevertheless difficult to 
understand how it might actually work without a return to all the 
problems it seeks to avoid. Once more, it seems, a transcendent God 
is brought into contradiction with self-sufficient physical law. 
(e) Conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter that there have been signifi-
cant developments in science in the last few decades, leading to a 
more subtle view of our universe and its evolution. Amongst other 
things, life is increasingly understood to be a natural product of our 
universe rather than an improbable oddity in need of special explana-
tion (although this is not to say that the existence of such a universe 
is not itself in need of explanation). Thus science can no longer be a 
primary motivation for humanity to view itself as alien to the uni-
verse, spiritually divorced from a deterministic and mechanical envi-
ronment. Such a view is reinforced by the adoption of a critical real-
ist philosophy of science, in which the full spectrum of human knowl-
edge is acknowledged to be interdependent. Science is now more 
readily perceived to be friendly to the human spirit and less scepti-
cal. 
The recovery of a vision of humanity as belonging in the 
world can be developed towards religious ends. In particular we have 
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noted that it is sympathetic either to that mysticism which emphasises 
the underlying unity of the universe, or to some religious concept of 
Mother Earth. One might also think that it would be useful in con-
ceiving of divine interaction with our world, when the latter is no 
longer viewed as spiritually barren. 
However, this hope is disappointed. Resulting from its own 
methodology, the new scientific view continues to eschew any tele-
ology; thus it cannot easily be linked to any sense of universal pur-
pose. One may argue that, in the universe's evolution, we can detect 
a development towards some end, such as conscious life. Nevertheless, 
this would be the self-realization of the universe's nature, not a sign 
of some parallel external purposefulness or guidance. Within the 
scientific picture, introducing an external agency, even when divine, 
will always have an air of artificiality about it. 
In a sense, this is an obvious conclusion. Accepting a form 
of scientific realism, then it is not possible to square the circle of 
proposing some external divine interaction without science itself allow-
ing some derogation of its self-sufficiency. In the work of Polking-
horne and Peacocke, the problem of conceiving of a 'causal joint' 
between God and his creation is the sign of this. Indeed, the new 
insights of science which render the universe more friendly to human 
aspirations are a two-edged sword so far as such theism is concerned. 
In one way, it allows the burgeoning of a religious spirit; but in 
another way, it renews the argument which points towards rendering 
theism, if not deism, a needless hypothesis. 
Thus, if this analysis is correct, looking towards further 
developments within the discipline of science would not help, so long 
as these developments retain science's autonomy. We have to conclude 
that these attempts to understand divine interaction whilst retaining a 
full acceptance of contemporary scientific claims appear doomed to 
failure. In the next chapter, we therefore turn to an alternative 
mentioned in passing above: that God immanent!y brings a direction to 
his creation from within the processes described by physics. In this 
case, the metaphysical basis of science is itself changed. 
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chapter 7; Process Theology; h. Hadicsffly Digeareiat ^rgwoaek 
In each of the approaches to divine action thus far cons id-
ered, conceptual problems have been disclosed. Latterly we explored 
the newly-found openness of the physical universe as a possible door 
to divine interaction. Yet we nevertheless concluded that to accept 
the validity of a crit ical ly real science involves excluding God's direct 
activity in the world, for such a science claims to uncover a complete 
causal patterning. 
The theological determinism entertained in chapter four also 
had i ts weaknesses. I n particular, i ts understanding of human free -
dom and the apparent responsibility of God for the evi l of his creation 
were problematic. But there were other difficulties as well. For 
instance, whilst there are cogent arguments that God is timelessly 
eternal, nevertheless i t i s not easy to understand how such a God 
could interact personally with his creatures . I t would seem that an 
atemporal God creates the whole of the world's history "simulta-
neously". But we argued that a response i s logically consequent to a 
free act and so cannot be simultaneous with it in creation without 
linriting any notion of our freedom. 
Thus we have found no wholly adequate means of compre-
hending where or how God may interact with our world. However, 
process theologians, with whom this chapter will be concerned, present 
us with another option, a theology whose foundations are motivated by 
the very difficulties we seem to have come up against. 
(a) Process theology's crit ique of c lass ical theism 
Characterist ic of process theologians has been their i n s i s -
tence upon the importance of differentiating between a religious belief 
and the metaphysical tradition by which that belief i s formalized. I f 
theism appears to be irreconcilable with other scientific or humanistic 
beliefs, then i t i s argued one should question whether that conflict 
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arises merely through the assumed metaphysic. This i s never an easy 
question, since the metaphysic and the belief influence one another. 
Nevertheless, i t i s hardly an exaggeration to say that the mainstream 
of process theology 1 i s convinced that problems of relating God to the 
world arise exclusively through a mistaken metaphysic. I n particular, 
i t i s dismissive of the so-called classical metaphysical tradition of 
theology, originating in Greek philosophy and developed by the 
medieval scholastics. 
This criticism of c lassical theism i s one of the more widely 
acknowledged achievements of process theology 2. At i ts root lies the 
rejection of the Greek notion that perfection must be static. Now this 
idea arises from the reasonable supposition that a change in any 
entity will always be either for the better or the worse. Yet a per -
fect entity cannot by definition change for the better, nor would it 
remain perfect i f i t changed for the worse. Therefore, any perfect 
entity must be unchanging. 
Accepting such a proposition, God in his perfection will be an 
unchanging being. At the same time, however, Christ ianity i s com-
mitted to the biblical idea that, in loving and caring for his people, 
God is personal. But i t is diff icult to conceive how an unchanging 
being can be related to any other being in a personal relationship. I f 
nothing else, relationships appear to involve interaction, and the 
mutual interaction in a relationship of love would seem to necessitate 
some effect and hence change in both the parties involved. Now to 
establish a contradiction in this would demand a more careful analysis 
than i s within our scope. But that traditional theism indeed has 
problems at this point i s suggested by comments taken from Anselm 
and Aquinas 3 . 
On the subject of God's compassionate yet passionless nature, 
Anselm responds: 
"Thou art compassionate in terms of our experience, and 
not compassionate in terms of thy being." 4 
A point of similar effect i s made by Aquinas: 
"Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, 
and creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, i t 
is manifest that creatures are really related to God Him-
self; whereas in God there i s no real relation to creatures , 
but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are 
referred to Him." 5 
Hartshorne, amongst others, suggests that such a notion is not ade-
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guate. He analyses relationships into two types: internal and external. 
When a subject observes an object, then the observation affects the 
subject and the relevant relationship i s internal. However, the object 
(which may be another subject unaware of being observed) i s not 
affected and so is involved in the relationship externally. In this 
terminology, knowledge of an object i s an internal relationship. Hart-
shorne then cri t ic ises Aquinas for developing some such theory of 
relations, but applying it inconsistently by having God omniscient and 
yet not internally, but externally related to his creation. 
These difficulties are extended when one considers that t r a -
ditional theology ins i s t s that creation i s contingent, whilst God in his 
essence is necessary. Schubert Ogden fails to understand how the 
chief aim of humankind could be to serve or glorify such a God: 
"The God whom we are thus summoned to serve i s , in the 
la s t a n a l y s i s , so conce ived that he can be as l i t t le 
affected by our best actions as by our worst. As actus 
purus , and thus a statically complete perfection incapable 
in any respect of fur ther self-realization, God can be 
neither increased nor diminished by what we do, and our 
action, l ike our suffer ing , must be in the s tr ictest sense 
wholly indifferent to him." 6 
Process theologians thus question the religious adequacy of exalting 
the Christ ian God as an unchanging absolute at the expense of allow-
ing him a recognizably personal relationship with his mutable c r e a -
tures . But there i s another inadequacy beyond the alleged incoher-
ence of c lassical theism. Such a God can only lead to atheism in a 
secular age, Ogden argues: 
"The whole point of secularity is i ts emphatic affirmation 
that our life here and now in space and time, in nature 
and history, i s of ultimate significance. Yet i t is j u s t this 
affirmation that a wholly absolute God renders otiose." 7 
We have been misled, claims process theology, by the dominant meta-
phys ica l tradition which speaks of substance, being and static perfec-
tion. As John Cobb and David Gri f f in suggest, i t is theology's d i f f i -
culties with relatedness which give the lie to the whole of traditional 
metaphysics: 
"I f the actual things are thought to be static, relations are 
nuisances, required only by the need to give the philos-
ophy some relevance to the world as experienced; and if 
things have real relations with each other, and these re la -
tions belong to their respective essences, i t i s difficult to 
understand how these essences can be unchanging." 8 
I t i s at least plausible, therefore, that problems of relating divine 
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action to the world have arisen for metaphysical reasons as much as 
through str ict ly theological, or indeed scientif ic, beliefs. The problem 
i s not that of conceiving of divine action within our particular world, 
but of conceiving any divine action at all by a God who is , in meta-
physical terms, essentially unrelated to his creation. 
Of course, even if we accept this to be a true weakness of 
c lassical theology, i t i s not necessari ly a cause to re ject such 
theology. Any theological system will have its weak points; the ques-
tion i s whether the system broadly proposed by process theology i s 
better able to conceive God's relationship with the world without com-
promising other areas of belief. We therefore now t u r n to the con-
struct ive proposals of process theologians. 
(b) The basis o£ process t h e o l o g y ° s metaphysics 
In understanding any intellectual movement, one must be 
wary of assuming too simple a convergence of the views of the v a r i -
ous writers involved. This i s equally true of process theology, espe-
cially between the two major s trands of thought emanating from Alfred 
North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. Nevertheless, in their meta-
physical basis, there i s a great deal which unites them. 
Primarily, there i s a shared conviction that the classical 
tradition is inadequate to deal with the relationships we f ind within 
the world, as well as those between God and the world. As sketched 
above, this inadequacy is traced to Greek metaphysical ideas of s u b -
stance and being, as applicable both to the divine and non-divine. 
Plato, as Whitehead emphasised, saw change as inescapably part of our 
world, yet for him what i s most real is that which is most unchanging. 
Thus the temporal world we see around us becomes more real as it 
approaches a static perfection. But that i s to mislead us, it i s 
argued. Our personal experience of existence i s one of change, 
growth and decay; science, as we have seen in the previous chapter, 
gives us a view of the world whose underlying s tructure i s dynamic, 
not static. Thus our world i s in reality in process of becoming; where 
we have come to see permanence, this i s merely an abstraction from 
the constant flux of the world's existence. Whitehead and Hartshorne 
therefore reverse Plato's notion: what i s static i s least real and 
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abstract; what i s rea l i s in constant process of change and becoming. 
Hartshorne and Whitehead each builds a metaphysic based on 
s u c h a notion of reality. But there are differences between the two. 
Hartshorne emphasises that a metaphysic i s not empirical; rather, 
metaphysics belongs by nature with mathematics and formal logic: 
"[Metaphysics'] propositions, if we get them right, are such 
that denying them makes no sense. No conceivable obser-
vation could contradict them." 9 
Whitehead, on the other hand, i s more empirical in his approach, imag-
inatively searching experience for universal s tructures . This i s 
expressed in his "reformed subject iv ist principle" 1 0 , which states that 
what i s real can only be disclosed by generalization from the experi-
ence of subjects . I n like manner, God too can only be so understood: 
"God i s not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysi-
cal principles, invoked to save their collapse. He i s their 
chief exemplification . " u 
This contrasts with Hartshorne, for whom i t seems aspects of God are 
not merely an exemplification of metaphysical principle, but virtually 
constitute such . He writes, 
" I think the definition and existence of God must be 
treated like an arithmetical proposition: i f false, i t could 
not have been true , if t rue i t could not have been 
false."" 
Not surpr is ing ly , Hartshorne has made much of the ontological a r g u -
ment of Anselm 1 3 and his metaphysical system itself more or less 
entails belief in God. This sense of the inevitability of belief in God 
is made explicit in the writings of Ogden, one of Hartshorne's s t u -
dents: 
" I now wish to claim that.. . faith in God cannot but be real 
because it i s in the f inal analysis unavoidable." 1 4 
These characterist ics of the approaches used by Whitehead 
and Hartshorne raise important questions. To continue with Ogden 
and Hartshorne f i r s t , i t would appear that belief in God merely stems 
from a correct metaphysical analysis of our situation 1 5 . Yet the sense 
of "merely" here could cause concern that belief becomes no more 
than tr iv ia l , or that the concept of God has been so caught in the 
web of human rationality that it i s thereby unacceptably limited. Now, 
the notion that belief in God could become unavoidable i s not in itself 
too worrying. After all, atheism in its modern sense i s unknown in 
the Bible and, until relatively recently, belief in the existence of God 
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went virtually unquestioned. I t i s only in the modern age that 
believers have become used to the commonplace that God's existence is 
not to be proved or disproved. That God might once more become an 
accepted part of our intellectual outlook is no cause for concern. 
However, as in any rationalistic theology, the danger that 
God is cut down to the size of his creatures must be admitted. The 
question i s whether this danger invalidates the theology, for whilst 
Gunton concludes disapprovingly that, "Hartshorne's theology is i r r e -
trievably anthropomorphic," 1 6 Ogden can write with apparently little 
concern that Hartshorne's "working out [of] a frankly 'anthropomor-
phic' view of God must be admitted." 1 7 Whether anthropomorphism 
itself should count decisively against a proposed view of God is thus 
debatable, especially given the anthropomorphism of the biblical wit-
nesses. The acceptability of any particular notion of God will be 
judged in the l ight of the Christ ian tradition and our contemporary 
understanding of the world, not simply upon its degree of anthropo-
morphism. We shall evaluate Hartshorne's God later; it i s at that stage 
that his adequacy will have to be decided. 
Although approaching the matter differently, Whitehead's 
reformed subject iv is t principle leads to similar concerns. God, as real , 
i s only to be discerned through the experience of subjects . This l im-
its God's radical difference from creation. Of course, in practice, our 
positive concepts of God must always be so constrained; but White-
head's principle makes that limit absolute. Whether this limitation is 
necessari ly fatal to Whitehead's theology again cannot be immediately 
decided, particularly since the Christ ian tradition accepts that we 
ourselves reflect God's image to some degree. As with Hartshorne, the 
question can only be decided by evaluating the resultant theology. 
Judgment must therefore be reserved whether the basic 
approach of process theology is flawed. However, we have already 
commented that traditional theism i s not necessarily to be rejected 
because of its weaker points; the same likewise applies to process 
theology. I f i t i s found that the tendency towards anthropomorphism 
is a severe weakness, this must be balanced by i ts s trength which is 
i ts confluence with science. Whereas other approaches to divine 
action we have investigated have been reacting to science, either pos-
itively or negatively, none has redefined the metaphysical basis both 
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of theology and science in such a radical way as process theology. 
Thus Whitehead wrote, 
"Philosophy frees itself from the taint of ineffectiveness by 
its close relations with religion and with science, natural 
and sociological. I t attains i ts chief importance by fus ing 
the two, namely, religion and science, into one rational 
scheme of thought." 1 8 
Because this fusion is metaphysical, then if success fu l the empirical 
f indings of science will remain unchallenged. Therefore, if a theology 
can be built upon the same metaphysical underpinning, there should 
be no friction with science. The strength of process theology is i ts 
framework for understanding God's relationship with the world; i t i s 
this which should be balanced against any weakness found in its doc-
tr ine of God. 
We have noted a difference of approach between Whitehead 
and Hartshorne and we shall now proceed to investigate separately the 
two strands of process theology which stem from them. However, 
although there are real differences between them, i t i s easy to exag-
gerate their importance. I n particular, i t should be noted that Hart-
shorne takes much of Whitehead's thought as read. Thus , to some 
extent their separate treatment i s no more than a convenience for 
drawing out different aspects of process thought. 
(c) God as sympathetic participant i n the world 
Through the nineteenth century , the criticisms of theology 
engendered by the Enlightenment had given r ise to l iberal theology's 
concern with "the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man". 
This resulted in a greater emphasis upon a notion of God as love 
which, combined with a scepticism about traditional metaphysics, was 
also corrosive of belief in the impassibility of God. Love was under-
stood to require a mutual relationship. Hartshorne was one of those 
concerned to create a theological system which enshrined an essential 
relatedness of God to the world, without compromising some sense of 
God's absolute unsurpassabiJity. 
The theological system Hartshorne proposes 1 9 conceives God 
as being absolutely unsurpassable in his relatedness, whereby God i s 
thus the supreme experisncer of reality. I f we take i t that a proper 
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understanding of relatodness should involve mutuality, then this 
implies that God must also be relative to his creation. Now, relativity 
and absoluteness are usually taken to be opposites, and so describing 
God as absolutely relative may seem to have the character of an oxy-
moron. This would be so were the two polar opposites to apply to the 
same concrete aspect of God. I n fact, ixi the dipolar theism Hart-
shorne proposes, each polar pair i s formed from a concrete and a cor-
responding abstract aspect of God. Thus , the relativity of God is 
concrete, in that he i s related to every aspect of the universe . How-
ever, the absoluteness of his relativity i s abstract: it i s an implication 
of his being fully related to every aspect of the universe that no 
entity could have a greater relatedness. 
One may ponder why these categories could not be reversed, 
so that the concrete aspect of God would be his absoluteness. The 
answer follows directly from the decision to place "becoming" before 
"being" in the process metaphysics: nothing absolute can be concrete, 
since an absolute i s static and therefore has no actual existence. 
Much of the remainder of Hartshorne's system is simply the out-
working of th is decision, combined with his "Law of Polarity". This 
states that, when thinking of God metaphysically, we should always 
take account of both aspects of a polar pair. This i s in contrast with 
class ical theism which exalted one of each pair to an eminent degree 
and neglected the other. The prime example of i ts alleged weakness, 
as we have seen, i s that if God is supremely absolute, he then loses 
all relativity. 
One application of this law of polarity i s in considering God's 
necessary and contingent existence. Hartshorne writes: 
"Existence i s defined as the essence being somehow actual-
ized; actuality i s defined as how, or in what divine states 
or qualities, the essence i s actualized. Actuality (except 
in the sense of being somehow actualized) i s always 
contingent, even in the divine form." 2 0 
The concrete pole of God's existence i s therefore contingent, as we 
may have expected since his existence i s supremely related to the 
contingent world; the necessity of his existence i s abstract , consisting 
in the fact that he must be related to the world. 
Another polar pair we may apply to God is caused and 
uncaused. For Hartshorne, a perception is the effect of a cause out-
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side oneself. Thus God, as omniscient of a contingent world, i s 
supremely caused in his concrete pole; i t i s only in his abstract pole 
that he i s uncaused. 
I n similar fashion, we can apply many other polar opposites 
to God: he i s temporal by being concretely related to every time of 
the world's history, but he i s abstractly atemporal by being related 
equally to every time; God is abstractly infinite because he i s involved 
concretely in all the world's fLnitude; and so on. We may note that, in 
each case, the abstract pole of God's nature i s always subordinate to 
his concrete pole. Thus , for instance, whilst God in his concrete pole 
i s mutable, the abstract pole only enters through his being immutably 
mutable. 
I s such an understanding of God adequate? Colin Gunton, in 
his study of Hartshorne's theology, f inds two grounds for reject ing it: 
the impossibility of God truly acting as a cause, and the understand-
ing of love which the theology in practice implies. Let us consider 
these criticisms in t u r n . 
We have seen that, in his concrete pole, God i s caused, and 
therefore an effect. Thus if God i s to be a cause, he will be so in his 
abstract nature: but Gunton just i f iably complains, "it i s diff icult to 
see how a cause can be abstract , in any recognizable meaning of the 
term." 2 1 Hartshorne nevertheless f inds two senses in which God is a 
cause. F i r s t , he maintains that God acts as a f inal cause: the fact 
that we know God to be supremely an effect itself gives meaning and 
direction to the universe. Secondly, Hartshorne f inds that God i s also 
an efficient cause, although he here defines a cause as , 
"where previously there was only the potentiality of a c e r -
tain value, there i s now the actuality of this value." 2 2 
As Gunton points out, this is a strange definition since, for instance, 
"the bullet caused the glass to shatter" surely i s not equivalent to, 
"the glass once shatterable, i s now shattered," 2 3 But it does c larify 
how Hartshorne envisages God to act as a cause, because the def ini-
tion is backwards looking in time: what i s actual now (i.e. after the 
cause has acted) was previously only potential. Thus , as efficient 
cause, God is past: he acts through being externally related to events 
which are in his future , providing a store of concrete experience to 
which the future responds. 
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One could develop further the perplexities which resul t from 
this passive and abstract view of God's nature as a cause. However, 
that i s not necessary, since it has become sufficiently apparent that 
Hartshorne's notion of God is very different from that traditionally 
conceived. I n short, he has no requirement as such for a God who 
acts, as the following quotations makes clear: 
"It follows from the concept of the divine essence that the 
divine experience sums up with unique adequacy all the 
value of the entire natural world, and hence each thing 
can look to i t for guidance and inspiration. 
"Serving God should be its own reward, whether or not 
our last experience before our death is our last experi -
ence altogether. I f ind life i ts own reward, provided I 
can believe that all that i s beautiful or good in my 
earthly l iving, and in that of those I can influence or 
help, will be cherished forevermore in the life of G o d / ' 2 5 
God, i t seems, gives value and meaning to the world by acting as a 
guarantor of i ts f inal significance in the formation of his own experi-
ence, rather than by acting in any direct sense to ful f i l his purposes 
within creation. 
This concept f inds expression in Hartshorne's favoured term, 
'panentheism'. This means that, as in pantheism, all that i s the world 
is also God; but the world does not constitute God without remainder. 
What seems to be additional, as Hartshorne writes, i s that, 
"God i s the individual with str ict ly universa l functions, and 
the only such individual ." 2 6 
I t i s God's abstract pole which prevents panentheism becoming pan-
theism; this seems to be the explanation for Hartshorne's fondness of 
the analogy of the world as God's body. To understand this , let us 
consider a pair of identical twins, John and Mark: any cell from John's 
body is concretely much the same as an equivalent cell from Mark's 
body, including its chromosomes. What differentiates these two cells 
i s abstract , namely the universal properties of the bodies to which 
they belong, which makes one John and the other Mark. Likewise, 
God i s the universal property of our world, not concretely present in 
any of its elements and therefore more than their sum, j u s t as John is 
more than the sum of his cells. 
Some authors, for instance Grace Jantzen 2 7 , develop this 
analogy fur ther . However, i t founders when it i s taken to be an 
attempt to understand God's direct agency in the world. I t seems 
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unlikely that there i s the organic unity in the universe to form a 
unified agent; and if one assumes the universe as a whole to be an 
agent, the relationship with the individual agents we see around us 
becomes problematical i f their freedom is not to be compromised. Hence 
Thomas Tracy can rightly question: 
"Is the action of the super- indiv idual simply the accumu-
lated effect of the actions of many sub- individuals? I f so, 
i s the super- indiv idual an agent in any significant sense? 
Does the super- individual act by somehow influencing the 
actions of the many sub-individuals? If so, i s the super -
individual surreptit iously being treated as a distinct 
ent i ty tha t ac t s upon the society of many s u b -
indiv iduals?" 2 8 
But i t may be that these questions arise from using Hartshorne's anal -
ogy in a way different to his intention. The world as God's body 
uses the picture of a physical body as transcendently inhabited by 
spir i t , rather than that of a spir i tual agent embodied. Agency itself 
i s something of a red herring. 
Thus when Gunton crit ic izes the abstract nature of God's 
activity as a flaw, he seems to miss Hartshorne's point. However alien 
i t may appear, this abstract causation forms a consistent part of Hart-
shorne's system. We can understand this from a slightly different 
stand-point from its development by Ogden in existential terms. He 
writes: 
"[God's] creative action as such i s not an action in history, 
but an action that transcends i t - j u s t as, by analogy, 
our own inner decisions as selves are not simply identical 
with any of our outer acts of word and deed, but rather 
transcend or lie behind them as the decisions in which 
our words and deeds are grounded and to which they 
give expression." 2 9 
Following Heidegger, Ogden argues that the prime focus of a person's 
action is not the carry ing out of a particular project, but the action 
by which the self as such is constituted. I t i s the radical decision 
tru ly to exist. Ogden continues: 
"Now, if God's action is to be understood by s tr ic t analogy 
to the action of man, what i s meant by man's action i s , 
f i r s t of al l , this inner act whereby the human self as such 
i s constituted, and constituted, moreover, as a self who 
loves. According to the central claim of the Christ ian 
witness of faith, the being of God is a being of 'pure 
unbounded love' (Charles Wesley). I take this to imply 
that the primary meaning of God's action i s the act 
whereby, in each new present, he constitutes himself as 
God by participating fully and completely in the world of 
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his creatures , thereby laying the ground for the next 
stage of the creative process ." 3 0 
The self-constitution of God docs not need active agency as 
we might have understood that term. But it i s now Gunton's second 
criticism of Hartshorne which will have more weight in terms of the 
intention of the theology. I t concerns God's character as love, which 
motivated much of the criticism of tradition theism and lies at the 
heart of Hartshorne's conception: God as love demands relatedness. 
However, the reverse of this proposition i s fallacious: relatedness per 
se i s surely not love. Whilst Hartshorne has certainly created a God 
who i s ful ly related to the world, the conclusion that such a God 
therefore loves the world remains vulnerable. As Gunton writes: 
"Merely because God i s so constituted that everything that 
happens must make an impact upon him - a kind of meta-
physical sponge, infinitely absorbent - are we to say that 
he loves everything?. . . The difficulty with the neoclassi-
cal suf fer ing , for all i ts merits as a pointer to the real 
concern of God for his creatures , i s that i t i s not also a 
doing. I t i s totally automatic and in voluntary." 3 1 
If the movement from God's relatedness to his love i s inval id, then it 
i s not clear that Hartshorne can claim his God gives meaning and 
value to the world's existence in any sense. He i s part of the world's 
reality, perhaps i ts cosmic memory, but not obviously someone who 
"cherishes" our existence. The belief that God participates in the 
world with sympathy remains undemonstrated. 
We are now in a position to evaluate Hartshorne's doctrine of 
God, which has a number of strengths. F i r s t , of course, it enables 
God's relationship with his creation to be consistently conceived. This 
i s reinforced by God's dipolar nature which allows him also to remain 
meaningfully absolute. A further positive point is the metaphysical 
analysis which allows God to be conceived as the ground of our confi -
dence in existence in a manner plausible in our secular age. 
Yet there remain two major difficulties with this doctrine of 
God. F i r s t , the success in conceiving of a God who i s t ru ly loving 
seems to have been undermined by the necessarily attenuated notion 
of love used. Love i s itself an abstract term and not one readily 
defined, which i s perhaps why Hartshorne's theology apparently 
stumbles over it. Whilst in the human context, love may entail 
involvement and empathy, i t cannot be reduced to those terms. Miss-
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ing i s any sense of active desire, or active concern. & God who i s 
supremely involved in creation is not thereby recognised as a God 
who supremely loves. 
The second difficulty depends more upon a theological j u d g -
ment. We have seen that Hartshorne's God gives value to the world 
by his presence rather than by his action. He i s a f inal and an e f f i -
cient cause solely because knowledge of his existence i s held to i n f l u -
ence the actions of his creatures. Now this i s clearly a very different 
God to that conceived by the whole of Christ ian tradition, and perhaps 
should be rejected simply on that account. Talk of resurrect ion would 
seem to become meaningless and anthropology would become tho-
roughly Pelagian. However, combined with a Bultmannian existential-
ism, as Ogden proposes, much of Chris t ian doctrine might be re inter -
preted with some degree of consonance to traditional teaching. 
But what counts against Hartshorne's system from the point 
of view of our current investigation i s that i t banishes any but the 
most Pickwickian sense of God's action in the world. To accept such 
theology would be to accept that no divine action is possible, in any 
commonly understood meaning of the term. The irony is that Hart-
shorne's God ends up being the passive observer of the universe , as 
much as the God of traditional theism was the impassible observer. 
(d) God as creative persuasion 
Having discerned problems with Hartshorne's theology, we 
turn to the s trand of thought originating directly with Whitehead. I t 
must be s tressed again that in many ways i t i s artif icial to separate 
Whitehead from Hartshorne, since they share so much in common. 
Also, Hartshorne builds upon Whitehead rather than vice versa . Yet 
their approaches are sufficiently distinct to make the separation of 
value. 
Whitehead i s often more diff icult to fathom than Hartshorne 
and this i s not always helped by the clarity of his terminology. For 
instance, in Religion in the Making, Whitehead tells us that "feeling" 
can be used as a synonym for "actuality" 3 2 . Yet he writes in Process 
and Reality: 
"[As primordial, God's] feelings are only conceptual and so 
lack the fulness of actuality." 3 3 
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Or we may compare: 
"God i s an actual entity" 3 4 
with: 
"Thus, analogously to all actual entities, the nature of God 
is dipolar." 3 5 
This i s not to carp , but to warn that writers may with some jus t i f i ca -
tion interpret Whitehead in differing ways. As David Pailin writes: 
"[Whitehead's] ideas... have at times the provocative f r u i t -
fulness of concepts with fuzzy edges rather than the p r e -
cision of components of a fully f inished system." 3 6 
Let us now expound that system. Beyond both God and c r e -
ation, Whitehead places at the centre of his se l f -s ty led philosophy of 
organism the concept of creativity, that which allows becoming: 
"In all philosophic theory there i s an ultimate which i s 
actual in virtue of i ts accidents. I t i s only then capable 
of characterization through i ts accidental embodiments, 
and apart from these accidents i s devoid of actuality. I n 
the philosophy of organism this ultimate i s termed 'creat i -
vity'; and God i s its primordial, non-temporal accident." 3 7 
John Cobb suggests that we should think of creativity as analogous to 
prime matter in Aristotle's phys ics , i.e. that which only exists in 
definite entities but which constitutes their matter 3 8 . He suggests we 
may name it equivalently energy -as - such , or act iv i ty -as - such; what-
ever, it i s the point in the system where being i s replaced by becom-
ing. 
Two points follow from this which are worth noting. F i r s t , 
whereas Hartshorne's dipolar God is concretely temporal, Whitehead 
maintains that God i s non-temporal. Secondly, although God i s primor-
dial and thus i s given a unique standing, he i s nevertheless not the 
creator of the process of which he i s part. Creatio ex nihilo has no 
place in this philosophy, because God without a concrete universe 
could not be in a state of becoming; he would be static being, which 
has no reality. However, this does not undermine his status as in 
some sense the creator of the universe , as we shall now see. 
Whitehead variously develops his ideas from different points 
on the circumference of the closed system of his thought. I n Religion 
in the Making he chooses to analyse the actual, temporal universe into 
three formative elements 3 9 . F i r s t amongst these i s the absolute, 
creativity; there i s "the realm of ideal entities, or forms" which are 
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not actual themselves, but are exemplified in everything that i s actual; 
f inal ly, there i s , 
"the actual but non-temporal entity whereby the indetermi-
nation of mere creativity i s transmuted into a determinate 
freedom. This non-temporal actual entity i s what men call 
God."** 
I n this description we can see how God may be understood as creator. 
The underlying idea seems to be that pure creativity i s utterly 
chaotic, a constant riot of opposing possibilities which stymie one 
another. God i s that entity which, at every point, imposes an order 
on creation by making concrete one outcome in the process: 
"The definite determination which imposes ordered balance 
on the world requires an actual entity imposing its own 
unchanged consistency of character on every phase." 4 1 
The elementary events of this process are known as the 
actual occasions, which are the transitory individual creatures . Each 
actual occasion brings together a knowledge (or "prehension") of all 
the previous actual occasions in varying degree, the ideal forms, and 
God; it forges these by "concrescence" into a new actuality and 
thereby itself i s now prehended by following actual occasions. When 
we experience the world, we do not observe the actual occasions 
directly, but rather "enduring individuals". These are societies of 
actual occasions whose prehensions of each another are dominant. 
They therefore take on characterist ics that endure through a temporal 
progression. Thus , for instance, an electron, rock or person is each 
an enduring individual, with increasingly complex s tructures of pre -
hension. 
Whitehead points out that the system he has constructed i s 
at this point deterministic. I t i s the presence of evi l in the world 
which demands its further development, in particular two of i ts prop-
erties. F i r s t , 
"the common character of all evi l i s that i ts realization in 
fact involves that there i s some concurrent realization of 
a purpose towards elimination. The purpose i s to secure 
the avoidance of evil . The fact of the instability of evi l 
i s the moral order in the world." 4 2 
Since God is non-temporal and consistent, then this instability cannot 
f ind its origin in him. Secondly, evi l i s conceived to be ultimately 
aesthetic, so that i t i s a measure of value. The example i s used of a 
man who has been degraded to the level of a hog: so far as the man 
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himself i s concerned, he becomes no more evil than is a hog, not as 
such an evil creature. The evi l lies in the comparison of what the 
man has become with what he could have been 4 3 . 
Combining these conceptions, God is the actual entity whose 
purpose i s to give the world value by the elimination of evi l . How-
ever, the actual occasions themselves have a degree of freedom s u f f i -
cient to thwart God's intention. This i s expressed by each actual 
occasion having a dipolar nature, mental and physical . Whilst the 
physical pole acts to prehend the other actual occasions and God's 
purpose for that occasion, 
"the mental pole introduces the subject as a determinant of 
i ts own concrescence." 4 4 
This mental pole i s negligible in all non-living individuals . Thus , only 
in the higher creatures i s there opportunity for God's intentions to be 
overridden, so that the "initial aim" provided by God does not become 
the "subjective aim" of the actual occasion. 
As has an actual occasion, God has a dipolar nature (although 
not equivalent to that envisaged by Hartshorne): his primordial nature 
corresponds to the mental pole, whilst his consequent nature c o r r e -
sponds to the physical . I t i s his primordial nature which contains all 
the wealth of possibilities for the actual world; whereas, 
"the consequent nature of God i s conscious; and it i s the 
realization of the actual world in the unity of his nature, 
and through the transformation of his wisdom." 4 5 
Wow we noted above that Whitehead understands God to be the chief 
exemplification of metaphysical principles, rather than an exception. 
The reason for this may be traced to the critique of traditional the-
ism, where the metaphysical dist inctness of the divine and created 
realities leads to unresolved tensions. Nevertheless, God and the 
actual world have something of a mirror-image relationship to one 
another in Whitehead's thought: 
"Neither God, nor the World, reaches static completion. 
Both are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, 
the creative advance into novelty. Either of them, God 
and the World, i s the instrument of novelty for the other. 
"In every respect God and the World move conversely to 
each other in respect to their process. God i s primor-
dially one, namely, He is the primordial unity of relevance 
of the many potential forms: in the process He acquires a 
consequent multiplicity, which the primordial character 
absorbs into i ts own unity. The World i s primordially 
many, namely, the many actual occasions with their p h y s i -
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cal fLnitude; in the process it acquires a consequent 
unity, which is a novel occasion and is absorbed into the 
multiplicity of the primordial character."*5 
John Cobb believes that Whitehead's treatment of God's pri-
mordial and consequent nature is a weak point of his formulation47. 
He suggests that often Whitehead gives little reason for affirming 
God's consequent nature, other than to complete the analogy with the 
physical pole of other actual entities. The real interest, Cobb writes, 
is in God's primordial nature acting as the principle of limitation upon 
creativity; this then tempts Whitehead unduly to separate the two 
natures and assign different functions to each, whereas any actual 
entity is an inseparable synthesis of the two. The underlying func-
tion of the consequent nature, according to Cobb's reading, is to 
enable God to take proper account of the world when presenting the 
ideally-suited initial aim to each actual occasion. 
However, Cobb here appears to miss a further factor in God's 
consequent nature which Whitehead emphasises: 
"In it there is no loss, no obstruction. The world is felt 
in a unison of immediacy... 
"The consequent nature of God is his judgment on the 
world. He saves the world as it passes into the immediacy 
of his own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness which 
loses nothing that can be saved." 4 8 
It is this notion of the immediacy of the world's life preserved in God 
which appears to play a major part in Whitehead's religious motivation. 
Let us now complete our survey of Whitehead by considering a little 
further this religious conception. 
Whitehead is haunted by the fleetingness implied by a world 
of constant process; indeed, he acknowledges that the desire for per-
manence exhibited by Greek metaphysics is not to be denigrated 4 9. 
As we pass through our temporal existence, we experience a "perpet-
ual perishing" whereby the immediate present is lost to us, which 
Whitehead refers to as the "ultimate evil" 5 0. The consequent nature 
of God is therefore important in Whitehead's notion of "objective 
immortality". Just as, to some degree, every actual occasion prehends 
all its predecessors, so God in his consequent nature perfectly pre-
hends every actual occasion which then enters into God's life and 
becomes "a living, ever-present fact." 5 1 The reciprocal nature of 
divine and creaturely existence then means that this actuality in God 
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passes back into the world. Whitehead summarises his whole concep-
tion into four phases of the actualization of the universe: 
"There is f irst the phase of conceptual origination, defi-
cient in actuality... Secondly, there is the temporal phase 
of physical origination, with its multiplicity of actualities... 
Thirdly, there is the phase of perfected actuality, in 
which the many are one everlastingly... In everlasting-
ness, immediacy is reconciled with objective immortality... 
In the fourth phase, the creative action completes itself. 
For the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal 
world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actu-
ality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experi-
ence. For the kingdom of heaven is with us today. The 
action of the fourth phase is the love of God for the 
world. It is the particular providence for particular 
occasions... the love in the world passes into the love in 
heaven, and floods back again into the world. In this 
sense, God is the great companion - the fellow-sufferer 
who understands." 5 2 
Elsewhere, Whitehead writes, "God is not the world, but the valuation 
of the world."5 3 Thus the picture presented seems to be of God as 
that entity who so orders creativity that a world may be actualized. 
This is not a deterministic world and so it has a value attached to it 
which is contingent. God is also the measure of this value and pre-
sents the world with the opportunity to increase its value, through 
God's nature as love. It is also God who secures this value by its 
concretion in his own consequent nature. 
Such is the outline of Whitehead's proposals. Are they help-
ful in our quest for a conception of God's action in the world which is 
plausible in our modern age? In their evaluation, three questions 
present themselves. Can God truly be said to act in this system? Is 
the conception of God's action consistent with our understanding of 
the world? And is the conception of God properly Christian? 
Considering the first of these three of questions, we recall 
that a weakness of Hartshorne's development of process thought is his 
abstract notion of God as final and efficient cause. Thus he acts 
merely by being recognised in his metaphysical function as having the 
character of love. If we go with the grain of the world, so to say, 
then we should love too; but God seems to act as a cause in the 
absence of any specific intentions. The origin of this abstract nature 
of cause was in the dipolar construction of the theology. This, how-
ever, is not a feature of Whitehead's thought: the primordial and 
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consequent natures of God enter the description in a different way. 
God is involved as an actual entity in the concretion of an actual 
occasion, and therefore he is not purely abstract in his action. We 
have noted that the mental pole of the occasion can disregard this 
action and select a different subjective aim; but that is not to invali-
date our counting God's input as an action. God has an intention for 
each occasion in his presentation of its initial aim, and surely inten-
tion is of the essence of action. 
We consider next, therefore, whether we can accept this 
notion of divine action in the light of modern science. Here the ques-
tion arises of process theology's acceptance of panpsychism. Pailin 
suggests that a process view does not of itself require such an 
attachment54 (indeed, Ogden does not accept it, for instance), but it is 
apparently needed in Whitehead's system to allow the atomic actual 
occasions a degree of autonomy from God's diktat. However, pan-
psychism need not be a major problem from the point of view of 
science. We have already noted that it is only higher entities in 
which the mental pole becomes active: in other words, it is those enti-
ties with a complex structure. But, as we have seen in chapter five, 
the idea that mind may be an emergent property of an increasingly 
complex system is not itself foreign to science. If panpsychism is a 
metaphysical proposal, however much it might seem against common 
sense, it is probably safe from scientific attack. 
It must be admitted that the whole conception of actual occa-
sions can seem impenetrably mysterious, including their prehension of 
one another. Again, however, modern science's view of the world is 
not inimical to such a metaphysic. The subatomic nature of reality is 
felt to be mysterious by working physicists and paradoxes of quantum 
mechanical action at a distance, for example, are the subject of con-
temporary research. 
Thus we find no fatal flaw in Whitehead's conception of the 
manner of God's interaction with the world. It allows for the freedom 
and self-determination of the world we experience, whilst giving a 
consistent means of God's influence within it. 
So we come to the final question: is Whitehead's theology a 
sufficient representation of Christianity? As with Hartshorne, its 
qualification is defended with an appeal to love. Thus, Whitehead 
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writes of the "Galilean origin" of the Christian tradition which, 
"dwells upon the tender elements in the world, which 
slowly and in quietness operate by love; and it finds pur-
pose in the present immediacy of a kingdom not of this 
world. Love neither rules, nor is it unmoved; also it is a 
little oblivious as to morals. It does not look to the 
future; for it finds its own reward in the immediate pre-
sent."55 
In Hartshorne's theology, God's love seemed to be reduced to the con-
viction that God is fully related to the world. Whitehead, however, 
seems to allow love a more active role in influencing the course of the 
world's development through God's provision of initial aims, and it is 
through love that the world finds its value. God's action is the evo-
cation of a response from his creatures, through the lure of love 
incarnate within them. This is recognizably Christian. 
Yet Christianity is more than the belief that God is love. In 
its traditional forms, God does more than look on from the sidelines 
and encourages us in his purposes. He acts decisively to save us 
from ourselves; his purposes cannot ultimately be defeated. As Ian 
Barbour writes in an otherwise positive assessment of process 
theology, 
"one wonders whether Whitehead's God is too powerless to 
inspire worship. Perhaps in addition to the "persuasive" 
aspects of God there are more active and authoritative 
aspects, to which the sense of inescapable judgment and 
overwhelming awe in religious experience testify." 5 6 
We may feel that, as with any systematization, too much of the reli-
gious tradition is omitted from this theology. It is beyond the scope 
of this work to decide that question. Positively, however, what we 
have found in process theology is a technique which successfully 
overcomes many of the problems of relating a transcendent God to his 
creation. If conceiving of God's action in the world is taken to be a 
core problem of modern theology, then this success should motivate 
further investigation into process theology's possible consonance with 
a wider Christian tradition. 
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The objective of our investigation has been to find a model, 
or class of models, of divine interaction with creation which does not 
violate our scientific understanding of the world. The scientific 
understanding in question, we argued in chapter three, should be 
critically realist. That is, on the one hand, the world exists whether 
or not it is being observed and therefore is more than the sum of 
human experience of it. The physical laws revealed by science are 
taken to relate meaningfully to that world, so that theoretical terms 
such as "electron" have a counterpart in reality. But on the other 
hand, our knowledge is not perfect and is always open to correction. 
As in any human endeavour, our beliefs are founded upon the full 
spectrum of experience and rational enquiry, and they are never 
beyond doubt. Thus we can never simply identify the reality we 
observe with our present scientific theory. Nevertheless, this under-
standing of science requires that any proposed mode of God's interac-
tion with the physical universe should be consonant with it, or other-
wise that it should be explicitly recognized that the interaction 
involves a violation of the natural order. 
In fact, no modern theologian with whom we have dealt has 
proposed that God's action should in every case be understood to 
involve an explicit violation of physical law (even should miracles be 
countenanced on occasion). That surely reveals a sound instinct. For 
Christianity has generally taken a high view of the doctrine of cre-
ation. Creation is that which in a measure stands apart from God and 
which God himself has seen to be very good (Genesis 1:1-2:4). If, in 
order to interact with it, God must in some way undermine those very 
laws with which he has chosen to order creation, then this would seem 
to place under question the perfection of God's creative. To put the 
matter simply, is it worthy of an omnipotent and wise God to create a 
universe whose laws he himself must violate in every one of his 
actions? The problems are compounded if physical laws are not seen 
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as a type of external constraint upon the behaviour of matter, but 
part of matter's essence. For example, we might identify exclusively 
the essence of an electron as being behaviour in accordance with cer-
tain physical laws. In that case, for God to intervene to suspend 
those laws would entail the destruction of creation itself. 
Having discounted such a model of divine action, we are left 
with four other types of solution to the problem of God's action. Let 
us term these the types of independence, determinism, scientific open-
ness and modified metaphysics. 
The type of independence includes those models of divine 
action which affirm both that science is valid and complete in its 
appropriate sphere and also that science is of no direct relevance to 
the conceptualization of God's interaction. Examples of such models 
which we have examined are secondary causation (although we argued 
that this assumes compatibilism; it therefore might more properly 
belong to the type of determinism); Farrer's double agency; Bultmann's 
existentialist account; and Miles' understanding of the creation as 
being a single act of God. However, we found that none of these 
models was satisfactory. 
In the case of double agency, the analogy of action used was 
too stretched to be anything more than a restatement in different 
terms of the problem of how God could make use of the worldly web 
of causation to enact his own purposes. Farrer himself, as we saw, 
was content that the "causal joint" between the creator and the cre-
ation should remain obscure. To the extent that our experience of 
God's action will for ever be beyond our powers of full explanation, 
this contentment might be laudable. But it does not advance a solu-
tion to the problem with which deism, liberalism and the present age 
of theology have grappled. It is a proposal that the problem is insol-
uble. 
The models of divine action forwarded by Bultmann and Wiles 
derive from different presumptions. Bultmann is part of that tradition 
which seeks the validation of religion not through the truths of his-
tory, but the grace of inward faith. Wiles is more concerned with 
questions of God's justice and the problem of evil in the world around 
us. Nevertheless, from their differing starting points, both have God 
operating in a mentalistic sphere putatively independent of the world 
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of science. Each encounters the same problem, for the basic form of 
divine action is then an interaction between God and the human con-
sciousness, although this is more clear with Bultmann than with Wiles. 
Ultimately, therefore, both models depend for their coherence on the 
validity of human consciousness being divorced from the constraints 
of physical causation, if their independence from scientific claims is to 
be maintained. Wow it may prove to be the case that human con-
sciousness is indeed independent of the physical structure of the 
brain, but this would be a scientific question, any notion that such a 
model is independent of science in all circumstances is therefore 
invalidated. An alternative would be to maintain a Cartesian dualism, 
but neither Bultmann nor Wiles claims such. 
There is thus no successful example of a model of divine 
action which is entirely careless of scientific findings. Furthermore, 
it would seem unlikely that such a model could exist, for we are alto-
gether too enmeshed in the causal nexus around us. However, this 
type of model shades into the type of determinism in which all that 
occurs in creation is by the direct warrant of God. This could be in 
accord with physical law: clearly there is no disagreement with those 
processes which are deterministic; in those processes of a probabilistic 
nature, God would be an unseen hand. From the question we have set 
ourselves in this thesis, theological determinism must seem to count as 
a model of divine action which does not violate physical law. 
Yet a number of issues combine to lessen determinism's 
attractiveness, as discussed in chapter four. Foremost, of course, is 
the acceptability of theological determinism in the f irst place. This is 
a subject we have placed beyond the scope of this thesis, but it has 
clear implications for human responsibility and God's responsibility for 
evil actions in the world. As we noted, Paul Helm, who makes a 
strong defence of theological determinism, accepts that there are real 
weaknesses in this area. However, these are not sufficient for us 
completely to reject the possibility of theological determinism. 
Nevertheless, there is cause to reject theological determinism 
when combined with a mechanically deterministic view of creation. In 
this case, problems relate to revelation in particular. Calvin perceived 
the need in his deterministic system for revelations of God's intention 
to be marked in some unspecified way, so that their genuineness could 
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be assured. If the world were mechanically deterministic, such marks 
could not be produced, since anything which happened could be 
deduced from natural causes alone. The only other possibility would 
be for some miracle to occur. But now, not only would mechanical 
determinism have been violated (calling into question the perfection of 
God's own creation), but problems of verifying miracles would arise. 
Although such a view of affairs is not impossible to countenance, it is 
at the least inelegant to imagine God's interaction with his creation 
happening solely through the device of miracle. 
It would seem that theological determinism is best combined 
with a view of science that is not itself strictly deterministic. As we 
have seen, this itself accords well enough with a modern scientific 
outlook, although it is by no means proved that science has indeter-
ministic elements. Thus, for instance, quantum theory has both deter-
ministic and in deterministic elements combined in a rather ad hoc and 
unsatisfactory manner. It is fair to say that any resolution of the 
theory's problems is expected to retain the in deter ministic element, 
but strictly speaking this remains an open question. Be that as it 
may, the combination of theological determinism and scientific indeter-
minism itself gives rise to problems. Neglecting the ever-present 
question of human responsibility, this view would commit us to the 
belief that the probabilistic outcomes of events which science properly 
predicts are in fact determined from eternity by God. But would 
there not here be an element of deception on the part of God? The 
probabilistic laws which the scientist rightly observes to delineate 
in deter ministic phenomena would in reality be illusory. It seems that 
the God of truth would have misled us. 
Deterministic models of God's action thus have various diffi-
culties with which to deal. Nevertheless, it may be that none of these 
is insuperable. And, interestingly, we observed that this type of 
model allows God to be tunelessly eternal; we suggested that timeless 
eternity may itself be congenial to modern physics. 
The third type of model of divine action we have termed that 
of scientific openness. The type is characterized by a rejection of 
determinism, but a conviction that the world described by science is 
now complex and open enough to allow us to begin to conceive God's 
direct interaction with it. These models were investigated in chapters 
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five and six in their two major aspects. 
First, much is made of anti-reductionism= There is an 
increasing recognition that the language and concepts appropriate, 
say, to fundamental particle physics cannot be assumed to be appro-
priate for systems composed of those particles. The behaviour of a 
herd of cattle is not to be understood merely in the same way as the 
behaviour of the particles out of which they are composed. It is sug-
gested that the same may be particularly true of the relationship of 
mind and brain. Thus one may propose that God does not interact 
with the lowest levels of creation (whose interactions are limited by 
the simplicities of physical law), but can be conceived to interact with 
the higher levels. 
Unfortunately, this hope cannot be realized. Anti-
reductionism, we argued, is motivated by a rejection of dualism. Thus 
it is unwise to suppose that a dualistic interaction with God can be 
introduced via its use. Rather, anti-reductionism is making claims 
about the manner in which a complex system is to be described, 
although still founded upon a physical base in the most common 
understanding. Because such a system might not be comprehended by 
simple physical laws, it does not follow that ontologically it is open to 
non-physical interactions. There is but one reality and that reality 
remains physical, however different from lower-level systems it might 
appear. 
The second aspect of these models of divine action is their 
appeal to the new vistas of science opened in recent years. Instead 
of an inert view of matter, capable only of being moulded by external 
forces, the view is gaining ground which understands matter to be 
energetic and fruitful, always exploring new possibilities without being 
constrained deterministically. No longer, it is claimed, need there be 
any barrier placed between animate and inanimate matter, for the one 
becomes the other quite naturally. And if the creation is so friendly 
to life and consciousness, then perhaps it is open to God's interaction. 
In the work especially of Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne we 
examined some of the proposed ways in which this might be so. 
Yet we concluded that this approach will fail. It is stymied 
by a fundamental contradiction between the desire to allow science to 
be fully autonomous and self-sufficient, whilst attempting to include 
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an interaction with a reality beyond the created universe. Some 
"causal joint" is required between the two realities, but science can-
not know of any such joint without ipso facto including it within 
science's province. God could only interact with creation in such a 
way by himself becoming a cause alongside other regular causes and 
so part of the physical universe; he would also become a cause in 
principle capable of scientific investigation, which would hardly be 
welcome. God cannot interact with his creation in a way describable 
by science. 
The final type of model of divine interaction we have termed 
that of modified metaphysics. The other types each left the under-
standing of science untouched, assuming it to be a given in under-
standing divine action. In this final case, however, some modification 
of science is envisaged, but not such as to allow any alteration of the 
results of scientific research. Rather, the underlying metaphysics are 
altered and it is at that level that God's activity is then introduced. 
The example of this approach we have examined is process theology, in 
which we found both an advantage and a disadvantage. 
Positively, process theology appears to give us a coherent 
framework which incorporates both the autonomy of science and the 
immanent activity of God. The divine action is constituted largely by 
an inner final cause in creation, urging an advance towards the val-
ues realized by love. Such a final cause is not detectable by science, 
because it is effective within events rather than upon events. F u r -
ther, it is only nascent within the lower levels of creation such as 
electrons and rocks. Thus these entities fully obey physical laws. It 
is only when levels of consciousness are reached that the lure of 
divine love becomes effective. But at the level of consciousness, the 
appropriate science is psychology and sociology and there is nothing 
contradictory in supposing that these sciences may in principle detect 
a bias in human society towards something we might describe as love. 
Negatively, however, the God of process theology and that of 
traditional Christianity are clearly not identical. Process theology 
understands God to become real only through the process of creation 
(which he himself did not create); neither is God omnipotent. Notions 
of God's mighty arm, of his power to save and his glorious majesty 
find no home in this theology. In fact, the charge that process 
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theology's God is a weakling might not be without substance. Perhaps 
attempts to modify our metaphysics, under the constraint that science 
should be preserved, will always result in a weakened understanding 
of God. 
With what, then, are we left? Of the four types of models of 
divine action, we argued that two were unsustainable: the types of 
independence and scientific openness. God's action cannot be under-
stood in complete independence from science; attempts to incorporate a 
transcendent God's activity in his creation in scientific terms will also 
fail. The two remaining options are some version of determinism and 
some version of process theology. 
Each of these two types of model have their weaknesses, as 
we have seen. Determinism tends to diminish human responsibility and 
may also render the whole of scientific enquiry a charade. Process 
theology etiolates Christianity into something seemingly less than full 
blooded. In terms of maintaining a strong view of science, which may 
be what is demanded by our modern age, then process theology is 
more successful. In any case, its technique of modifying the underly-
ing metaphysic appears to be fruitful. But, as we have previously 
emphasised, different theological models will each have their strengths 
and weaknesses. In their broader consideration, it is a matter of 
judgment which of these four types of model is preferable. 
In the debate about science and religion, it is interesting 
that two of the most important foundational areas remain unclear. 
First, the limits of science are not known. Of course, this is likely to 
remain the case, but in particular brain science is only in its infancy. 
In trying to understand things of the spirit, we do not even yet 
agree whether it may be possible for science to comprehend con-
sciousness. Secondly, in theology, the breadth of debate emphasises a 
lack of consensus on what is actually required of divine interaction. 
At present, the spectrum extends from deists content to know only 
that God cared enough to make his creation, to those whose religion 
sees God intimately ordering every aspect of their lives. In these 
circumstances, agreement will be hard to reach on the success of any 
one model of divine action in the light of science. 
Nevertheless, theology has always involved the mutual reflec-
tion upon our experience of God and of the universe. The question of 
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models of divine action is part of that debate and surely it wiH also 
form part of its clarification in our modern age. 
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